YASUMASA KURODA

REED TOWN, JAPAN

A STUDY IN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE

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The University Press of Hawaii

Honolulu

Open Access edition funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities / Andrew W. Mellon Foundation *Humanities Open Book Program*.

Open Access ISBNs:
9780824879143 (PDF)
9780824879150 (EPUB)
This version created: 17 May, 2019

To Alice

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Foreword

This is an admirable book about the political processes of a Japanese town. It is admirable from many points of view. First of all it is a courageous work. Professor Kuroda undertook as an independent scholar with minimal resources a study of a kind usually undertaken by a team of investigators with large funds. Even more importantly, Professor Kuroda acted with persistence in following his feeling that it would be worthwhile to study a local community in a relatively centralized or unitary national system of government and politics. Despite the skepticism of many of his colleagues, who doubted whether a dependent Japanese town could be conceived to have a "power structure" or whether it could be studied by empirical research methods used at other levels of analysis in Japan and for community politics studies elsewhere, Professor Kuroda confounded the skeptics.

The result is a community study that in its own right illuminates various facets of political change and dynamics even in Japanese national life, and points out various fruitful directions for further studies of Japanese town and urban politics.

This study is admirable also because it is concerned with understanding how and why citizens in a local community in a relatively unitary system are, in fact, more concerned with political processes and events at the local than at higher levels of government. Few studies of local political power anywhere have integrated in their frameworks attention to ordinary citizens as well as leaders, as this study of Reed Town has done. In such a search for understanding, the author combines modern, quantitative research methods with imaginative constructs and sensitive interpretation. Clearly, he does not fall into the trap that has caught so many modern political and social scientists: the belief that the facts speak for themselves. There are no facts without interpretation.

Let me comment only on one specific feature of political life to which Professor Kuroda calls attention. In his analysis of the political culture which can help give meaning to a community's politics and power structure, he refers to "collectivity orientation." Some years ago in my own studies of American community power structures, the conception of the community as a collectivity was identified as an important component of political ideology. But it characterized only a small sector, primarily at the leadership level, of the citizens. Professor Kuroda points to the importance of change in this and other factors at the community level as being helpful in understanding political change and strain in Japanese politics in the nation at large.

In our American power structure studies, moreover, collectivity orientations not only characterized a much smaller portion of the citizenry than in Japanese communities but they existed in a generally more individualistic ideological and institutional matrix of American politics, which makes their meanings appear very different in the two cultures. Intriguing and important questions are raised in and by the Reed Town study. For example, what is happening to collectivity orientations, to the political culture generally, and to community-national power structures in Japan in the light of the twin processes of urban growth and metropolitanization on the one hand, and apparently increasing "rationalization" through further centralization of governmental authority on the other?

Of equal importance to non-Japanese social scientists are questions about their own political processes and trends. Is there, for example, more of a collectivity orientation and a kind of conservative organismic sociopolitical fabric, as some analysts have speculated, in Canada than in the United States? Are the increasingly swift metropolitanization and post-industrial scientific-technological trends ripping such a Canadian fabric, and are such processes contributing to the increasing political conflicts and breakdowns of American cities? Is there increasing change in the power structures of American cities, and how do such events compare to what is happening in Japanese cities?

This foreword ends with a plea that such questions about North American politics be studied more fully by and with the assistance of Japanese and other non-Western scholars. Professor Kuroda's own biculturalism has, I imagine, contributed to the insightfulness of his study. It would be most useful to reverse the usual trend of Western, particularly American, scholars studying Japanese politics and have Japanese scholars

doing research into American community power structures. I would hope that the good suggestions made by Professor Kuroda for further, larger-scale research into Japanese community politics and power structures are taken up but also turned into proposals and projects of a truly cross-national comparative community—and national—political systems character. Unless the initiative and leadership for such comparative research come from Japanese scholars, the cultural biases and parochialism of American students of power structures are likely to minimize the intellectual values for them even of such creative, multifaceted studies of a Japanese community as the one reported in the following pages by Professor Kuroda.

ROBERT E. AGGER
Professor of Political Science
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

Preface

The entrenched field of local government in the political science discipline in the 1950s was impelled to move forward as a result of the provocative and creative work of Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure.* His pioneering study was instrumental in stimulating many political scientists and sociologists because of his methodology and conclusions. Scoble (1957, 1961) pioneered an alternative approach to the study of community power structure. Dahl (1961) reacted to the challenge by developing further the decision-making approach and by offering a conclusion different from that of Hunter. Many other works on power structure followed. A significant advance toward the building of comparative community power structure theories was made when Agger and his associates published *The Rulers and the Ruled* in 1964. Their models of analysis go beyond the usual "elitists vs. pluralists" argument with which both political scientists and sociologists appeared to have been obsessed in the first decade since the publication of Hunter's now classic work. Agger et al. introduced different dimensions into the study of community power structure. Their work is theoretical in purpose, comparative and longitudinal in scope, and scientific in method. Their study obliterated many impediments of earlier works on community power structure analysis.

The present work is written for the dual purpose of developing a theory of community power structure and political change and of understanding and describing Reed Town's politics. Those who have interest in the theory-building will probably find chapters 1 and 2 and other theoretical and methodological parts of the book most stimulating, whereas area specialists on Japan may find the theoretical and methodological details of the book at times difficult to understand. Furthermore, there may be some whose chief concern is with the use of American-made methods on a foreign soil Then, there are

sociologists and political scientists whose primary concern lies in community politics. Because of the widely different readers to whom the book is addressed and because of the fact that I am a marginal product of the American and Japanese cultures, I have made conscious efforts to explain everything in detail in order to obviate the danger of being misunderstood.

Materials gathered for this book are derived from my field trip to Japan in 1963, which was made possible through a Rockefeller Foundation grant I received from the University of Denver. Subsequently, the ACLS and SSRC Joint Committee on East Asian Studies provided me with further financial assistance in 1966 which enabled me to complete the book. I am also indebted to the following individuals for their assistance at various stages of completing the book: Robert E. Agger, Terry N. Clark, Eugene C. Erickson, Marshall N. Goldstein, Miriam Gould, Alice K. Kuroda, Mitzi A. Loftus, Harry Scoble, and Charles Wall. I wish to thank them without burdening them with any responsibility for possible errors contained herein. Furthermore, I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs. Freda Hellinger and others at the Social Science Research Institute and the Department of Political Science of the University of Hawaii who patiently and competently typed my manuscript and all the tables. Thanks are also due all Reed Town residents who made the survey of 1963 possible.

1
Introduction

THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY

Floyd Hunter (1953), employing a new systematic methodology, studied Atlanta, Georgia, and came to a challenging conclusion: that the city was run by the power elite. This provocative study, in terms of its new methodology as well as its substantive findings, led many sociologists and political scientists to study community power structure throughout the United States and even abroad. A decade later, Jennings (1964) replicated Hunter's study in the same city and concluded that he could not find the kind of power elite structure in Atlanta of which Hunter spoke earlier. [1] Dahl (1961), on the other hand, using an alternative to Hunter's reputational technique, found New Haven to be a pluralistic democratic community. Agger and his associates (1964) contributed to the growing literature through the publication of an elaborate comparative analysis of four community power structure studies over a period of time. There are numerous reports of community power structure studies in both political science and sociology journals and books today. And yet, only a few community power studies have been made outside the United States. Although many questions remain unanswered, one of the most crucial ones waiting to be at least explored is the question of to what extent and in what ways cultural and institutional factors in American communities account for many of the findings about community power structure in the United States.

To answer and explore such a question, we political scientists and sociologists need comparative data from as many parts of the world as possible. Those who have studied non-North American communities through the use of modern research techniques have reported their findings in articles (e.g.,

The New Atlantis, 1970), but thus far only two books on non-American community power structure have been published (Akimoto 1971; Miller 1970). [2] Now this study is about community power structure and political change; it is based upon a systematic empirical survey of a community referred to as Reed Town, Japan, which is located very close to the largest city in the world today, Tokyo. Reed Town is a fictitious name given to this town. Over a dozen articles dealing with other aspects of the same town have been published. Only hitherto unpublished findings are presented in this book, however.

Several pioneering community studies have been carried out in Japan by non-Japanese researchers (e.g., Beardsley et al. 1959; Dore 1958; Embree 1964). Although they approached their studies largely from an anthropological perspective, their efforts provide us with insights into community political life in Japan. [3] Steiner's (1965) comprehensive and definitive work on local government in Japan signified another step toward a better understanding of Japanese local politics. Perhaps now is the time to approach the study of Japanese community politics in a more scientific and comparative perspective.

There are a few community power structure studies being conducted by Japanese sociologists which will be reported in chapter 2. However, their findings are reported in the Japanese language, making it nearly impossible for American political scientists and sociologists to incorporate their Japanese colleagues' findings into their own efforts toward the building of better theories to explain community power structure in a wider perspective.

Thus, the present study is an attempt to fill this research gap that exists in the literature today. [4] Furthermore, it is not simply a study of another community power structure in the sense that it employs new techniques to supplement the study of community power structure in the tradition developed in the past twenty years. *It is designed also to place the study of community power structure within a nation-state* and attempts to analyze the community power structure within a particular nation going through a particular kind of political change at the time of my survey in 1963. It is now clear, then, that the present study is a scientific attempt to work toward the *development of theories of community power struc ture in cross-cultural scope.*

THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

Political scientists are interested in what a government does and what people do to affect government activities—politics. Here, I am concerned with the question of what a local government does and why it behaves the way it does. [5]

"Government" is defined here as a policy-making organization for members of a social system, through which a legitimate monopoly of physical force is maintained over individuals and groups within a society, and through which effective policies are selected and effective decisions made for a society (Hill and Kuroda 1963). "Politics" is a word used rather frequently for a multitude of phenomena (Alker 1965:13–16; Milbrath 1965:1–2). Agger et al. (1964:1) define it as "apsects of life in which certain people act to maintain or to shift the patterns of action of government officials." Politics as defined in this study includes not only people's actions to influence the scope of government activities but also the behavior of government officials in their dealings with the people. Thus, for example, a mayor's plea to maintain peace and order, transmitted by mass media, and a Black revolt against the status quo in a metropolitan area are both considered to be politics or political behavior. Political participation is action designed to affect policies.

When politics is defined in this way the government is considered as both a necessary and sufficient condition for politics to emerge in a society. A power struggle may exist between any two individuals, but in order for such an interaction to be considered as politics in the present study, its outcome must in some way affect the scope of government activity.

Patterns of political behavior as described above, within an analytically distinguishable boundary, then, compose a "political system." And when one speaks of a "community power structure" one includes not only a government structure but also all those relevant patterns of political participation that affect the scope of government activities. I am here concerned with such a power structure at the community level, which is bound together by some legal means within a nation-state. "Community politics" thus refers to political behavior or politics which centers around the lowest level of government recognized by a national government.

The preceding definitions of the basic terms definitely suggest that *this is not a study of local government as such but, rather, a more inclusive study of community power structure.* Now a question might be raised as to the reasons for choosing community-level politics over national politics, which obviously is more important in the sense that it affects more people in a wider area of their activities.

Aristotle regarded the community as the instrument for the goal-realization of an individual ethical self. Bentley (1908) viewed local government as the web of group struggle. Long (1958) saw it as an "ecology of games." And more recently Agger et al. (1964) thought of it as a laboratory for political scientists. I shall consider it as the lowest level of the governing process found in a society and the primary object of my inquiry in this book.

Why study the lowest level of the governing process? Studying politics at the community level may not be as important as studying a national government. Yet, in many ways, this level is a strategic one on which to begin the study of politics. First, access to data is relatively easy and open, whereas such is not the case if one wishes to study a national power structure. Second, although a local government is related to a prefectural or regional government of some sort, as well as to the national government, its functions are more limited than those of government at higher levels. Thus, it is possible to study local government activities in their entirety rather than only in limited aspects. Third, the existence of abundant literature on American community power structure today makes it possible to compare my study with others made particularly in the United States.

What differentiates my research from other studies in the field then? The next section provides an answer and points out the scope and some of the features of this study of Reed Town, Japan.

COMMUNITY POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The legion of community power structure studies which have thus far been conducted are by and large limited to the United States. The few exceptions include: D'Antonio et al. (1961); Form and D'Antonio (1959); Hoskin (1967); Klapp and Padgett (1960); Kuroda (1965d); Miller (1958a, 1958b, 1965, 1970);

Miller et al. (1964); and *The New Atlantis* (1970). This book is an extension of these studies. However, another dimension will be added to this comparative analysis by examining the relationship between different levels of politics. In what way does local politics relate to the politics of a nation-state? Furthermore, I shall delve into an examination of the relationship between the citizenry and the power structure and not simply make an analysis of the power structure alone. And, lastly, what distinguishes this work from many similar studies is an attempt to relate community power structure to changes at both the local and the national levels of politics.

The question of who rules or what a government does in North American communities has been scrutinized in a nation where the political culture espouses democratic ideals with a zeal and uniformity matched only by that found in totalitarian political cultures. The few brief studies made outside the United States, such as ones conducted in England and Mexico, do not explicitly examine the possible effects of the political culture on the community political systems. This study, among other things, attempts to assess the possible effects of the political culture upon the community political system. Also, thought will be given to the possible influence of the difference in forms of government upon community power structure. Japan operates under a unitary form of government, whereas the United States has a federal form of government. Thus, in making a cross-cultural comparison of the present study with studies conducted in the United States, the difference between Japan and the United States, derived from both the political culture and the formal government structure, must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the difficulty of cross-cultural comparison includes the isolation of these two variables from other independent variables which may affect the community power structure—such variables as the size of the community under investigation, its economic basis, its demographic structure, and the strength of each party. Needless to say, the different approaches employed by various authors in ascertaining the power structure also make it difficult to make cross-cultural comparisons of my data with the existing literature.

Despite the difficulties involved in a cross-cultural work of this nature, attempts will be made to generate hypotheses by isolating cultural and structural factors affecting the decision-making process at the local level in Reed Town. Chapter 3 on the research site includes a section on the Japanese political

culture and formal government structure which is designed to give the reader a contextual basis for understanding the power structure in Reed Town.

Another relevant structural variable to be included in this study is its *attempt to explain, in a limited way, community decision-making by link ing the local level of politics with that of the nation.* In politics at different levels—community, prefecture, nation, and world—actors as well as spectators differ in their orientation to politics. Community power structure analysis has neglected the relationship between national and local politics with but few exceptions (e.g., Hunter 1959; Vidich and Bensman 1958). Aside from the question of the "pork barrel," there are many questions deriving from the relationship between different levels of politics which can be raised to help explain the kinds of political change a nation such as Japan is going through. For this purpose, several models of political change are proposed and tested at both levels of politics.

Students of community power structure, with the few notable exceptions of Agger et al. (1964), Presthus (1964), and Wildavsky (1964), have neglected to pay serious attention to the masses of people to any significant extent. Many are simply concerned with the size of the room at the top or the number of different rooms at the top, and not with the huge room at the bottom or rooms anywhere between the top and the bottom. The models introduced in chapter 2 will consider the community as a whole and will attempt to examine the relationship between the masses and their leaders in a systematic manner, so as to provide some explanation of the community power structure encompassing the entire community, and not simply the top power structure, and some explanation of the political change taking place in Reed Town as well as elsewhere.

POLITICAL CHANGE

Whether we are students of Eastern political thought or of Western, we have all learned that Aristotle and Confucius, to name only two great thinkers, were very much concerned with political change in their pursuit of an ideal state. Confucius felt that written laws cannot adequately bring about good government. Rather, he was of the opinion that all children should be politically socialized in the Confucian way, so as to internalize basic social values to the extent that there will be no need for numerous written laws to control human conduct. The most

important value of his system was what is referred to in Chinese as *jen,* which literally means the relationship between men. The *jen* could be love, indifference, or anger—whatever emotion is most appropriate to a particular situation. What is of interest here, however, is the fact that his concept of the Mandate of Heaven facilitated the political changes that took place in China over the ages. [6] The Japanese accepted parts of Confucian philosophy but not the Mandate of Heaven, which would have run counter to their concept of the emperor. Those who desired political change in Japan had to bring about their goals within the framework of the traditional emperor system. Thus, a number of shogunates arose, each legitimizing its military rule in the name of the emperor. [7] There always seem to be some right ways to induce change in a society, as well as many wrong ways. A democracy in the West allows limited alternatives by which its citizens can bring about desired changes.

How does one go about understanding the process of political change? Not only were ancient political theorists interested in the study of political change, but contemporary political scientists also find it an intriguing subject. [8] An interest in political change may stem from three different causes, however. First, some political scientists may be interested in political change as a natural experiment which can be used to test hypotheses. Second, some may become concerned with political change because of their disillusionment with the status quo. Third, there are those political scientists who are interested in political change solely as it adversely affects systematic stability in such countries as Japan and the United States. Before we go any further it might be best to define what is meant by political change.

Political change is an alteration over a period of time in any aspect of a political system. Change may take place in input functions and be followed by changes in output functions or vice versa. A prescription for basic political change is incomplete without allowance for alterations, as, for example, in the process of political socialization. Mao showed his concern over the establishment of communes in China as early as the late 1930s. Castro's revolution was followed by a rapid increase in the number of schools built for children of all social classes. The Egyptian bloodless revolution in 1951 was followed by the extensive installation of radios in the villages. The Kennedy-Johnson poverty program also provided for special projects for the youngsters of poor family backgrounds, such as the Head Start program. Poverty cannot be eliminated unless young

children in poor families can acquire a set of values different from those of their parents. This value acquisition should take place early enough in life to be securely internalized as the children grow up. In the case of Japan, the Allied occupation brought about many changes in the school system in order to cut off military and jingoistic traditions.

The concept of political change, as defined here, says nothing about direction such as is implied by the terms "development" or "modernization" now in vogue. Furthermore, the concept of political change should not be confused with the stability-instability concept. A political system can be rapidly changing yet remain quite stable. Conversely, in some nations the problem is that the government continues to be very unstable while no basic political changes take place.

Political change can be discussed in various ways for many different purposes. An attempt is made here to elaborate on my definition of political change so as to locate a particular interest within the totality of political change. In attempting to measure any political change, it appears to be most useful to consider five different aspects of it: the ideological direction of the change; the rate of the change; the agent of the change; the level of politics; and the area of society affected by the change.

Those who are interested in "political development" are concerned with the direction of political change. In what direction is a political system moving? Is Japan becoming a democratic state? These are the questions to be answered here. Normative political theories can aid in determining the direction of political change. A related question pertains to the justification of political change. Justification of a particular new political order is an important function of ideologies which are used to bring about political change.

Once the ideological position of a given political change is determined, the next aspect to be viewed is the rate of change. How rapidly, for example, is Japan becoming a democratic state? How fast is the Black sector of the American political system changing? The rate of political change is often closely linked to ideological stand. Rap Brown and Stokeley Carmichael demand immediate change. Obviously, their ideological stands have changed from the days when they were following Dr. Martin Luther King and professed belief in nonviolence.

Some questions, such as the rate at which European colonialism is dying in Africa, can be answered easily; other questions may be more difficult to measure operationally. In the case of European colonialism, one can count the number of African colonies which become independent states each year.

Some political changes occur without much interference from outside the political system, whereas in other cases forces external to the system play a significant role in the process of political change.

Black communities in the United States today are going through such rapid change that teenagers and people in their early twenties are playing the major role in parts of the Black civil rights movement. This rapid change taking place in a sector of the American polity is largely a result of endogenous factors, since it seems to be occurring without any significant foreign intervention. On the other hand, the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe or of Israel in Palestine is a product of exogenous forces. By the same token, much of the political change that has taken place in Japan since 1945 is a product of the Allied occupation.

Certain types of political change affect only local governments in limited geographical areas, whereas a war directly affects the national governments involved. Thus, it is important to talk about political change at different levels of politics. Political change may be taking place in both local and national politics, or change at the local level may lag behind that on the national level or vice versa. The differences one observes at different levels of politics are related to the type of political systems operating in a nation-state. In a country such as Great Britain, one may find that changes at the local level of politics are not as frequent as those one would expect to find in American local politics.

By focusing attention on changes that are taking place at a particular level of politics, one ought to be able to be more specific about the agent of political change. Indeed, it may be that the nature of the agent and the type of the political system determine the degree to which different levels of politics will be affected. A study of this aspect of political change ought to aid political theorists in generating further hypotheses on patterns of political change.

The larger the area or the sector of a society to be affected by a political change, the more revolutionary is that change. For instance, political changes in Latin America, with the notable exception of Cuba, are quite limited in the sense that they usually affect only the national level.

What has been presented in this section of the chapter is my general orientation to the concept of political change. In the chapters to follow, I shall view parts of the above-described concept of political change as they relate to the major questions to be discussed.

SUMMARY

The nature of this study is first described by emphasizing the need for studies of community power structure in non-North American settings in order to determine, among other things, the extent to which cultural and institutional frameworks affect the findings of power structure studies conducted in the United States. Such a perspective led the present study to be comparative in scope and scientific in nature.

Because I have been stimulated by the work on community politics in the recent past, I decided to expand my study of a Japanese community by linking the local-level politics to that of the national level and by relating the top community leaders' attitudes to those of their followers. In so doing, I plan to view local and national politics as dynamic systems. Thus, I have expanded the horizon of my inquiry to a larger universe than that of other studies. Obviously, such a theoretical orientation increases its benefits while at the same time it complicates my theoretical framework.

Although the theoretical framework implied in this chapter includes national politics, the focus of my attention will be on Reed Town. Most of the data presented in the book are derived from a survey conducted in Reed Town. National politics is discussed in the present study only to indicate the place of local politics in Japan, which, as the reader will note, is different from that in the United States.

Chapter 2 provides a set of theoretical models which will be employed to organize all my findings about community power structure and political change in Reed Town. The materials presented must be understood not only in terms of the theoretical frameworks presented in chapter 2 but also within the particular political culture and institutions of Reed Town. For this

reason, chapter 3, which describes Reed Town and Japan, is provided for those readers who are not familiar with the Japanese political system.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 present the findings. Chapter 4 attempts to determine Reed Town residents' perception of local politics in relation to higher levels of politics, that is, prefectural, national, and international politics. Chapter 5 is the core chapter of the book in the sense that it discusses the power structure of Reed Town. Major issues in Reed Town are analyzed in chapter 6, for the purposes of verifying and supplementing the findings given in chapter 5. Chapter 7 examines the kind of political change Reed Town was experiencing in 1963. Chapter 8 compares political change at the national level with that of Reed Town in terms of the role of the family in the political socialization process. Concluding remarks are given in chapter 9 and are followed by an appendix, notes, and a bibliography.

The data on Reed Town employed throughout the book are deposited at the International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California at Berkeley. The questionnaire used in the survey is reproduced in the appendix. Those readers who are interested in secondary analysis of the data may purchase a copy of the data at a reasonable cost through the Data Library.

2
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes theoretical models and operational definitions employed in the study. Since many different models will be introduced and developed, it may be necessary for the reader to refer back to this chapter while reading the ensuing ones.

The chapter begins with a discussion of how citizens *perceive* local politics or Reed Town politics in reference to politics at higher levels, that is, prefectural, national, and world. The hypothesis introduced attempts to show how a Japanese citizen feels about the importance of community politics vis-à-vis national politics and how his view may differ from that of an American citizen living in an American community. Thus, the hypothesis deals with only one aspect of the relationship between local-and national-level politics and does not go into other facets of the relationship. (Those who are interested in other aspects may wish to read Steiner 1965.) Through the introduction of this model I point out one possible independent variable which may account for some of the findings of community power structure studies in the United States.

Having placed local politics in comparative perspective in terms of politics and culture, we shall then move to the core of this study: the types of community power structure. Here four different types of community power structure are presented in a model derived from various studies in Japan and the United States.

The third section introduces an issue-involvement model which is designed to supplement the power structure types and to test their validity.

The fourth section develops a model to measure community political change. This model is different from the previous ones in that it attempts to measure a dynamic aspect of community life. As was the case with the models previously introduced, the primary data which will be applied to this model are not aggregate data but survey data based upon interviews with sample respondents. Again in this sense, the reader is warned here that this is not a macropolitical analysis but rather a micropolitical one.

The last section of the chapter is designed to compare and contrast political change taking place at the local level with that at the national level in cross-national perspective.

Thus, what is to follow in this chapter is a blueprint of my plans to study Reed Town in cross-national perspective.

LOCAL POLITICS IN RELATION TO WORLD POLITICS

How does one view local politics in relation to world or national politics? The answer, of course, may vary with the issue or crisis as well as with the interest of the viewer at a particular time and place. National and international politics may occupy the minds of much of the citizenry during a war or national crisis. On the other hand, an issue such as fluoridation may arouse an interest in local politics only among the people who would be affected by it.

Nations today operate under various formal systems and political customs which separate them one from another. Unlike the federal United States, *Japan's political system functions through a unitary form of gov ernment, under which more formal power resides in the central govern ment.* More functions are performed by the Japanese central government —as in the area of education (see chapters 3 and 4)—than by the national government of the United States. Actually, however, the form of government alone tells one little about the behavior of nations operating under it. The Soviet Union and the United States, for example, have in common a federal form of government. Constitutionally speaking, both the United States and the Soviet Union operate under federalism, a system where neither central nor regional governments can exercise exclusive power over one another except in limited areas of the decision-making. The federal form of government is prevalent in heterogeneous countries such as India, Switzerland, the United

States, and the Soviet Union, whereas homogeneous nations such as Great Britain and Japan operate under a unitary form of government where the central government exercises most power vis-à-vis a confederate form of government where the central government does not have any exclusive power in crucial areas of the decision-making. *One should not assume, however, that the Japanese citizen attributes more importance to his national government than does the American voter, simply because his national government is much more powerful and does more things for him.*

American voters seem to be more interested in national politics than in local politics. There are reasons for this. First of all, the most spectacular political event in the United States is the presidential election held every four years, with its primaries and its dramatic national conventions carried to millions of homes through well-developed mass media. There are no such events in Japan. Second, the impersonal and alienated political life that one experiences in most American communities today does not help to arouse the interest of the citizenry in local political affairs. The personal relationships one develops in the United States today are much narrower in scope than one might expect to develop in rural Japan, where one's association with others is much more diffused in purpose and much wider in the area of human interaction. A celebrated Japanese movie, *The Gate of Hell,* is known for its beautiful blending of reality and imagination. The viewer often loses sight of what is real and what is not because of the skillful blending of the two. An observer of the political drama in a Japanese rural community will find it difficult to see where politics begins and social intercourse ends, as perhaps is the case in many non-Western societies. Life in a Japanese community is meaningful because the individual is well integrated into the community life. The local community is an important unit of Japanese society, in the sense that its members feel and live as its members in all aspects of their lives. In such circumstances, one should expect to find the residents of a community regarding local politics as being at least as important as national politics, if not more so. The foregoing psychological and sociological, rather than political, reasons then lead to a hypothesis that *the higher the level of politics the less interest the Japanese will have in politics.*

In order to test this hypothesis, a decision was made to use the following question to measure the extent of personal involvement at four different levels of politics:

> Some people don't pay much attention to international, national, prefectural, and local politics. How much interest do you have in local politics, prefectural politics, national politics, and world politics.

Those who said that they were either "very interested" or "somewhat interested" were considered to be interested in politics at a given level. NA's (not ascertainables) were eliminated from the procedure.

	Local	Prefecture	Nation	World
Very interested				
Somewhat interested				
Not interested				
NA				

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE TYPES

The preceding hypothesis has provided a comparative perspective in understanding community power structure. If the hypothesis fits the empirical data, the understanding of community power structure in Japan is especially important in the sense that local politics is perceived as being more important than national politics. It is important not simply because it is the power structure I deal with in this book but because it is a social structure as well. Keeping this in mind, we now move to the core of the whole theoretical framework of the book, namely, the question of community power structure—a subject of lively debate from the viewpoints of both theory and methodology. For this reason and because some readers may not be familiar with the community power structure studies that have been done in Japan or the United States, a brief review is given in this chapter. The model of community power structure introduced here is influenced by Agger et al. (1964) and by the normative theories of representative democracy.

Miller and Stokes (1963), in their analysis of constituency influence in the United States Congress, found that congressmen conform most closely to the opinions held by their constituency on civil rights issues and least on the question of foreign relations. Their report certainly points to a hypothesis that the

area of foreign involvement conforms to the "Burkean" model of representation and the domain of domestic issues to the "instructed-delegate" model. However, as they explicitly state (p. 56), the relationship is really more complicated than that. From the viewpoint of residents of a community, it certainly makes sense, at least in the Reed Town type of community (see chapter 3), to expect the "instructed-delegate" category to be most applicable to politicians at the local level and the "Burkean" category to those at the national level. What is suggested here is that a linear relationship may be found between the level of politics and the bipolar representation models.

This section, which deals with four types of community power structure, makes use of the "Burkean, instructed-delegate, and responsible-party models" referred to by Miller and Stokes. This factor of the dimension of representation will be added to the continuing debate on the power elite vs. the pluralistic democracy in the model of community power structure to be presented.

There are several *key concepts* which must be defined in order to make tangible the models of community politics. My definitions for "politics" and "government" were given in chapter 1. I shall add here my definitions for "political power" and "influence."

"Political power" refers to certain aspects of politics or political participation. All who participate in decision-making that affects a government's actions may be said to be engaged in politics, but only those who contribute to a decisional outcome are said to be accorded political power (Agger et al. 1964). In other words, it is quite possible for some participants to exercise no power at all in decision-making. According to this definition of political power, one cannot be powerful without directly participating in a decision-making process. Access to the process is, then, a necessary but not sufficient condition for exercising political power. People may act and affect others, and yet fail to see their preferences realized. Thus, people can exercise *political influence* but not have power. Nor does this deny the fact that in some instances a person can affect a decisional outcome without being physically present in the decision-making process. However, following Agger et al., such an act would not be considered a use of political power, but would exemplify, rather, the use of *political status*. Thus, there are two physically observable ways through which one may affect a given decisional outcome determining the scope of government action through political influence: either one may be actively

and directly involved in a decision-making situation, thus exhibiting political influence or power; or one may indirectly affect a decisional outcome through persuasion of other individuals who are perhaps more centrally involved in the decision-making process, thus also exerting political influence or power. But a person or group may be involved by others' taking them into account, according to their political status. These two methods in the decision-making process are analytically separate.

"Political status," then, is exercised by a person whose preference for a certain course of action by the government is taken into consideration by those who are participating in decision-making. For example, the mere existence of a Communist Party cell in Reed Town may restrain some leaders in the community from taking certain actions. It thus may have political status without taking action. Although few in number and not too effective, communists in Reed Town have been known for their exposé of corruption on several occasions. Thus, when so acting, they are said to have some influence on the local government, although they may or may not have political power over particular community decisions in Reed Town. More often, however, government officials and others with power may take the existence of communists in Reed Town into consideration in their involvement in the decision-making process.

Political status may be accorded not only to those who are absent in a given decision-making process, but also to some who are directly participating in it. Persons who are acting and whose status or reputation are taken into consideration by others who are involved in a decision-making process are exercising political influence; their past performance, economic resources, and so forth, as well as their present actions, may be taken into consideration by others, and if so they are said to be influential. It follows that in some instances a participant in decision-making may be both powerful and influential. Thus, the concept of political power may include political influence, but not vice versa.

"Political leaders" are those members of a community who exercise great degrees of either political influence or political power or both. Thus, political leaders are not necessarily limited to those who hold an official position in a local government but include any others in a community who meet these terms. Political leaders include members of a community who have high political status even though they may not be active participants.

A "community power structure" refers to selected aspects of political leadership patterns observed at a given time, that is, those patterns of power and influence that determine the scope of local government activity.

A proposed model of types of community power structure takes a comparison of attitudes between the leaders and their followers into consideration. Such terms as "values," "beliefs," "opinions," and "attitudes" are frequently used in social science literature without being clearly defined. Rokeach (1968) recently attempted to clarify these terms. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) sought to define all basic terms in political science. As stated by Clark (1967), those who are engaged in studying community power structure have neglected to examine systematically the attitudes or values of leaders and those of their followers. They are largely interested in sociological variables that affect the structural aspect of community power but not in psychological variables. The proposed model of community power structure is based upon an assumption that a better understanding of community power structure requires an inclusion of psychological variables. This makes it necessary for me to define what is meant by "attitudes" and "values'' in addition to the political terms introduced above.

"Values" are *patterns of preference* concerning means and ends of conduct. Values are those criteria which guide a man's mode of behavior. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) proposed an eight-value system in which all the values are abstract, as they ought to be. "Attitudes," on the other hand, *deal with specifics.* An attitude is a man's orientation toward a specific matter, expressed in terms of either true-false or agree-disagree. A man may have thousands of attitudes but all these attitudes may cluster around relatively few values. There are many definitions of "attitudes" in the existing literature. My definition comes close to what some authors refer to as "opinions." Lasswell thought there are eight values which can be used to explain most of our behavior. Rokeach used twenty-four values in his study. A single value may affect a number of attitudes.

Having defined the major terms used in the proposed model, it is time to introduce the model itself.

THE MODEL: FOUR TYPES OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

Agger et al. (1964) introduced into the study of community political systems the idea that the ideological orientation of the leadership should be taken into consideration in understanding

a community power structure; this approach is adopted here with some modifications. [1] My concept of a community power structure is based on two variables: (1) *the extent to which the attitude of the leadership is homogeneous and compatible or heterogeneous and conflicting,* and (2) *the extent to which the attitude of the leadership represents that of the rest of the population in a commu nity.*

Dahl (1961, 1967), in his concern with pluralistic democracy, emphasizes the degree to which leaders compete one with another. Moreover, Schumpeter (1950) singles out the competition for power as the most important variable in the existence of a democracy. Essentially, both authors are concerned with the extent to which the leadership segments of a polity are maintained through competition. Competition may take place with or without conflict over attitudes and values. Differences in values and attitudes of the leadership are likely to increase the level of competition. Furthermore, according to Dahl the more divergent the ideological orientation of the leadership, the more democratic the polity. Thus, the first variable is considered by many authors to be an important dimension of community power structure. Agger et al. (1964) refer to this dimension as "convergence" and "divergence," whereas Clark (1967) refers to it as "similar" and "divergent."

Another group of political scientists (Miller and Stokes 1963) approaches the problem of democracy in a political system in a somewhat different manner than does Dahl. They are concerned more with representation than with competition. An inherent problem in both cases is that the degree of competition as well as of representativeness may vary with the kind of issue. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the two variables represents an improvement over what has been done in the past in the field of community power structure. For example, the incorporation of the second variable implies that it would be rather difficult to characterize any community power structure as being simply a "power elite" community (Hunter 1953) or a "pluralistic democracy" (Dahl 1961), for this pattern may vary with the particular area of community decision-making. One may find communities in which some decisions are made openly, with all competing opinions given an equal chance of being heard, whereas in other areas of decision everyone agrees with everyone else. In the latter case, of course, it does not necessarily follow that these decisions are made democratically, as Agger et al. point out (1964:13). These decisions may very well have been manipulated by some of the elite in such a way that

they do not become issues which call for open conflict. Obviously, a similar criticism may be launched against those who employ the representation model. Here, what one includes in one's operational definition of the attitudes or issues becomes of paramount importance.

Indeed, in this sense those who adhere to Hunter's reputational technique and those who favor Dahl's decision-making approach may very well resemble a couple of blind men trying to determine what an elephant is like. Before I go into my review of different schools of thought in determining a community power structure, I shall now characterize the four different types of community power structure presented in Figure 1.

The first type, a *simple democracy,* refers to a community in which there is a consensus among the leaders, who reflect a similar consensus among the rank-and-file citizens. It is a simple type of democracy because the leaders are homogeneous in their attitude, which is also shared by the masses. Such a community might exist in rural areas where everyone more or less agrees with everyone else. *Such a community power structure is democratic in the sense that it represents the interests of the people, which obviously is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for what we call a fully developed democracy.*

Attitude of Leaders	Fit between Attitudes of Leaders and Citizens	
	Representative	Nonrepresentative
Homogeneous (consensus)	Simple democracy (elite)	Stable power elite
Heterogeneous (conflict)	Pluralistic democracy	Unstable power elite

Figure 1. Community power structure types.

This community of consensus could be a function of a certain political culture or of a leadership which is successfully guiding its people into what it considers a desirable form of government, without providing them with any alternatives. For example, if one reads the minutes of the Reed Town Assembly one will find that all decisions in Reed Town are recorded as unanimous. One will find this to be the case in many rural areas where dissent is discouraged, even in the United States. Also,

such a political system might be found in such countries as Cuba under Castro and Egypt under the late President Nasser, where the leaders rule their people by charisma. Noncommunist ideologies are not allowed in Cuba, while Egyptian communists are found only in prisons. As both Castro's and Nasser's efforts to eliminate illiteracy bear fruit, the leaders of these countries may have to change their way of governing, for literate masses are capable of acquiring values and attitudes contrary to those of the existing political order. The existence of mass literacy, however, was not at least a sufficient condition to prevent the advent of such authoritarian states as Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan.

I expect to find this type of simple democracy in a rural community where most of the members still make a living by farming and where no labor unions or other interest groups have yet taken root. Under this type of power structure, it is likely that the sense of political efficacy is high. The people feel that they are efficacious because their values and attitudes are represented by their leaders, no matter how such values were acquired in the process of political socialization.

The second type, a *pluralistic democracy,* is characterized by the existence of *competition* among the leaders who have different attitudes and value preferences. Another necessary condition for the emergence of a pluralistic democracy, as defined here, is that the leaders' attitudes are shared by the people. In other words, the different attitudes found among the leaders should reflect the attitudes of wide segments of the community and no single segment of a community should be overrepresented. Thus, by "representation" I mean the extent to which the dispersion in the leaders' attitude corresponds to that in the attitude of their followers. If the masses are homogeneous in their attitude toward relevant issues in a community, the leaders should also be homogeneous in their attitude if they are to be representative.

If it is empirically true that Nazi leaders represented the attitudes of the masses, then their countries will be considered "simple democracies" and therefore they will be distinguished from pluralistic democracies where a wide range in the ideological spectrum is represented, such as one might expect to find in Japan or France where communists as well as rightists are represented in the national legislative body.

Dahl (1967:24) defines American pluralism in terms of the "existence of multiple centers of powers, none of which is wholly sovereign." He seems to consider the existence of mul-

tiple power centers as the most important characteristic of American pluralism. My definition of pluralism is different from Dahl's in that *I demand that a fragmented leadership repre sent a fragmented citizenry* and also in that Dahl adds the restricting clause that none of the power centers can be entirely sovereign. According to my definition *there could be a pluralistic democracy even if there is a wholly sovereign power center, as long as that center represents the majority.* However, we shall keep this part of Dahl's definition in mind as we see if what can be termed as a "wholly sovereign power" exists in Reed Town.

The third type, a *stable power elite,* emerges when the leaders rule without regard for the opinions of the masses. *Those who make up the core of the community power structure are homogeneous in their attitude, yet their attitude is not shared by the citizenry.* There are no leaders who represent the interests of the people, although the leaders may take the masses into account. Such a political system is stable to the extent that the unity of the leadership is maintained over time and that the masses are kept in order by the leaders, through the use of force if necessary. Ostracism and other means of discouraging deviant behavior may be employed at the community level, in order to maintain the community power structure.

In such a community power structure, it is very likely that many basic issues are resolved without any public discussion; this creates the impression that there are no conflicts in the community. A power-elite community power structure will maintain itself as long as it can keep the masses away from active political participation. The basic difference between this type of community power structure and the first type (simple democracy) is that here there are no leaders who represent the interests of the masses. This point of difference suggests, then, that this type of power-elite community power structure is more likely to be found in urban communities, where there are many groups of diverse interests and attitudes, than in rural communities.

Such an urban community might be one in which several Blacks, laborers, or other social minority members, such as the *Eta* in Japan, are included among the community leaders. [2] This may give the impression that the community enjoys a pluralistic democracy, where divergent views *appear* to be expressed and where the interests of the masses, including minority members, are protected and represented. Yet, one feature of the model introduced in the present study is that *I do not accept an empirical finding showing varying social backgrounds among the*

leaders as suffi cient evidence to conclude that the community under study enjoys a pluralistic democracy. I require that a fragmented leadership represent citizens who are also fragmented. Thus, the example cited above, where the leaders hail from various social and economic backgrounds, is relevant to my model of a pluralistic democracy only if they do indeed represent the attitudes of the working men, *Eta,* or Blacks. A community leadership may very well be structured in such a way that only those minority members with an attitude similar to that of persons already in power can be recruited into the community power structure, in which case this apparently democratic community would be classified, according to my model, as a power-elite community.

The fourth type, an *unstable power elite,* represents a power structure which is different from the preceding category in that *the leaders are heterogeneous in their attitudes, although their attitudinal differences do not reflect the interests of the masses.* This type of community power structure may appear as a transitional phase in the process of a change in power structure from the last model discussed to, for example, a pluralistic-democracy type of community power structure. Prior to the development of various interest groups and other associations which represent a wide range of ideological orientations among the people, the leaders may acquire diverse attitudes which in turn may influence the masses to be more diversified in their attitudes.

The competition existing among the leaders may lead to a higher turnover rate in the leadership recruitment process than in the stable-power-elite model discussed above, where those who rule the community represent a limited range of attitudes and where no leader represents the interests of the masses. The explanation for such a tendency is suggested by the hypothesis that the decisional outcomes of leaders who represent a wide range of ideas and values are less predictive, and thus the power structure itself is more subject to change than in a community which may be classified as either a simple democracy or a simple power elite.

Having designed a model for analyzing community power structure, I am ready to move toward the question of how to discover the community power structure.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF LEADERS: A REVIEW

The question of *who ought to rule* has been discussed for centuries by many political philosophers in East and West. But in the past scholars have paid relatively little attention to the empirical question of *who rules.* It is only in the last decade or so that political scientists have begun to treat the question of who rules in a somewhat systematic manner. The publication of Hunter's *Community Power Structure* (1953), which coincided with a movement toward the scientific study of politics within the political science field, stimulated many political scientists and sociologists to study local communities, mostly in the United States, for the purpose of examining the leadership structure and the decision-making process. Some who disagreed with Hunter's method and conclusion offered alternatives to his reputational technique. Hunter's reliance upon reputation as the measurement of power was severely criticized by Dahl and others who suggested an alternative approach to the study of community decision-making: the scrutiny of a series of what they considered to be important issue decisions in a community.

Perhaps it is best to summarize the major approaches which have been used by social scientists in recent years to identify the leaders in a political system. One may group them into four categories, although there are a number of variations within each type: the positional approach; the repu-tational approach; the event-analysis approach; and the economic-dominant approach.

The Positional Approach This is a time-honored approach and the most direct way of identifying leaders. Under this approach, it is assumed that those who occupy important official positions—such as the mayor, the local labor union officials, and the officials of voluntary associations—are leaders. An official position, then, is considered the necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of community power. The positional approach is often used in conjunction with other approaches.

The Reputational Approach This is the approach originated by Hunter (1953). It seeks to identify community leaders by using a panel of knowledgeable persons who are assumed to be informed on public leadership. The knowledgeables are asked to nominate persons whom they consider to be important leaders in general or in specified areas of community decision-making. This technique is used more often by sociologists than by political scientists. The weakness involved in the approach,

particularly its sole dependence on the knowledgeables' understanding of the community leadership system, has been pointed out by its critics (Bell 1958; Dahl 1961; Kaufman and Jones 1954; Polsby 1959a, 1959b, 1969; and Walter 1964).

Its merits are many, however. Those who are interested in a debate between the advocates and opponents of the reputational approach may see Bonjean and Olson (1964), D'Antonio and Ehrlich (1961), D'Antonio and Erickson (1962), D'Antonio (1962), Polsby (1962, 1969), Walton (1966), and Wolfinger (1962). The reputational approach is useful for comparative studies in particular because of its operational procedures, which make it possible for it to be carried out within any political system, regardless of type, as long as one is allowed to conduct a survey and can secure the cooperation of the individuals in a community. Furthermore, it is relatively inexpensive both in terms of cost and the time it takes to complete the survey. An attempt was made by Holloway (1963) to validate the approach.

The Event-Analysis Approach This approach has been employed by Kimball and Pearsall (1955), Scoble (1961), and Dahl (1961), among others, as an alternative to the reputational technique. The event-analysis approach is not new, by any means, although it has been refined in recent years. One first selects what are considered to be key decisions made in the community under study. Then, as many historians and Bentleyan political scientists have done, one traces the history of the selected public issues in an effort to ascertain who actually made the decisions over a period of time. The strength of this approach lies in its focus on the behavioral aspects of community decision-making rather than on the political resources of potential community leaders.

Its limitations are serious and numerous, however. For example, defenders of the event-analysis approach show little interest in attempting comparative studies, even though they aspire to be scientific. Their method does not seem to lend itself to cross-cultural analysis because of differences in events and issues and the scope of local government activities. *Moreover, in some communities one simply does not find a good case to be analyzed, because the nature of the power structure is such that any open conflict is avoided, or because decisions are made in such a way that no apparent and important issues are present.* As Agger et al. (1964:13) state, "political influence might be exercised so skillfully by the few that they succeed in averting de-

mands for other scopes of government or in preventing such preferences from being pursued or strengthened to the point of becoming issues in 'key decisions'."

Anton (1963), using *Small Town in Mass Society* by Vidich and Bensman (1958) as an example, makes a similar point and proceeds to explain how limited the event-analysis approach is in defining political power. According to the pluralists (the event-analysis approach), power is observable only where an open conflict exists. However, social ostracism, or *mura-hachibu* as it is known in Japanese culture, and other manipulative devices employed to avert open conflicts are quite common in some political cultures. And Japan is no exception to such a generalization. In fact, if one can observe political power only when there is an open conflict or an issue, one is bound to find more than one side to the conflict or issue, which can lead an observer to conclude that there are competing power groups in a community.

The Economic-Dominant Approach As in the cases of the reputational approach and the positional approach, this technique uses a political resource, namely, economic power, as an indicator of community power. The first modern use of this technique was made by Schulze and Blumberg (1957). The approach assumes that the economic power of an individual—that is, the ability to hire or the ability to affect the economic structure of a community in one way or another—is the single most important aspect of a community power structure. It is obvious that economic power cannot be equated with political power. Nor can one assume that economic resources alone are sufficient to yield power in community politics. One can say, however, that the economic dominants are capable of exercising power if they so desire.

Various other approaches, such as the "opinion leadership" approach and the "participation" approach (Agger and Ostrom 1956; Kuroda 1965d), have been used by social scientists to study the social or political structure of a community. However, inasmuch as these approaches have no direct bearing upon this particular study of Reed Town politics, we shall move to a review of the systematic studies of community power structure that have been conducted in Japan. Those who wish to know more about alternative techniques, as well as community power studies made in the United States, may see Bell et al. (1961); Bonjean et al. (1971); Clark (1968); D'Antonio and Ehrlich (1961); Janowitz (1961); Polsby (1963); Press (1962); and Walton (1966).

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE STUDIES IN JAPAN

Several general summaries of community power structure studies are now available. The only further review of the literature which I believe useful here is of a handful of community power structure studies done in Japan, by Japanese scholars, which are not readily available to the American reader.

There are numerous accounts of case studies on historical events that attempt to describe decision-making in Japanese communities. However, the most recent and most comprehensive study, though not systematic and up-to-date in its approach, is a monograph published by the International Christian University in Tokyo (Kokusai Kirisutokyō Daigaku, Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1958). It consists of a series of studies on Japanese local politics, conducted by a team of social scientists, a few of which are available in English (Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, 1960). In addition to these case studies, a few modern, systematic surveys of community power structures are beginning to be conducted by several sociologists in Japan.

Two other groups of sociologists have been engaged in community leadership studies: Professor Shigeru Katsumura, Ritsuo Akimoto, et al. at the Social Science Research Institute, Waseda University; and Professor Jōji Watanuki et al. at the University of Tokyo.

Akimoto, who has played a major role in the Waseda group, has written several articles based upon his and his associates' studies in several different communities. He used the positional approach in his first community study, that of E City, published in 1964, in which he describes the role played by a dominant industry in the political processes of that city.

The June 1965 issue of *Shakaikagaku Tōkyū* (Waseda University Journal of Social Science) brings together a series of articles on a single community where studies have been conducted by a Waseda University Social Science Research Institute team. The nine articles, written by ten scholars, deal with various aspects of the community political system. This 564-page report is the most comprehensive and systematic study of community power structure to be published in Japan to date. In an introductory article, Katsumura and Akimoto (1965) review the literature, consisting mainly of studies done in the United States, and discuss the methods and problems of community power studies. Three articles deal with economic-industrial aspects of the community as they relate to the community

political system. Two, written by Akimoto and Katsumura respectively, are on the power structure and policy-making process. Another article probes the political attitudes of the leaders. The last two articles describe the legal framework within which politics operates in the community.

In this volume Akimoto (1965) reports on what he refers to as the K City power structure. Apparently he used a combination of the reputational and event-analysis approaches in this study. In brief, his painstaking method called, first of all, for an examination of the major issues in this city during the past twenty years. Through this research he gathered 108 names of living persons who had participated in decision-making on these important issues. Akimoto then asked each of these 108 individuals to list the men he refers to as "top influentials." Further, he asked the top influentials to name three "key influentials," whom they considered the most influential in the process of policy-making in the city. Akimoto reports that he found no exclusively economic elite as such running the city, but he does conclude that the leadership structure is formed around the economic elite or persons from T Company, which is the dominant company in the city.

Katsumura, in his article "Community Leadership Formation and the Policy-Making Process" (1965), divides the 108 leaders Akimoto described into six categories on the basis of their social backgrounds and functional differentiation in the policy-making process: (1) city councilmen; (2) leaders in farming areas; (3) leading businessmen, mostly in the downtown area; (4) progressive leaders representing most of the labor unions; (5) the mayor and other city hall leaders; and (6) T Company employees who hold some formal position in the city government. Katsumura attempts to delineate the activities, over a period of time, of the six different categories of leaders. He points out the way in which all these leaders succumbed to the rising power of T Company. Labor union leaders and managerial personnel worked together on the city council. He presents the interesting hypothesis that all employees of T Company, regardless of their status in the company, will work for the benefit of the company in the policy-making process. Actually, this hypothesis concurs with the fact that most Japanese labor unions are formed not within a specific industry but within a particular company, which means that white-collar and blue-collar workers are often in the same union. Katsumura then proceeds to show the power relations among different leaders through the use of a sociogram. The last part of his report deals with the activities

of the "K Development Association," which was established to develop the company's economy. Such organizations are often formed in communities in Japan, as well as in the United States (Present 1966), when the economic base is not diversified. Katsumura ends on a pessimistic note as regards the future of democracy in K City.

Kawahara, in his article "The Political Consciousness of Community Leaders" (1965), analyzes the value orientations of the 108 leaders, who are divided into five groups on a basis similar to that employed by Katsumura. Kawahara's comparisons were made only among the leaders; therefore, he could not make any statements concerning the leaders' attitudes as compared with those of the general population. However, he does show some interesting comparisons between the leaders affiliated with T Company and the leaders from farming areas. The attitudes of these leaders, in general, seem to be more conservative than the attitudes of the nation as a whole, as manifested in polls on such questions as their attitude toward Japan's Self-Defense Forces.

The following year an article by Akimoto appeared in the *Shakaigaku Hyōron* (Japan Sociological Review) (1966). This report is seemingly an extension of his 1965 article on the K City power structure. One notable point of methodological importance is his dismissal of the event-analysis approach as inappropriate for the study of Japanese communities, where the central government makes all the important decisions and where local governments act as agents of the central government. He cites a political scientist's work in justifying this point. Although Akimoto is correct about the heavy dependence of the local governments on the national government in Japan, an objection may be made to his remarks on the grounds that local governments do have some important decisions to make in such areas as school affairs. His most recent study—of C City in S Prefecture—was recently published (1971).

Another political sociologist, Watanuki, and his colleagues at the University of Tokyo began a study of community power structure in 1966. The results of their study are not available at the time of this writing.

Hunter, realizing the relevance of international trade to his study of power structure in the United States, attempted to study the power structure of Tokyo but with no success. It appears to be difficult for foreign scholars to use the reputational technique in Japan, unless they are fully accepted by the community under investigation. Language, social, and cultural

barriers may very well prevent them from being accepted and considered as one with the community members. This difficulty may, of course, be somewhat attenuated if the foreigner studies a large metropolitan community. I shall return to this question of the use of the reputational technique and Japanese culture in chapter 3.

Thus, the study of community power structure in Japan is still in an incipient stage, whereas nearly one hundred studies have already been conducted in the United States. Nevertheless, there are several generalizations one can make about these few studies conducted in Japan.

First, as was the case with the United States, political sociologists have shown more interest in the study of community power structure than have political scientists in Japan. It is hoped that more political scientists will begin to study community power structure in systematic ways, as have sociologists.

Second, the results of these few community studies indicate that the view of Japanese community power structures may vary from one community to another depending upon the techniques employed, whereas the structure itself varies according to economic bases, historical roots, and other factors.

Third, various techniques are being tried in ascertaining the power structure in Japan just as is the case in the United States. There seems to be no single technique which will be used exclusively by all Japanese social scientists. Variants of the reputational technique were employed in Japan for the first time by Akimoto and myself in the same year. The fears expressed by some that the reputational technique may not be applicable outside of Western civilization were dispelled by our use of the technique in 1963.

Fourth, there are no studies which attempt to show the possible impact of Japanese political culture on the community power structure. As stated earlier, attempts will be made in this book to suggest possible effects of American culture on the American community power structure as we now know it, through insight gained by studying Reed Town's community power structure in comparative perspective.

LEADERSHIP MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES

Many factors had to be considered in planning this study of Reed Town's leadership system in 1963, especially since no one had yet applied any modern research techniques to the analysis

of community power structure in Japan. The decision was made to use the reputational approach as the major technique and to supplement it by three other approaches (the economic-dominant approach and, to a limited extent, the event-analysis and positional approaches). Although I was somewhat familiar with the town, having grown up not too far from Reed Town, I was at the research site for only one summer. In order to do justice to the event-analysis approach, a researcher must live in the community he studies for more than that length of time, to ensure that he obtains not just one-or two-sided descriptions of public issues, but all relevant views. I had to hold the use of event analysis to a minimum in order to complete the field work as scheduled.

The reputational technique was employed because of its comparability and simplicity, as well as the time factor. However, as indicated earlier, I do not wish to give the impression that the reputational technique is easy to apply in every political culture and, particularly, in the Japanese political culture. In fact, I was not quite certain whether I could apply it even after my interviewers had started to interview a few key informants. My colleagues feared that it would not be usable in the Japanese culture. They were right to some extent, for I met some resistance to my study at the outset. In order to establish closer ties and to become familiar with some of the positional leaders, my wife (who assisted me in conducting the survey) and I invited them to a restaurant on several occasions; in this way we established rapport with at least some of the important positional leaders in the community.

As those who would refute the reputational technique justly claim, the validity of the technique is dependent upon its informants to a large extent. If one attempts cross-cultural surveys, how can he be assured that he is obtaining the cooperation of key informants in each culture? This technique, of course, assumes that the informants have the information one seeks. Here I must conclude that certain political cultures may prevent one from using the reputational technique.

Those political scientists who have used event analysis, such as Dahl, Polsby, and Wolfinger, have shown little concern for comparative power structure analysis. The event-analysis technique had never been used outside the United States, whereas at least a few studies employing the reputational technique have been carried out in England, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, and Venezuela (Abu-Laban 1967; Akimoto 1964, 1965, 1966; Form and D'Antonio 1959; Hoskin 1967; Kuroda i965d; and

Miller 1958a, 1958b). *Those who employ the reputational technique have shown more interest in a comparative study of community leadership* (Agger, Erickson, Form, Kuroda, Miller, and others). The steps involved in the measurement of leadership according to the reputational technique are, as a rule, explained in detail. This makes it possible for others with similar interests to replicate the studies elsewhere. However, if one wishes to replicate Dahl's method of issue selection in a Japanese community, it may prove to be difficult, because the functions of local governments in Japan are different from those in the United States (Steiner 1965). This point will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Another factor to be considered here is that the event-analysis approach largely predetermines the kind of results one will obtain, as evidenced in Walton's inventory of community studies (1966). Walton warns that "the type of power structure identified by studies that rely on a single method may well be an artifact of that method" (p. 438). His warning is particularly applicable for those who use the event-analysis approach. Whereas twelve out of fourteen studies which used event analysis produced non-pyramidal power structure results, only about one-half of the studies which employed the reputational technique resulted in a pyramidal power structure. Of course, it could be that these results are merely a consequence of the kind of communities chosen by the several social scientists as their research sites.

Lastly, if Walter (1964) was correct in his logical analysis of the reputational approach—namely, that the result of any reputational work is an artifact of the operational procedures involved—one finds it difficult to explain, for instance, why Blankenship (1964:216) was able to draw the conclusion that "there is considerable overlap in the results produced by our two measures of power.... leadership may be said to be homogeneous: reputation and action join.'' Freeman and his associates (1963) have shown that a difference exists between the results produced by the two techniques. Their studies demonstrate that different techniques measure different kinds of leaders in a community. These and still other conflicting findings (Agger et al. 1964; Jennings 1964; Presthus 1964; and Scoble 1961) relating to different techniques of community leadership measurement led me to employ more than one approach in this study of a Japanese community. The next section describes the operational procedures employed in the survey of Reed Town.

REPUTATIONAL LEADERS

A set of knowledgeable persons from major institutional areas was selected first. As classified by area, the list included:

1. Local Government
   (a) Clerk in the Town Hall who was also a secretary for the Town Assembly
   (b) Head secretary for the Town Assembly
   (c) Former president of the Town Assembly
   (d) President of the Election Management Committee
   (e) Member of the Social Welfare Committee
2. Mass Media
   (a) The only newspaperman in the town
3. Education
   (a) Former president of the Board of Education
   (b) Member of the School Board
   (c) President of the School Board
   (d) Two primary school principals
   (e) Two elementary school principals
4. Business
   (a) President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
   (b) Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
   (c) Director of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
5. Agriculture
   (a) Director of the Farmers' Co-op
   (b) President of the Farmers' Co-op

Each of these eighteen knowledgeables was asked to prepare a list of persons he considered leaders in three areas of community decision-making, as follows:

> We would like from you a list of people in Reed Town who have the greatest power and influence in local community affairs. We want people you believe are actually very influential rather than people you think should be influential. If possible, name a specific person rather than a position:
>
> 1. Leaders in local government and community matters in general
> 2. Leaders in the educational area
> 3. Leaders in economic activities (business and agriculture)

A few of the knowledgeables gave no specific names other than those occupying official positions in the community. One of them answered this question by giving a description of what he felt was going on in the town. A great majority of them, however, complied with my request.

Having asked the knowledgeables the question about leadership, I thought it might be revealing to see how the reputational leaders themselves choose leaders from among themselves. With some revision, I adopted part of Agger's questionnaire dealing with this particular matter and carefully translated it into Japanese (Agger et al, 1964). The resultant series of questions was given to all individuals who were nominated at least twice in one institutional area. There were exactly fifty such individuals. I added the name of one businessman to this list as a validity check to see how he would be viewed. I thought that he might receive a few votes, since he was a member of the Town Assembly at the time of the survey. It so happens that he did not receive a single vote.

The results indicated that the fifty individuals who were nominated at least twice in one institutional area were, in fact, considered to be leaders by the leaders themselves. A formal position in the Town Assembly obviously was not sufficient to make a businessman a leader in the community. *This incident may be taken as an indicator of the validity of the reputational technique employed in the survey.*

The questions asked in this second phase of the reputational approach were:

> 1. We have talked to a number of people in Reed Town who have given us a list of people they consider to be important in community decision-making. We would like you to look at this list and indicate which of these people you would consider to be among the most important leaders in the community. (Choose as many as you wish.) By "most important people" we mean people who could get a major policy project adopted in Reed Town. You may feel free to add the name of anyone you think important in community policy-making who is not listed already.
> *(Note:* Ask the following two questions only if the respondent still wants to know what is meant by "most important people.'')
>
> > *(a)* Suppose a major project was before the community, one that required a decision by a group of leaders whom nearly everyone would accept. Which people would you choose to make up this group—regardless of whether you know them personally?

(*b*) In most towns, certain persons are said to be influential "behind the scenes" and to have a lot to say about programs that are planned and projects and issues that come up around town. What persons in Reed Town are influential in this way or are influential in being able to stop particular community policies?

2. Are any of these related to you? (*Note:* Make an *X* next to name.)

(a) Would you consider any of these people as a close personal friend?

(Note: Make an *X* in the appropriate column.)

(b) Do you know these people personally? *(Note:* Make an *X* in the appropriate column.)

3. What, in your opinion, are the most important issues, problems, or projects facing Reed Town at the present time?

4. Have you or your organization done anything or are you planning to do anything about any of these matters?

This time I was able to obtain full cooperation from all forty-six individuals of whom I asked these questions. (I had accidentally omitted from the list of those to be questioned five of the names that were nominated twice. Thus, five individuals were not contacted.)

A decision was made to consider all those who were nominated eight or more times, either in phase one or phase two, as top leaders. Twenty-three individuals met this criterion. [3] Of the twenty-three, our interviewers were able to interview nineteen. These nineteen completed a long questionnaire, which we also gave to the general population sample.

This section ends with a note on the validity of the reputational technique employed. One of the questions included in the questionnaire for the top leaders and general population sample was "How often do you meet and discuss things with the following people: (1) town or county officials and (2) community leaders?" Seventy-nine percent or fifteen of the nineteen top leaders answered that they discuss matters with town officials "often" and the rest (21 percent) stated that they discussed matters "once in a while." The response to the second part of the question yielded a similar result of 74 percent and 26 percent respectively. None of the top leaders used the last response category of "very seldom or not at all," whereas approximately two-thirds of the general population sample respondents gave that answer. In other words, all of the top leaders selected in the

present research design proved to have frequent or at least occasional contacts with office-holders as well as other community leaders.

As will be reported in chapter 5, the knowledgeables and the leaders themselves were in substantial agreement on whom they thought to be leaders, as evidenced by a relatively high correlation coefficient ($r = .76$).

The built-in check included in the second phase of the leadership selection, made by adding an assemblyman's name, proved that the leaders did not make their selections at random, for he received no nomination from the leaders.

Furthermore, informal conversations with a knowledgeable and trustworthy person led me to conclude that I had indeed obtained the leadership list I intended to acquire. Although more could be presented to prove the validity of the reputational technique I employed, the evidence presented above, I believe, is sufficient to consider the approach valid.

THE ECONOMIC DOMINANTS

Although political resources such as information, money, status, and skill are not sufficient to determine the amount of power one possesses, they are at least important contributory factors in the acquisition of power and influence. My definition for "economic dominants" is adopted from Schulze and Blumberg (1957).[4] *Those persons in Reed Town who em ployed more than ten workers were considered as economic dominants in this study.* I located eight individuals who met this criterion by using the membership list of the Reed Town Chamber of Commerce and Industry (C of C & I). To my surprise the man who owned and operated the largest factory, employing nearly 200 workers, was not a member of the chamber. I added his name to the list. My interviewers were able to interview seven out of these nine economic dominants.

There were 186 members of the C of C & I at the time of the survey. Many of them had one, two, or three employees. There are many small businessmen in this town, but very few big businessmen as such. This is true to some extent of the whole of Japan, but the percentage of small businessmen in this town is greater than in the nation as a whole.[5]

THE GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLE

No study of a community power structure is complete without a survey of the rank-and-file citizens of the community under investigation, as indicated in my theoretical orientation to the study of community power structures. [6] The following paragraphs describe the sampling procedures employed in my survey of 1963.

The *population* or the *universe* in this study is the registered voters of Reed Town in April 1963. The list of registered voters contains the names of almost everyone above the age of twenty. This list is revised at least once a year in September, even when there is to be no election. A supplementary list is prepared before each election in order to ensure accuracy. Moreover, in Japan the local government sees to it that every eligible person is registered. Thus, it is relatively safe to assume that the list includes the total adult population of Reed Town.

A probability sample of the universe was secured from a list of registered voters, the most economical, reliable, and valid way of acquiring a representative sample in any Japanese community.

The total population of Reed Town, as of 1 August 1963, was 16,498, divided into 8268 males and 8230 females. The total number of families at that time was 2686. The population of the community has been constant since 1955. There were 9345 registered voters in Reed Town at the time of the election on 30 April 1963, two months prior to our arrival at the research site. The registered voter list, which had been updated in April, was used to select the sample of the general population. *Every thirtieth name on the list was chosen, giving us a list of 321 systematically selected persons to be interviewed.* I succeeded in securing interviews with 287 of them. The remaining thirty-four were not interviewed for the several reasons shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Reasons for Failure to Interview

Reason	Number	Percentage
Out of town for summer employment	9	26
Moved away	8	23
Refused	7	21

Reason	Number	Percentage
Married and moved away	6	18
Could not locate	3	9
Deceased	1	3
Total N and %	34	100

Since no substitutes were allowed, all interviewers were asked to make at least five call-backs before they gave up. In a few cases, as many as seven or eight call-backs were made before our interviewers were able to secure an interview. *The completed 287 interviews form almost 90 percent of the original sample.*

SAMPLING ERROR

Sources of error are abundant in all social science surveys today (see Deming 1950). Attempts were made to acquire as valid a sample as possible in every stage of the survey process. Tables 2, 3, and 4 are designed to show the range of discrepancy between the sample and its universe.

First, the sex ratio in the sample was examined in relation to that in the universe and the total population of the community at the time of the survey. Table 2 reveals less than a 2 percent difference between them. It also shows no difference whatsoever between the entire sample of 321 persons and the respondents who completed their schedules.

Table 2. Sex Ratios of Reed Town Population

	Total population		Registered voters		Entire sample		Respondents interviewed	
Male	8,268	(50%)	4,585	(49%)	163	(51%)	148	(51%)
Female	8,230	(50%)	4,760	(51%)	158	(49%)	139	(49%)
Total	16,498	(100%)	9,345	(100%)	321	(100%)	287	(100%)

Second, the age distribution of the respondents was examined and compared With the age distribution of Reed Town residents, as given in the 1960 census. (As mentioned earlier, the population of Reed Town has remained about the same in the past decade or so, and it is safe to assume that there was no drastic change in the population structure of the community between 1960 and 1963.) Table 3 reveals the largest discrepancy between the total adult population and the sample to be approximately 2 percent. Thus, my sample reflects the age distribution of the total adult population of Reed Town.

Third, since the central focus of this survey was the political attitudes of the people in Reed Town, Table 4 is presented to show any discrepancy in political party preference which exists between the universe and the sample. The table provides a comparison of the political party preferences shown in the survey and in the general national election held three months later on 21 November 1963. Two questions concerning party preferences were asked in the survey. The first question simply asked one's party preference (not membership); the second question asked the respondent who had no particular preference to show his inclination toward one direction or other: "If you do not have any particular party preference, do you think of yourself as closer to the Socialist Party or the Liberal-Democratic Party?" To this second question, twenty-six respondents replied that they were close to neither the Socialist Party nor the Liberal-Democratic Party; twenty-eight others made no response at all. These fifty-four respondents who refused to identify themselves with any party were excluded from the tabulation in Table 4. It might be noted that in the district there was only one candidate for the House of Representatives who was without any particular party preference. One might add, however, that he was known as a conservative candidate.

Table 3. Age Distribution of Reed Town Population (%)

Age	Adult Population (1960)	Sample (1963)
20–24	16.2	15.0
25–29	13.1	13.6
30–34	10.2	11.1

Age	Adult Population (1960)	Sample (1963)
35–39	9.6	10.8
40–44	9.6	7.7
45–54	17.8	15.7
55–64	12.6	14.3
65+	10.8	11.8
Total %	99.9	100.0
Total N	8533	287

Table 4. Political Party Preference

	General election (21 Nov 1963)		Survey (July-Aug 1963)	
Preference	N	%	N	%
Liberal-Democratic Party	5511	74.7	172	73.8
Socialist Party	1653	22.4	58	24.9
Democratic Socialist Party	53	0.7	1	0.4
Communist Party	137	1.9	2	0.9
Independent	23	0.3	0	0
Total N and %	7377	100.0	233	100.0

The ratios I find among sample respondents concerning their party choice are close to those shown by the voting record in the general election of 1963: 74.8 vs. 73.8 percent and 22.4 vs. 24.9 percent for the two major parties. Again in Table 4 one finds that the discrepancy is approximately 2 percent, as was the case in the first two instances.

Further comparative data are given in Tables 9, 10, and 17 in chapter 3. Although these data presentations are not sufficient to draw any final conclusion as to the representativeness of the sample, they do indicate that the sample used for this survey is not significantly different from the universe I wanted to study, as far as I can tell from the matching of three variables. Chapter 3, which describes the community under study in relation to other parts of Japan, may help determine the extent to which I may make generalizations from this limited study.

I have described the leadership selection and the procedure for sampling the general population. The model proposed calls for a further step: a classifying of the community power structure in terms of the extent to which the leaders agree or disagree among themselves as to their attitudes. The next section delineates the procedure used to compare the attitudes among top leaders, economic dominants, and general population sample respondents.

COMPARING THE ATTITUDES

The model introduced earlier and illustrated in Figure 1 calls for an examination of the attitudes of the leaders as to the extent of their diversity and a comparison of their attitudes with those of the citizenry in order to ascertain how well the leaders represent the attitudes of the public. What aspects of a man's attitude or value orientation ought to be examined in order to determine the kind of power structure that exists in a community as envisioned in Figure 1? I am obviously concerned with those aspects of one's attitude which relate closely to political behavior. And within the realm of political behavior, I am interested in attitudes that are most likely to constitute a basic factor in shaping one's political action as a community leader or a concerned citizen.

Although there has been some work done on a similar problem in the United States Congress (Miller and Stokes 1963), no students of community power structure have attempted to examine the representativeness of the community leaders in any systematic manner as proposed in this book. First, the *attitudes toward four issues* considered to be important for Reed Town were selected for investigation, and the attitudes of each group will be examined as to their homogeneity and relationship to the other two groups in order to determine the type of community power structure in Reed Town. Second, the *political party preference* of the top leaders,

economic dominants, and the citizenry will be investigated to see how well the top leaders represent the partisan views of the public. Included also in this phase of the study will be the attitudes of the three groups toward *domestic and international* leaders. The third group of data to be used to determine the type of community power structure is not as relevant to what I am trying to do as are the first two sets of data. Nevertheless, *a series of attitudinal questions* to elicit the information desired to form various scales will be used to test the relationship among the three groups. The scale titles are: F Scale, political efficacy, political obligation, ideological orientation, political cynicism, nationalism-internationalism, peace-war orientation, war anticipation, anti-Americanism, and anti-Russianism. Also included were miscellaneous questions on political opinions, current topics, and local issues. Admittedly, some are more relevant to what I wish to include than others. As is the case in any statistical analysis, the results depend on what one includes in one's data and what one excludes. In the future, pertinent questions pertaining both to value orientations and attitudes in ascertaining the power structure type as proposed in Figure 1 should be selected through more explicit criteria.

There is an important cultural reason for including the third set of data in my theoretical framework: the fact that the Japanese are known to avoid open conflict at all costs when it is possible to do so, which makes it difficult to find relevant issues for study that show differences in attitudes or stands taken by different groups. As stated earlier, all official decisions in Reed Town are made unanimously. Under such a circumstance, where it is extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain behavioral data which can be used to ascertain differences in preference among different individuals, an alternative is to obtain attitudinal data which may be used to imply possible behavioral data.

The last set of data was gathered in such a manner as to allow statistical analysis. Standard deviation, the most commonly used measure of dispersion or variability (see, for example, McClosky et al. 1960), was employed to measure the extent of homogeneity found in the attitudinal items described above. Sigma scores were computed on each item. The higher the sigma, the more heterogeneous the attitude. The theoretical range of sigma is from zero, where all leaders give identical responses to an item, to 2.50, where an equal number of responses is found at each of the two extreme ends of the re-

sponse range. Six responses were possible: “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “agree slightly,” “disagree slightly,” “disagree somewhat,” and “disagree strongly.”

My aim was to determine whether a given set of attitude scores found among the leaders was homogeneous or heterogeneous. In order to determine a cutoff point between these two categories, a standard deviation score was calculated for a situation where respondents answer an item at random. The sigma score for a situation where a dozen respondents give six different answers, with two individuals in each category, is 1.71. In my analysis, sigma scores at this level or above denote “highly heterogeneous” responses (extreme dispersion). Sigma scores between 1.70 and 1.26 are considered “heterogeneous”; those between 1.25 and 0.81, “homogeneous”; and those between 0.80 and zero, “extremely homogeneous.”

The second variable in the proposed model of community power structure (Figure 1) is the extent of representation in a community (the horizontal dimension of the figure), as manifested by the leaders’ attitudes. The next section will show how the attitudes of the top leaders, economic dominants, and the general population sample were compared. (Several terms will be used in the present study to refer to the general population sample respondents: “citizenry,” “public,” and “rank-and-file citizens.”)

It is relatively simple to compare the attitudes of two groups, since there are only two possible outcomes. When, however, there are three groups to be compared—not simultaneously, but two at a time—there are eight possible combinations. Inasmuch as I was interested in defining the role of the economic dominants in community politics, the decision was made to compare two groups at a time so as to clarify the relationship between the economic dominants and the leaders on the one hand, and the relationship between each of those two groups and the general population on the other. Several steps are involved in this process. First, the mean, standard deviation, and variance for each group are calculated on the items that appear on Cards V and VI of the questionnaire (see appendix). Second, the student T Test is employed to discern if there is a statistically significant difference between the two means compared. Consequently, the T Test is performed three times per item. Third, the results of the T Test are then compared among the three different combinations of two groups. As stated, this operation produces eight logically possible outcomes, as specified in Figure 2.

Type 1 in Figure 2 denotes results showing that the three groups possess three different views on an item. Further categorizations can be made specifying which group has a positive, neutral, or negative orientation to that particular item.



Type	GP-RL	GP-ED	RL-ED	Description
1	+	+	+	All three groups have different attitudes
2	+	+	–	RL and ED share attitudes, GP is unique
3	+	–	+	GP and ED share attitudes, RL is unique
4	–	+	+	RL and GP share attitudes, ED is unique
5	–	–	+	GP takes neutral position
6	–	+	–	RL takes neutral position

Type	GP-RL	GP-ED	RL-ED	Description
7	+	–	–	ED takes neutral position
8	–	–	–	All three groups share attitude

Note: GP: general population sample
RL: reputational leadership sample
ED: economic dominants sample
+ : statistically significant difference (*P* ? 0.05)
– : statistically insignificant difference

Figure 2. The Eight Possible Outcomes

Types 2, 3, and 4 refer to results in which one of the three groups possesses a unique attitude in relation to the other two groups. One would expect to find many Type 2 results in a community which is run by an economic elite. Type 3 will be found in a community in which the economic dominants do not play an important role in community decision-making. They might well be alienated to such an extent that their sense of political efficacy would be about the same as that of the general population. Type 4 results can occur under the same conditions that produce Type 2. One may find this pattern also in what Schulze (1961) refers to as a community in which power is bifurcated.

Types 5, 6, and 7 all describe a situation in which one of the groups takes a neutral position, while the other two take an extreme stand. Type 5 implies a conflict between the reputational leaders and the economic dominants. One should expect to find Type 6 in a community in which the reputational leaders take a neutral position, while the general population and the economic dominants hold opposite views. Type 7 denotes the same kind of situation except that the economic dominants take a neutral position in this instance.

If an outcome of Type 8 is found on many items, one may say that this community has either a simple representative form of government or a near anarchical form of government, since there ceases to be conflict between what I consider to be important segments of the community population.

After comparing the results of the T Test, the fourth and last step is to discern the areas in which attitude items conform to these eight different types.

If one finds that the economic dominants are just as politically efficacious as the reputational leaders, one may conclude that the community under study is governed by the reputational leaders and the economic dominants, who feel equally sure of realizing their political goals. If the reputational technique automatically shows a community run by the economic dominants or the power elite, one should not find very many Type 3 results.

COMMUNITY-ISSUE ANALYSIS

As indicated earlier, concentrating on issues in a study of community power structure can be misleading, for the power structure might be so subtle that no important and potentially conflict-laden issues ever become openly discussed public issues. However, this is not to say that one should pay no attention to public issues.

Issues can be theorized and analyzed in several different ways. For example, one could view them in terms of their potentiality for becoming important issues as opposed to openly discussed issues (Swanson 1962: 6–12). One could examine issues by scrutinizing people's attitudes toward them. Dahl (1956:90–123), for example, talks about "strong consensus with weak preferences" and "strong consensus with strong preferences."

THE ISSUE-INVOLVEMENT MODEL

What I am proposing here is essentially a static model of the analysis of issue involvement among leaders. The model, however, is capable of producing hypotheses concerning the dynamics of community decision-making through certain assumptions about the actors in the decision-making system. This model is presented in order to classify different issues into meaningful categories, for the purpose of generating hypotheses concerning the relationship between issue involvement and leadership structure.

Several concepts which are involved in the proposed model need to be defined at this time. "Intensity," for the purpose of this model, is defined as the extent to which members of the community leadership system are concerned with a given issue. One way to operationalize this definition is to count the number of leaders who are concerned with a particular issue. If a problem, such as a town tax, is mentioned as an important

issue by 75 percent of the leaders interviewed, one may consider this particular issue high on the intensity scale. The cutoff point may be placed at any point, depending upon the purpose of a particular analysis and the frequency distribution of the particular issue under study, for I consider this a continuous variable.

The next concept has to do with the extent to which the concern over an issue is *dispersed* or *concentrated* among the various strata of leaders under investigation. If it is concentrated, where is it concentrated? For instance, the nature of an issue may be such that only the top leaders are aware of it. This concept needs to be operationalized through two steps. First, an examination must be made to see whether an issue in a given community is considered a major issue by all strata of the community leadership system. The issue will then be classified as either "dispersed" or "concentrated." The second step involves only the "concentrated" category. There are roughly three kinds of "concentration": (1) concentration based on specialized areas of decision-making, such as is the case when all members of a school board are concerned with the construction of a new school building; (2) concentration based on the attitudes of the leaders, as, for example, the feeling of all members of the Sons of the Rising Sun Society that the decreasing prestige of the emperor is an important issue; and (3) concentration based on a hierarchy within the leadership system, where the assumption is that leaders with the most prestige may see certain issues as important and pressing, whereas those with less prestige and power, because of their cognitive differences, may not regard these issues as relevant.

Table 5. Issue Involvement

	Concentrated		
Intensity	Upper	Lower	Dispersed
High	A1	A2	A3
Low	B1	B2	B3

While there are three possible categories of concentration, as described above, only the last is illustrated in Table 5, since it is relevant to my analysis of the issue involvement of the leaders

and economic dominants (in chapter 5). In Table 5, A3 represents the kind of issue with which everyone in the leadership system is concerned, regardless of his position within the hierarchy of the system. It could be any common problem regarded as important by the community as a whole, such as the problem of smog. The presence of issues which fall into categories A3 or B3 is of little concern to those who are interested in the internal dynamics of the decision-making system. However, the appearance of A2 or the transformation of B2 to A2 is important. The appearance of A1 or B1 may indicate a future change in the internal dynamics of the community power structure. Of course, it is assumed in these hypotheses, among other things, that those who are in power will attempt to maintain their power and influence. An earlier study (Kuroda 1967b) supports this assumption, for it was found that not only do those who are actively engaged in politics desire to maintain the amount of community influence they currently possess, but they also express a desire to have more influence, whereas those without any community influence to begin with show no desire for political influence.

Thus, the appearance of A2 can be taken as an indicator of instability within the leadership system. Top leaders obviously attempt to prevent the transformation of any issue into A2. Perceptive leaders may try to divide the issue on the basis of specialized areas of decision-making, in such a way that cleavages along the line of the vertical hierarchy would not occur.

The proposed model is a basic one which can be adapted to the specific empirical data found in Reed Town in order to maximize its utility in explaining leadership dynamics in the community.

THE CASE STUDY

In addition to the model of issue analysis proposed above, the decision was made to study at least one openly debated issue by using what is usually known as the case-study method of collecting whatever relevant materials one can in reconstructing a given case. After speaking to a number of people in Reed Town, it became obvious to me that the most dramatic and significant issue which showed each side's position clearly was one involving the construction of school buildings.

The findings on this issue will be related to several of the propositions Dahl offers in *Who Governs?* (1961), to see to what extent and in what ways this particular issue, which caused so

much friction and so many emotional outbursts in Reed Town, is similar to what Dahl found in New Haven. Newspaper accounts and informal discussions with people we met were used to reconstruct the case. The only publication in Reed Town, which reports what the local government wants its citizens to know, remained completely silent on this controversy, which lasted over a year. Apparently, there was felt to be no need to report an event about which everyone knew and with which many were directly involved.

COMMUNITY POLITICAL CHANGE

Thus far in my concern with the community power structure, I have treated the community political system as if it were static. Yet all political systems are subject to change of some sort. The problem for nonrevolutionary politicians is how to maintain a dynamic equilibrium while the system goes through change. One task of political scientists is to predict and explain change in political systems. One must somehow measure the kinds and rate of political change before one can begin to explain why political systems change as they do.

THE MODEL

The conceptual scheme suggested in this section is an attempt to measure and describe political change. There are a few assumptions which must be made explicit at this time. First, it is assumed that there is no direct influence from outside a given political system to change it. In other words, the proposed model describes only those changes that are the product of internal changes within a community. Second, the use of political power or influence or both is a necessary condition for political change. Third, those who aspire to political power do so because they want some change in the existing allocation of values. Fourth and last, political participation is also a necessary condition for the exercise of political power. If one wishes to affect the decisional outcome, one must in some way participate in the process of decision-making.

For these reasons and in line with these assumptions, political participation and community influence aspiration were selected as the two significant variables in measuring the quality of political change or the degree of stability in the process of political change. When power aspiration is high

among the members of a political system, one can infer that the system desires a political change. The kind of political change, however, is determined to a large measure by the kinds of citizens who desire the change.

Thus, two analytically distinguishable systems are possible: a stable system and a revolutionary system. These two types are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

The Stable Political System By this I mean a political system in which the quality of political change is such that it maintains a dynamic equilibrium. *This system appears when there is a positive correlation between the two variables, political participation and power aspiration.* If the citizens who seek political power are found among the already politically active citizens, one should not anticipate political change that disrupts the existing political order or regime. In such a process, it is likely that only legal means would be employed to deal with problems arising out of political change. In short, this system may be dynamic but it is stable. All augurs well for the system as long as the aspirants to political power are limited to the citizens already active under it. The system tries to obliterate all potential problems that might produce dissidents, who in turn might use inactive citizens as a source of political power in order to bring about basic structural changes in the political system. Welfare programs of varied sorts may be considered as a means to thus placate potential dissenters in the political system.

The Revolutionary Political System Aristotle reasons in his *Politics* that revolutions are led by those who had been hitherto powerless elements of a political system. If those who are seeking political power belong to hitherto impotent and inactive segments of a political system, one can expect the system to be a revolutionary one, in the sense that either the system has just gone through a radical and basic political change that disrupted the previous political regime or the system is about ready for such a change. In Black communities of the United States, one observes young men and women who desire power. They are not only dissatisfied with the existing political regime but are also willing to do something to change it, even at the risk of being killed or harmed. They are probably not too concerned with being imprisoned, since it is hard to grow up without being arrested during some stage of political socialization in Black communities. Some of them regard the ghetto itself as a prison. Older Blacks, who may be just as dissatisfied with the existing "White" power structure, are not found in the streets where the action is because of their timidity, which was internalized

in them during the *critical periods of their political socialization* (Kuroda and Kuroda 1968). Young men and women who participate in politics also seem to want more and more power as they acquire power and participate more.

When hitherto inactive and impotent citizens seek political power, the problems they face seem insurmountable, in the sense that existing means to gain access to political power are not available to them. Consequently, they often resort to violence as a means to their end. Such is the case when vociferous Blacks are led to employ direct violence, which is against the rules of the game in a stable political system.

Under the revolutionary political system, those who want power have neither the necessary experience nor the skill to bring about a stable political change. This often results in the eruption of violence as one observes it in various parts of the United States today.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

This section describes the way in which the two key variables used in the proposed model—political participation and power aspiration—are operationalized in the present study. Chapter 7 presents my findings based upon this model.

The *political participation* scale is a measure of the extent to which an individual is involved in local political matters, including electoral activities. Since 90 percent of the respondents claimed that they voted regularly and since Reed Town's official records also showed that a voting turnout of 85 to 90 percent was not uncommon (as will be shown in chapter 3), my question on the respondents' voting habits was excluded from the scale. Five items selected from a battery of questions were used to construct a Guttman scale:

1. Has anyone come to you within the past year for advice on political party or election matters? (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) NA.
2. How often during the past year have you seriously discussed local government or community matters with your friends? (1) Often, (2) Once in a while, (3) Not at all, (4) NA.
3. Have you taken an active part in any local government or community issue since the annexation (1955)? (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) NA.

4. I have a list of some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. Can you tell me whether you did any of these things during the election campaign last year (1962)? Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates? (1) Yes, (2) No, (3) NA.
5. How interested are you in what the town government is doing? (1) Very interested, (2) Somewhat interested, (3) Not very interested, (4) Not at all interested, (5) NA.
Coefficient of reproducibility: .99
Item scalability: .77
Note: NA stands for "not ascertainable."

Power aspiration is obviously a difficult concept to operationalize, particularly in view of the fact that social scientists are ambiguous about their abstract definition of power (Riker 1964). A decision was made to let the respondents provide their own interpretation of the terms "power" or "influence." The question was stated in clear and simple Japanese so that the respondents could be expected to give meaningful responses. An English version of the question reads as follows:

> Would you like to have more influence in community affairs than you now have or are you pretty much satisfied with what you have? (1) Would like more influence, (2) Satisfied with present influence, (3) NA.

Those who answered that they would like to have more influence were classified as having a high power aspiration, whereas those who were satisfied with what they then had were classified as low.

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE FAMILY

Chapter 2 began with an attempt to place local politics in position in the world of politics. The last theoretical model to be presented—political participation/power aspiration—again shows a link between local politics and national politics in the process of political change. Are the political changes that are taking place at the local level similar to those taking place at the national level? Is local politics changing as rapidly as national politics? In order to answer these and related questions, a model of political change based upon the role of the family in the political socialization process is proposed.

The family, one of the oldest and most widely spread social institutions in human society, acts as an important agency of political socialization, the process by which a person acquires a particular set of political norms and behavioral patterns. Hyman's generalization (1959:17) that "humans must learn their political behavior early and well and persist in it" is accepted by many sociologists and political scientists in the United States. The topic to be discussed here is the role of the family in political change at different levels of politics.

In one of my earlier works (Kuroda 1965a:133) I stated:

> One's social or family origin is a sufficient if not a necessary condition to enter the ruling class in such political systems as premodern India, Tokugawa Japan, and pre-Faisal Saudi Arabia, all of which are characterized by political stability and the inaccessible political elite. Japan may be conceived of as a political system moving from a non-equalitarian, relatively closed political elite characterized by hereditary nobility, nepotism, and a ruling class in the classic sense of the term, to a system based upon more equalitarian principles and a more accessible political leadership structure. In this sense, Japan can be placed on a continuum somewhere between a polity like that of Saudi Arabia and that of the United States. Both nations are relatively stable in comparison to Japan, which since World War II has been and still is undergoing rather rapid social and political change....

Furthermore, I found that no significant association exists between the political orientation of elite law students in Japan and that of their parents (Kuroda 1965e). The two studies cited dealt with Japanese law students, many of whom will, in the future, become active in politics at the national level. An attempt is made in this book to build on those earlier findings and speculations by examining the political orientation of the respondents in Reed Town and that of their parents. By so doing, I hope to grasp in more detail the dimensions of political change in postwar Japan.

TYPES OF POLITICAL CHANGE

Table 6 presents nine different types of intergenerational political changes. In the table, plus signs denote a positive association between the political orientation of the respondents and that of their fathers; minus signs represent a negative association; and zeros signify no significant relationship.

Table 6. Political Changes at the Local and National Levels

Level	Type of polity								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Local politics	+	+	+	0	0	0	–	–	–
National politics	+	–	0	+	–	0	+	–	0

In the Type 1 polity, one observes continuity in political orientation over two generations at both levels of politics. In such a polity, national leaders will be recruited from the same sectors of its system as its present leaders and will possess a similar ideological orientation. The same trend will prevail at the local level as well. The United States might be placed in this category, with the exception of its Black communities. Such a political system would be characterized by stability over a long period of time.

The Type 2 polity is structured in such a way that the situation at the local level remains the same as that described above, while at the national level one observes a negative association between the political orientation of the present generation and that of their elders. Such a situation may be found in a polity which has undergone political change radical to the extent that those who were active in national politics prior to the change are no longer allowed to participate actively in politics, assuming that they were spared their lives by the new leaders. An early phase of Egypt's bloodless revolution in 1952 may be an example of this type of political change.

Type 3 refers to a political change at the national level sufficient to produce at least no significant association between the political orientation of the leaders and that of their fathers. Most political changes observed in Asia and Africa since 1945 belong to either Type 2 or Type 3.

The next three types conform respectively to the first three described, as far as national politics is concerned. At the local level, however, plus signs are replaced by zeros, signifying more changes than in the first three types. It could be that political change may take the form of Type 2, for example, but gradually alter its characteristics to conform to Type 5; this is often a necessary condition for more basic changes at the local level in many political systems in the world today. That is to say, a revo-

lution is introduced first at the national level and then gradually the revolution affects politics at the local level to the extent that it too experiences considerable change.

The last three types of political change represent more radical changes than the middle three. Type 8 is a model of radical revolutionary change such as the Chinese and Cuban revolutions represent. Those who had became have-nots overnight in these countries.

The question I pose now is this: What kind of political change did Japan experience in its postwar era? I will be able to make some speculations on the basis of what has been discussed in this section. Operational procedures employed in this study are described next.

In addition to the Reed Town survey data, data from another study I conducted are used to test the proposed model. For national-level politics, data from my earlier survey on Japanese law students are employed; this survey is by no means the ideal choice, yet it is the only one of its kind now in existence which can be used for this purpose.

The survey of law students (Kuroda 1962) was based on a sample of students at the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto and trainees at the Legal Education and Research Institute. These schools were selected because of their reputation for producing national leaders in modern Japan (Iyasu 1960, Kuroda 1962). The same data, in slightly different form, are presented in my article "Agencies of Political Socialization and Political Change: Political Orientation of Japanese Law Students" (Kuroda 1965e). The following questions constituted the major variables involved in the analysis:

1. Student Personal Political Involvement Scale
   Are you involved at present in any political activities? (1) Yes, (2) No. Do you plan to go into politics (full time or part time) after graduation? (1) Yes, (2) No.
   How interested are you in politics? (1) very much interested, (2) Interested, (3) Not so interested, (4) Not at all interested. Coefficient of reproducibility: 0.996

Because of the small number of the most active students, the categories were combined to form the "politicals" (those who plan to enter politics and who are interested in politics) and the "spectators" (those who are not going into politics although

they are interested in it). A third category comprises those who neither plan to go into politics nor have any interest in it—the "apoliticals."

2. Family Political Involvement
   Do you have parents, siblings, or close relatives who are or were involved in politics? (1) Yes, (2) No.
3. Party Preference (student)
   Will you tell me which party you now support as well as a party you used to support, if different from your present choice? (1) Communist Party, (2) Socialist Party, (3) Any other left-wing party (specify), (4) Liberal-Democratic Party, (5) Any other right-wing party (specify), and (6) No preference.
4. Party Preference (father and mother)
   Your father's party preference: answer categories as above.

The 1963 survey of Reed Town provided the corresponding data on the local level. The extent of political involvement was measured through the use of Guttman-type scaling of personal political participation as described on pages 47–48.

1. Family Political Involvement
   To what extent was your family (parents, brothers, etc.) interested in community affairs while you grew up? (1) Very interested, (2) Somewhat interested, (3) Not at all interested.
2. Party Identification
   What political party do you support? (1) Liberal-Democratic Party, (2) Democratic Socialist Party, (3) Socialist Party, (4) Communist Party, (5) Other right-wing parties, (6) Other left-wing parties, (7) No party identification.
3. Parents' Party Identification
   Question and answer categories are essentially the same as those above.

This chapter introduced my theories, models, and operational definitions. The chapters to follow are framed within these orientations. Obviously, not all operational definitions are given in this chapter. Some of the reader's possible questions may be answered as he reads further. It may also be necessary for some readers to return to this chapter while reading the chapters that follow, since the models described here constitute

the foundation of the entire book. The appendix provides an English translation of the complete questionnaire used; this, too, may answer possible questions.

The next chapter delineates the Japanese political system and Reed Town. This description will be followed by empirical findings, presented in accordance with the theoretical framework that I have described.

3
Reed Town, Japan: The Research Site

INTRODUCTION

The understanding of community politics is increased not only through the use of an explicit theoretical framework and the description of operational definitions of major concepts but also through the knowledge of the particular community under study. Provided in this chapter is a description of the Japanese political system as a whole and that of the community, which furnishes a contextual basis for the data analysis in subsequent chapters. Inasmuch as this is not a book on Japanese politics as such, the description of national politics will be kept at a minimum. [1] In describing the community, attempts will be made to compare the characteristics of Reed Town with those of the nation as a whole, in order to place the community in a meaningful perspective.

THE JAPANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Japan's political system has gone through two major changes in recent times. First, the end of Tokugawa Shogunate rule and the advent of the Meiji Restoration (1867–1868) was the beginning of political modernization from the traditional feudal Japan. Various European political institutions and ideas were incorporated into the Japanese political system and Japan was on her way toward liberal and democratic rule when the military and extreme nationalists began their upsurge in the early 1930s, which culminated in World War II. Japan was defeated for the first time in her over 2000 years of history. The occupation of Japan by the Allied forces brought about further democratization in the postwar period. This, then, was the second

drastic political change she experienced in the less than 100 years since the Meiji Restoration. The new constitution was promulgated in 1946 and became effective in 1947. The Allied occupation of Japan ended in 1952 and she regained her independence.

I shall first of all describe briefly the structure of Japan's political system. This description will be followed by an attempt to characterize the political culture within which the Japanese people carry on their political activities.

If I were to discuss all the organizations relevant to the functioning of the Japanese government, as defined in chapter 1, I would obviously have to include many associations and organizations in my discussion. However, I shall include here only those which constitute the core of the Japanese political system: the National Diet, the prime minister's office and cabinet, the Supreme Court and lower courts, the political parties, and the interest groups.

The National Diet, consisting of two houses, is designed to make laws, although a great majority of the laws that are passed in the diet originate with the executive branch of the government. The House of Representatives, the more powerful of the two houses, consists of 491 popularly elected representatives. The House of Councillors is composed of 250 popularly elected members.

Roughly one-third of the diet seats in the recent past have been held by the Socialist Party and other progressive political parties; the majority have been maintained by the Liberal-Democratic Party, the most conservative of all political parties in Japan and one having close connections with big business (Yanaga 1968). The Japanese Communist Party normally maintains a few seats in the diet, while the Kōmeitō (Fair Play Party) has made considerable gains in recent years, obtaining about 5 percent of the votes in the 1967 election. The Kōmeitō is the political wing of a new religious group called *Sōkagakkai* (Value-Creating Society), a Buddhist association. Its ideological orientation is mixed and difficult to characterize.

The Kōmei Party won only 28 seats in the last general election, held in December 1972, compared to 47 held before the election. The Communist and Socialist parties, on the other hand, gained in the last general election. The Communist Party tripled their total seats with 38, the highest number ever in the history of the Japan Communist Party. The Socialists came in second as usual, with 118 seats in the last election, a gain of 31. The rise of progressive parties in the 1972 General Election is

attributable to the emergence of "citizen" movements sweeping many communities throughout Japan to a large extent (for details, see Kuroda 1972).

The Socialist Party advocates a positive neutral policy for Japan and rejects the pro-West policy pursued by the Liberal-Democratic Party. Its members represent a wide ideological spectrum within socialism. There is also the Democratic Socialist Party, which split off from the Japan Socialist Party and which represents an ideology of moderation. Their policy stands lie between those of the Japan Socialist Party and the Liberal-Democratic Party. The Democratic Socialist Party's strength remains rather weak, with only 17 seats in the diet.

The diet is vested by the constitution to elect the prime minister. Since Liberal-Democrats constitute a majority in the diet, the prime minister of Japan is naturally chosen from the Liberal-Democratic Party. (The one exception since the end of World War II was a socialist, head of the short-lived [1947–1948] Katayama Cabinet.) Japanese political parties are infested with factions, as has been pointed out by many, [2] so that what usually happens is that the Liberal-Democrat who commands the largest support from a coalition of various factions within the Liberal-Democratic Party wins the coveted premiership. (The Japan Socialist Party too suffers from factional rivals, but its internal struggles are based more on ideological grounds than are those of the Liberal-Democratic Party.) The prime minister's position is similar to that of his counterpart in Great Britain. He has the right to choose his cabinet officers. He can be ousted by the diet through a vote of nonconfidence. The constitution requires that a majority of the cabinet members be diet members. In practice nearly all members of the cabinet have been drawn from the House of Representatives. A very few have been members of the House of Councillors or outsiders. In reality, the problem for the prime minister is how to balance his cabinet so as to maintain and strengthen his position among the contending factions within the Liberal-Democratic Party.

All cabinet decisions are made collectively, with all cabinet members held responsible for any decision. As Ward (1967:94) points out, what this means is that the cabinet makes its decisions by *consensus*. There is no room for disagreement. The cabinet continues to discuss problems, without any formal vote-taking, until it reaches a unanimous decision. As will be pointed out, the Reed Town Assembly acts very much like the Japanese cabinet, with a consistent record of all decisions being made unanimously.

As is the case with many aspects of postwar Japan, the legal system in Japan was heavily influenced by the United States after 1945. It now has provisions for judicial review. However, the judicial system operates quite differently in Japan, where people are socialized to avoid open conflict at all costs, than it does in the United States. The jury system, although tried in the 1920s, is not workable in Japan, where the ordinary people simply do not feel that they have the authority to pass judgment on their fellow citizens. The people feel that only trained authorities are able to judge what is right and what is wrong. Judges and prosecutors in Japan are not elected but are appointed by the government, and they constitute part of the Japanese bureaucracy.

The emperor, unlike in prewar years, is considered simply a symbol of the state and no longer occupies an important position in Japanese politics.

Thus far I have treated the major institutions which constitute the core of Japanese politics. I shall now view Japanese politics in vertical perspective and see how the national government relates to local governments.

Japan operates under a *unitary form of government.* Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union, and India, where heterogeneous populations constitute a nation under federalism, Japan, as in the case of Great Britain, is composed of a remarkably homogeneous people. The control exercised by the central government was far-reaching before 1945. The Allied occupation attempted to decentralize the Japanese government, as evidenced in the new constitution. For example, the governor of a prefecture used to be appointed by the Home Ministry; under the constitution he is elected directly by the people. However, many of the newly elected governors turned out to be former government bureaucrats who were immune from the postwar purge because of their bureaucratic positions. Thus, the control of prefectural and local governments by the central or national government continued even after the promulgation of the new constitution. And the tendency toward recentralization still continues in present-day Japan. The only countervailing force is that a governor must still be elected, which requires him to represent the interest of the voters. In his function as an intermediary between the central government and the local government, he is more representative of the national government than the other way around.

The nation is divided into forty-six units which are equivalent to the states of the United States. They are referred to, in Japanese, as *to-dō-fu- ken,* because they are composed of one *to* (Tokyo), one *do* (Hokkaidō), two *fu* (Kyoto and Osaka [urban prefectures]), and forty-two *k en* (prefectures). Reed Town is located in a prefecture near Tokyo. These prefectures are further divided into *gun* (counties) and then into cities, towns and villages.

The Japanese unitary form of government is also well interwoven with the traditional Japanese values, such as respect for authority, the superior-inferior relationship, and so on. Ward (1967) characterizes these aspects of the Japanese culture as constituting monism in the Japanese mind. The Japanese tend to regard their political system as a natural pattern, where the levels of organization progress from the lowest level, the family, to the national government. Obviously, such a way of thinking may be changing among the young Japanese, but it still persists to some extent among the older generation who are in the decision-making positions. *Thus, the combination of such a cultural heritage and the formal frame work within which the Japanese government functions makes the Japanese local government much less independent than the American counterpart,*

Steiner (1965:327) says that local decision-making units "are not only used to accepting guidance from above, but are afraid of acting without it. Thus if a municipality desires to adopt a by-law on its own initiative, the mayor often shows a draft to the Local Affairs Office of the prefecture before submitting it to his assembly. The same is true for the budget." Local as well as prefectural governments are afraid to act on important matters without the consent of higher authorities. And the national government not only expects lower authorities to have this attitude but is making an effort to maintain its power over the lower governing bodies.

Another force working to maintain this strong central government and weak local government is "pork-barrel" politics. As long as conservative parties maintain their majority in the diet, progressive local leaders will find it difficult to bring about any changes leading to decentralization and more local autonomy. This may partly explain why Reed Town's Mayor Abe, a socialist, ran in the mayoral election as an independent. He and other progressive local leaders are afraid of the central government's retaliation. They must walk a tightrope between their constituents, who desire more local autonomy, and the central government, which controls the local government's purse.

Steiner (1956:195) hypothesizes that mayors and village heads spend as much as 80 percent of their time acting on behalf of the central government. Presumably their remaining time is spent in serving the local needs. Obviously, how one calculates these percentages depends largely upon how the distinction between the two different functions of local government is operationalized. In many cases, the distinction is blurred by such programs as "grants-in-aid." In any case, there is no doubt to any observer that *there is less local autonomy in Japan than in the United States.* Since a more detailed description of the national-local government relationship is given in chapter 4, in conjunction with the way the residents of Reed Town regard local politics in relation to national politics, I shall now move from the description of political structure to that of the political culture which characterizes Japanese politics today.

The *structural dimensions* of a political system reveal only a part of that system. How the previously described set of political roles in Japan functions can be better understood if one knows something about the *psychological dimensions* of the system. Values, attitudes, and actions that characterize the individual citizens in a nation constitute the political culture of the system. What are some of the salient characteristics of Japanese political culture?

Collectivity Orientation The first characteristic to be noted is *collec tivity orientation* (Dore 1958:440–441; Matsumoto 1960:59–66). The Japanese, when compared with Westerners, are considerably more group- or collectivity-oriented. Their life centers around groups: for example, the family and cliques in which there is a deep sense of in-group cohesion. Although there has been a trend toward an individual orientation, a pervasive collectivity orientation continues to persist in Japan, particularly in rural areas. In a national survey conducted in 1958, 37 percent of the people stated that they preferred the postwar style of life centering on the individual to the prewar pattern of life centered on the family and the nation. Fifty percent of the respondents preferred the prewar style of life, whereas others gave no definite answers (Tōkeisūri Kenkyūjo 1966: 437). Those who preferred the postwar style of life emphasizing the importance of the individual were found among the younger, the better-educated, and the Socialist Party supporters, whereas the older, the less-educated, the farmers, and the Liberal-Democratic Party supporters tended to adhere to the prewar collectivity orientation.

Likewise in Reed Town, the results of factor analyses of the items included in Table 32 (chapter 5) show that what is referred to as collectivity orientation accounted for the great amount of the variance among the public and its leaders. One of the seventy-one items, an item on political efficacy, was deleted from the leadership group analysis since all leaders agreed strongly on it (Kuroda 1968b). A missing-data program was employed which enabled me to have a correlation matrix for both groups, since there were a number of NA's ("Not Ascertainables," including "Don't Knows"). The eleven dimensions identified accounted for only 36.5 percent of the total variance for the public, whereas about 70 percent of the variance for the leaders was explained by the nine chosen dimensions. What was most interesting was that in both groups "collectivity orientation" emerged as the most important dimension. Although what is termed "collectivity orientation" is not identical in each case, there is a high degree of association, as indicated by the cosine value of 0.73. The concern for groups underlies many Japanese attitudes. Here, then, is more empirical evidence supporting the generalization.

Now, how does this collectivity orientation manifest itself in the political behavior of the Japanese people? It means that decisions are likely to be made on a unanimous basis by reaching a consensus. Every attempt is made to avoid open conflict among the members of a group. This underlying factor, then, leads to a propensity for *consensus-building* rather than an *open, competitive* style in the process of decision-making. Such a style of decision-making was referred to as the *ringi* system by Abegglen (1958:83–84) in his work on the Japanese factory. The word *ringi* denotes a decision-making process in which a proposed solution to a problem is prepared beforehand by a few individuals who then ask others for their approval of it, rather than the problem itself being brought up for open discussion, in which pro and con opinions are aired. A Japanese social psychologist (Takagi 1969:54) proposes the hypothesis that decision-making in Japan is characterized by the importance of the *tatemae* (rules of the game) and the absence of *honne* (one's real intention). Decisions are delayed until some solution is worked out that is acceptable to all parties concerned. Under such circumstances, then, there is no room for dissenters. Consequently, there is little likelihood of the emergence of an effective opposition party. When a minority group does emerge, it is treated as an outside party rather than as an opposition or minority party in the competitive political game.

These factors led Scalapino and Masumi (1962) to label the Japan Socialist Party as only half a party. The continuing existence of collectivity orientation creates a sterile ground for factions. A relatively small group of individuals will get together to form a faction on the basis of various personal connections. Inasmuch as the members of a faction must maintain a primary group relationship among themselves, the faction never gets too large. There arises a need for another faction to develop. There were two major factions in Reed Town, headed by the current mayor and the former mayor, at the time of my survey in 1963 (Kuroda 1968a).

Also pertinent to the collectivity orientation of the Japanese people is the vagueness of their language. The ambiguity of the Japanese language can be utilized by politicians to their advantage, for the structure of the language is such that it allows one to avoid open conflicts. It is also a mechanism by which the social class system is maintained. One speaks differently to different people depending upon one's social status. One interesting aspect of the Japanese language is that there is a lack of profane words. There are none of the colorful expressions so often found in Arabic, Chinese, English, or Russian. The worst thing one can say in Japanese is "you idiot" or "beast." This too may be part of that aspect of Japanese culture which emphasizes the importance of group harmony in a structured society.

Table 7. Attitudes toward Ideologies (%)

Response	Democracy	Capitalism	Liberalism	Socialism
Good	38	19	24	15
Conditional approval	49	41	43	40
Not good	3	16	12	20
Others	0	1	1	1
Don't know	10	23	20	24
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	2698	2698	2698	2698

Source: Suzuki (1966:58)

Absence of an Absolute Ideology The second salient characteristic to be considered is the *apparent lack of any absolute ideology* in Japan today. Unlike such countries as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, where there is an ideological symbol acceptable to most if not all of the citizens, the Japanese people are without any sacred symbol, with the possible exception of peace. Americans—whether SDS members or members of Young Americans for Freedom—espouse democracy, however differently it may be defined by individual citizens, just as Russians support their communist ideals. Neither democracy nor socialism is acceptable to the majority of the Japanese people. Table 7 presents the results of a nationwide survey made in 1963, The question asked was how the respondents felt about four ideological symbols. The entries show that none of the four ideologies is acceptable to a majority of the Japanese people. Democracy is most popular, with 38 percent of the people giving a positive response. But 38 percent is not even half the sample. As many as 49 percent of the respondents gave conditional answers. Another interesting finding from the data presented in Table 7 is that nearly half chose to answer the question by saying "it depends…" to all four ideologies. Nearly one-half of the citizens (40 to 49 percent) neither like nor dislike the ideologies to which they were asked to react. This is not exactly what is referred to in political science literature as "the end of ideology"; rather, it is simply a *lack of enthusiasm* for any one ideology. The Japanese neither reject nor accept any of the four major ideologies in the world today.

This dimension of the Japanese seems to coincide with the Japanese government's decision to place *economic development before politics,* as manifested in Japan's remarkable economic accomplishment since 1945. The government has not yet taken any major step to increase its power in world politics; its performance has been the opposite of what De Gaulle attempted to do for France.

What all this means in terms of community politics is that, unlike what happened in the United States where some reacted with emotion to such works as Hunter's and Mill's, not very many Japanese are going to react intensely to my concluding that Reed Town is run by the power elite or that it enjoys a pluralistic democracy, because they just cannot get very excited about any established ideology.

Receptiveness to Foreign Ideas The third salient feature of Japanese culture to be discussed is related to the second one. *The Japanese have been hospitable to foreign ideas but at the same time they have not been willing to accept any major ideas in toto.* This was indicated earlier in reference to the Japanese acceptance of some parts of the Confucian philosophy and rejection of certain other parts which did not fit into the Japanese tradition.

One of the items included in the F Scale in the questionnaire (see appendix) was: "People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the Japanese way of life." A great majority (77 percent) of Reed Town respondents agreed with this statement; 12 percent of them disagreed. The Japanese are willing to change their way of life in order to meet new challenges which face them from one generation to another. A similar conclusion was reached in a recent study I made of Japanese national heroes (Kuroda 1969b). The responses to twenty-two arbitrarily chosen heroes were factor-analyzed to search out the principal dimensions of respectability. It was learned from this analysis of data from a nationwide survey that the second most important factor or dimension, accounting for 11 percent of the total variance, was what one might label as "foreign culture." Five extreme variables were found among those persons who contributed to the development of Japanese culture through the introduction of foreign ideas and institutions to the country. The Japanese are willing to listen to new ideas and respect those scholars who act as a bridge between foreign cultures and their indigenous tradition.

This tradition of adopting an alien cultural heritage is not new with modern Japan. She has been importing different ideas and ways of life ever since her inception. The Japanese used to learn a great deal from their advanced neighbors, China and Korea. And yet, they have somehow maintained their own heritage. This characteristic may be one of the distinguishing features of the Japanese political culture as compared with those of other countries.

National Homogeneity Though I found the Japanese to be without any one ideology uniting the minds of all citizens, the Japanese people are remarkably homogeneous in their cultural heritage, owing to a number of historical and geographical facts. Unlike the United States or the Soviet Union, where different ethnic groups are trying to live in peace, the Japanese are ethnically rather homogeneous. Regional differences are of much smaller magnitude than in the United States, for, after

all, Japan is smaller in size than the state of California. This homogeneity is built into Japan's political system and unitary form of government. As the reader will note in chapter 4 (pages 103–105) the national government has again launched a campaign to recentralize the government structure.

Tied to this aspect of Japan's political system is the fact that mass media are organized on a national basis. There are no hometown newspapers or radio or television stations to speak of in Japan. Three giant newspapers with branches all over the nation each have a daily circulation in excess of 5,000,000.

What this means in terms of our interest here is that although communities in Japan may vary in size, structure, issues, and so on, citizens have much in common vis-à-vis their cultural backgrounds and knowledge gained about the Japanese society through the mass media. Thus, everything else being equal, there is less regional difference in Japan than in the United States and other countries.

Lack of Religious Influence on Japanese Politics Religion, with the possible exception of a newly emerging sect, the *Sōk agakkai* , appears to have no significant relation to politics in Japan. For example, although Christians form not more than l percent of Japan's total population, a Christian socialist, Tetsu Katayama, has served as Japan's premier, and the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Kōtarō Tanaka, is also a Christian (Schubert 1967). Although perhaps decreasing in importance, religion continues to play a part in American politics. American voters would hardly choose a Buddhist from Hawaii as president of the United States. Likewise, it is extremely doubtful that voters in the Soviet Union would elect a Buddhist as their leader. Such is not the case in Japan where, according to a recent survey, about one-third of the adult population believes in religion; the remaining two-thirds are nonreligious. [3] The political culture appears to be such that the Japanese do not mind having Christians among their top leaders. They may prefer not to have a member of the outcast class, such as a person of *Eta* origin, as their political leader, but religious persons of any persuasion are acceptable to them.

In this respect, postwar Japan presents a departure from Imperial Japan, which made extensive use of Shintoism as the state religion. It was believed that Japan was divine and that she had a divine duty to bring about peace in Asia by ridding the area of foreigners. However, secularism has been in existence for centuries in Japan. The defeat of Japan even further changed the people's attitude toward religion. The Japanese are

now quite content to live without any established religion, and to them religion and politics are two different things. Religion has simply lost its relevance to life in Japan.

Attempts have been made to relate this lack of religiosity to politics, but without much success. Why does religion play no significant role in Japanese life? Ike (1957) refers to the "informal government" exercised by small groups within the Japanese society, groups characterized by "highly personalized and enduring social relationships." I propose that these groups act as an agency to satisfy the psychological needs of the Japanese people. Individuals know that they can depend upon their friends and relatives for help in case of emergency. The rise of the *Sōkagakkai* in urban Japan may be considered as an indicator of the modernization and industrialization that is taking place in Japan. That is to say, modernization and industrialization are breaking up the small groups Ike talks about, and many of the less-educated young urbanites are attempting to satisfy their need for primary human contacts through this new religion, in a way which reminds one of Goethe's suggestion, in one of his poems, that uneducated people need religion.

While I was conducting the survey, I found only a few people in Reed Town who belonged to the *Sōkagakkai.* This may be because Ike's small groups are still functioning in this predominantly farming community.

It is assumed in this proposed explanation that stripping religion of its ritualistic and mystical aspects provides a way by which people of divergent value orientations and unequal wealth can live together in some tolerable fashion.

Ike (1957:286) attributes the political stability in Japan to the small group, saying:

> As historical experience has shown, a society organized on the basis of small groups has a remarkable capacity for survival in times of severe dislocation and distress. Unlike a highly integrated political system whose proper functioning is dependent upon direction from the center, a loosely organized system can continue to operate even if the center becomes disorganized or even paralyzed. By the same token, the Japanese political system contains within it elements of stability; and hence the possibilities of the social order breaking down as a prelude to revolution seem rather remote.

Ike's theory makes sense when one applies it to Japan, but it is difficult to apply to Latin American or Middle Eastern countries where strong small groups exist side by side with political instability, regime changes, and revolutions.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF REED TOWN

Having briefly described the national political system, I am now ready to characterize Reed Town. After a brief exposition of the history of the town, demographic features of the community are described and its educational system, economic base, and mass communications are remarked upon. Important formal political organizations are then delineated and an attempt is made to describe, at least, the physical and political symbols present in the community. The chapter ends with a profile of the general population sample's social background.

HISTORY

Reed Town is not far from Tokyo. Modern means of transportation can take a resident of Reed Town to the heart of the largest city in the world within an hour. However, the town is quite different from Tokyo in many ways. Reed Town is a new community in the sense that it was created on 1 March 1955 as a result of the amalgamation of a town and two adjoining villages. [4] The old town, which was established as a community in 1888 and obtained township status in 1915, was primarily a commercial center where farmers from the neighboring villages came to shop; some farmers also lived within its bounds. The region is well known for its rice and vegetable production for Tokyo; in fact, it has been known for its rice farming since the days of the *Manyōshū* (seventh and eighth centuries). The *Manyōshū* refers to the first collection of Japanese poems compiled toward the end of the eighth century. It consists of nearly 4500 poems, approximately one-half of which have been composed by the Imperial family and its court officials and the other half by the people at large, over a period of 450 years. It contains short poems by a variety of different bards and reflects the early development of Japanese literature.

As was the case in many parts of the Kantō region, the site of Reed Town lay under the ocean until two or three thousand years ago. Certain poems in the *Manyōsh ū* refer to this region. The area was controlled by various feudal lords and later came

under the direct rule of the Tokugawa shogunate during its long reign (Yokozeni 1955). In 1876, after the Meiji Restoration, a new prefecture was created which encompassed the site of present-day Reed Town.

Modernization of the community started with the development of a school system. The first primary school of the town was established in 1878 after compulsory education was introduced in Japan. This first modern school opened its doors on 20 June of that year, and at that time a temple was used as the school building. (The traditional form of education had been carried on in temples during the Tokugawa period.)

A branch of the district court was established in 1888 and the modern police system was established in 1893. Reed Town now has a branch of a nearby high school, two junior high schools, and three elementary schools. In 1963, there were 2236 pupils in the three elementary schools. The two junior high schools had 1349 students.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The size of Reed Town is about 31 square kilometers. The population of the community has been around 16,500 for the past decade, as shown in Table 8. The growth of population has been very gradual, from 12,021 in 1920 to 16,498 on 1 August 1963, the time of the survey. Many young men and women living there work outside the community, in factories or offices in Tokyo. My informal conversations with schoolteachers revealed that parents were complaining about their children's not being interested in farming any longer. Practically none of the children in the middle schools would choose to be farmers. This obviously is not peculiar to this community, for the percentage of farmers in the Japanese working population has been decreasing at the rate of about 1.5 percent per year during the past decade and a half. According to Matsubara (1962:15) 57 percent of male middle-school graduates in Japan went into farming in 1950, whereas only 9 percent did so in 1961. Reed Town is apparently no exception to this national trend in contemporary Japan. One should keep in mind that the decrease in farming population does not necessarily mean an increased migration from farming communities. As I observed while I was in the Reed Town community, those who continue to till their land are mostly older men and women. The younger men and women work in factories and offices, as stated earlier. There are still some large landholders, the owners of large farms which they used to rent

to tenant farmers. Today, they hire a few helpers only at the busiest times. Small farming machinery fit for intensive agriculture has replaced the several hired hands and work animals they used to have.

Table 8. Reed Town's Population Growth over Time

	1920	1930	1940	1947	1950	1955	1963
Population	12,021	10,410	13,084	15,771	16,015	16,354	16,498
Households	2,135	2,213	2,240	2,741	2,584	2,564	2,686

Another observation one can make from Table 8 is that there seems to have been no decrease in the size of family or the number of people per household. The average size of the Japanese family is now below four, which is significantly smaller than the (approximately) six in Reed Town. This may be attributable to the predominantly agricultural nature of the community, although why the rate should be higher here than in the average rural district, where it is somewhat over five (Fukutake 1961: 66–68), is still a question to be answered.

The population density of the community is about twice the national average. The density was 535 per square kilometer at the time of the amalgamation, as against 259 at the national level (Tsuneishi 1966:14).

Thus, Reed Town, where the average family is larger than the national average, has also twice the national population density. On the one hand, the larger family or household may indicate a greater conservative and traditional value orientation; on the other hand, the high population density indicates some degree of urbanization, suggesting a trend away from a traditional value orientation. These two factors may cancel each other out in the complex patterns of human behavior.

Table 9. 1960 Population by Sex and Age: All-urban Japan, All-rural Japan, and Reed Town (%)

	All-urban		All-rural		Reed Town		
Age	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total

	All-urban		All-rural		Reed Town		
0–4	8.3	7.7	9.4	8.7	10.0	8.5	9.3
5–9	9.3	8.7	12.0	10.9	12.2	11.6	11.9
10–14	11.4	10.7	13.5	12.4	13.9	13.5	13.6
15–19	11.3	10.5	8.4	8.2	9.9	9.8	9.8
20–24	10.1	9.6	6.8	7.4	9.0	7.9	8.4
25–29	9.7	9.4	7.6	7.5	7.5	6.7	7.1
30–34	8.4	8.2	7.8	7.3	6.6	6.1	6.4
35–39	6.1	7.0	5.9	6.7	5.1	5.8	5.4
40–44	5.0	5.9	5.0	5.6	4.2	5.4	4.8
45–49	4.9	5.4	4.9	5.5	4.3	5.2	4.7
50–54	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.5
55–59	3.8	3.8	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.0	4.2
60–64	2.9	3.0	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.1
65–69	2.0	2.2	2.7	3.5	2.6	2.5	2.5
70–74	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.7
75–79	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.5	0.8	1.3	1.1
80–84	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.5
85+	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3
Total	100.0	100.2	100.1	100.9	100.3	98.4	99.3

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, 1960 Population Census of Japan, Vol. 2, Part I, p. 47, and Vol. 4, Part II, p. 153.

Table 9 presents the population figures for 1960 by sex and age for all-urban and all-rural Japan, as well as for Reed Town. A relatively large proportion of the young adult (twenty to twenty-four years old) population in urban areas indicates a migration of young adults from rural to urban centers. The figures for Reed Town show that Reed Town is not an average rural community, but lies somewhere between the average rural and urban communities as far as this aspect of its demographic characteristics is concerned. However, Reed Town may be more rural than this finding implies, since the town is located close to Tokyo, and therefore its young adults do not necessarily have to leave their town permanently to go to work in Tokyo: they can commute. Thus, one may describe the town as being a rural community located very close to the largest city in the world, a fact which makes it not a typical isolated rural community. Many of its young residents work in Tokyo, and consequently a larger number of its residents are exposed to urban life than would be the case for an isolated rural community, many of whose residents might never visit Tokyo.

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Before the Meiji period, the Tokugawa educational system was based largely upon Chinese learning. A British sociologist, R. P. Dore (1964), estimates that about 50 percent of the male population in the mid-nineteenth century was literate. Japan's literacy today rates near the highest in the world. This high percentage of literacy was accomplished through compulsory education, which was initiated in the 1870s. Various techniques were employed to interest young children and their parents in formal schooling during the formative period of modern compulsory education in nineteenth-century Japan. Until World War II, education was centralized to the extent that every school used the same textbooks, issued by the Ministry of Education. Even today, all textbooks are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Education. [5]

The educational system went through radical changes, in both context and structure, after World War II. [6] Reform, as directed by SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers), was basic and effective. However, a trend back to the old system—referred to in Japanese as *Gyakukōsu* (reverse course)—became apparent when changes were instituted to make membership on the School Board appointive rather than elective. Also, the teaching of ethics, somewhat similar to the

Shūshin of prewar days, was reinstituted over the almost violent protest of the Japan Teachers' Union. The *Shūshin* was a required subject for all school children. Its primary goal was to provide school children with a proper code of ethics. It was, however, used by the military regime to promote chauvinism among the people of Japan during World War II.

According to the regulations set forth by the Ministry of Education (Monbushō, n.d.), the School Board should be organized and operated in the following manner:

1. All prefectures, cities, towns, and villages should have a School Board.
2. The board should ordinarily consist of five members, although it may consist of three members in small communities.
3. Its members should be men who are eligible for local public office. The governor or mayor will appoint the members from among men of high morals who are well informed and interested in education; the consent of the prefectural legislature or city council is necessary.
4. Members may serve for a period of four years. Members may be reap-pointed.
5. Members may not disclose any information which might have an adverse effect on the community. They are expected to adhere to this proscription even after they complete their appointment. They may not become officials of any political party or other political organization, nor may they actively participate in any political movement, etc.

The School Board has a chairman and a secretary. The functions of the board include the establishment and maintenance of the school system, hiring and firing and other personnel matters, and many other overall supervisory responsibilities within the school system.

In addition to the School Board, there are four assemblymen who are members of the Committee on Education. Their main concern is with the handling of the city budget for public schools. Forty to fifty percent of the local government expenditure goes into the public schools every year. An important point to be made in this connection is that the city pays for most public school expenditures, with the notable exception of teachers' salaries. Fifty percent of their salary comes from the prefectural government; the other half is provided by the

central government. This appears to give teachers a stronger position in their relationship with the local School Board than they would otherwise have.

The process by which teachers are employed in Japan suggests the extent of decentralization in its political system. All qualified teachers take an examination prepared by the School Board in each prefecture. If they pass the prefectural examination, their names are placed on the list of qualified teachers. This list is sent out to the local offices of the Prefectural Board of Education, located in each county seat. The School Board in a community looks through this list and if its members find anyone they wish to employ, they contact the person directly. If the negotiations between the two parties are successful, the local School Board makes an unofficial report to the Prefectural Board of Education, which in turn issues an official notice of employment to the prospective teacher. A copy of the letter is sent to the local board. This process shows the extent of the power that the local board can exercise.

Reed Town has three elementary schools, two middle schools, and an extension division of a nearby prefectural high school. Postwar educational-reform programs raised the minimum schooling required of all citizens from six years to nine years; that is, six years in elementary school and three years in middle school. There is approximately one teacher for every thirty-five children in the schools. At the elementary level, the sex ratio among teachers is about one to one. However, the ratio becomes one to two in favor of male teachers at the middle-school level. Also, most male teachers are university graduates, whereas female teachers are quite often high-school graduates.

How well educated are the residents of Reed Town? Table 10 presents at least a partial answer to this question. They are not well educated in comparison with the rest of Japan. Likewise, they compare poorly with the average for rural districts. University graduates among the male residents of Reed Town form less than 2 percent, which is slightly lower than the rural male average. A high percentage of the residents belonging to the postwar generation (both male and female) are found in category three, the postwar middle-school graduates. This finding implies that even among the younger generation, Reed Town residents are not as well educated as the average Japanese. Why is this so? One possible explanation is that the community is not located on a railroad leading to Tokyo. One must first take a bus before one can get on a train for Tokyo, which means

that, although the distance between the two is not great, and although there are some buses which go directly to Tokyo, Tokyo is not as convenient to the community as it could be. In fact, this was one of the issues mentioned by leaders of the town as being a major problem, as will be discussed in chapter 6. Highly educated persons with desirable positions may prefer to move to Tokyo rather than stay in Reed Town. There are not many attractive positions in the community for those with a higher education.

Table 11 presents the percentage of students in Reed Town who have gone beyond the compulsory education of nine years. The figures in the table do not include the small number of the middle-school graduates who attend night schools. The percentage of the youth obtaining a higher education increased from the year 1959 to 1963, but the growth was very slow.

Table 10. 1960 School Enrollment and Type of Schooling Completed by Persons 15 Years Old and over, by Sex: All-Japan, All-urban, All-rural, and Reed Town (%)

	All-Japan		**All-urban**		**All-rural**		**Reed Town**	
School*	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1	13.1	21.5	10.7	18.2	17.7	27.6	24.1	37.3
2	32.7	29.4	29.5	27.4	38.8	32.2	32.9	26.9
3	17.9	18.7	18.3	18.7	10.8	18.6	24.4	26.5
4	3.8	2.1	3.2	1.6	5.1	2.9	2.8	1.0
5	12.3	15.6	14.6	18.7	8.9	9.9	6.1	3.4
6	10.6	10.3	12.3	11.9	7.5	7.2	6.9	3.8
7	3.9	2.0	4.7	2.5	2.4	1.1	1.0	0.9
8	4.3	0.4	7.0	0.5	2.2	0.1	1.7	0.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	99.7	99.9

** 1: prewar primary school; 2: prewar secondary school; 3: postwar middle school; 4: pre-war youth school; 5: prewar middle school; 6: postwar high school; 7: postwar two-year college and prewar high school; 8: university (pre-and postwar). For significance of pre-war-postwar distinction, see Passin (1965).*
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, 1960 Population Census of Japan, Vol.3, Part I, pp. 220–221 and Vol. 4, Part II, pp. 178–179.

Table 11. Percentage of Students Who Go beyond Compulsory Education in Reed Town

Year	Sex	Students attending high school (%)	Total students graduated
1959	Male	27	169
	Female	23	184
1960	Male	31	195
	Female	21	164
1963	Male	32	227
	Female	26	248

THE ECONOMIC BASE

New Reed Town is a predominantly farming community. The old Reed Town district obviously has the smallest proportion of farmers, whereas the two adjoining villages consist largely of farmers. It was reported in 1957 that 1801 of the 2574 households in Reed Town made their living by farming, although some members of these farming households may have worked in factories and places other than their farms. The 1801 households represented about 70 percent of the total number of households. The proportion of farmers in the Japanese working population has been decreasing throughout the nation, and in 1963, I would estimate that approximately 61 percent of the households in the community were engaged in farming. This means that farming was still the largest industry in the community.

There was one toy factory, the only large enterprise in the community, employing 150 to 200 workers. Even this factory was closed a few years after the survey was conducted. About two dozen small factories existed in 1963, each employing be-

tween four and twenty employees. There were no major industries as such in Reed Town, in spite of the community's recent efforts to invite large industries.

MASS COMMUNICATION [7]

In relation to what one finds in the United States, many things in Japan are centralized. As pointed out earlier, the mass communication system is no exception. Practically all villages, towns, and cities in Japan are without their own local papers. Three giant newspapers, *Asahi, Mainichi,* and *Yomiuri,* each with a daily circulation of over 5,000,000, dominate the newspaper market. There are private radio stations and television networks, many of which are also centrally controlled. Thus, this community, like thousands of others in Japan, has no local newspapers, no local radio stations, no local television, or any other locally based mass medium. It does have, however, a public telephone service to which nearly all families subscribe. The telephone service does not have the modern system of private numbers, although it is possible for a subscriber to call anyone within the community through an operator.

There is also a community bulletin issued monthly by the Town Hall. It reports items the Town Hall thinks the residents ought to know about, such as details of voter registration, the use of insecticides, news about schools, elections, and so forth. As with many public bulletins, it reports no controversial issues, even when everybody in the community knows there is a serious conflict in the town. It is printed on two to four pages of tabloid-size paper.

There is in the community one part-time reporter for a paper (*S Shinbun,* published in S Prefecture), who acted as one of my knowledgeables in the selection of leaders.

ASSOCIATIONS

Political action always takes place within some group context. The more organizations one belongs to, the more active one is in politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Key 1961:504–506; Kuroda 1967d; and Stouffer 1966). There are no active political parties in this community, although a small minority of communists from time to time bring controversial issues out into the open by issuing pamphlets. Nearly all local politicians claim that they are independents. However, there are a few politically significant organizations. The Farmers' Co-op, to which most of the

farmers belong, elects its own officials, and, invariably, nearly all assemblymen of farming background are officials of the co-op.

There are no labor unions in this community, since there are no large factories with the exception of the one toy factory. There is, however, an organization for employers in the community: the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Its membership consists mainly of small businessmen who are interested in promoting their business interests. A few members of the chamber are publicly involved in politics, as will be shown in chapter 4.

Other associations in Reed Town appear to have no direct or continuing relationship to community politics. There are three branches of the *Seinendan* (Youth Association) in the community. About 800 young people who are no longer in school belong to this association. The membership is made up of persons who have completed their nine years of compulsory education and who are younger than thirty. Their primary purpose is to promote the welfare of young people through the sponsorship of various events, including such public works as planting trees.

The three branches of the Women's Association in the community are interested in the promotion of women's status, life-improvement methods, and recreational activities. Any woman residing in the community is qualified to be a member of the organization. The membership is rather large, comprising nearly 2000 women.

There are a few other organizations which are small or politically insignificant. Factional groupings among leaders which can be considered as associations will be discussed in chapter 5. We now move from non-political associations to formal town-government structures.

THE POLITICAL BASIS OF REED TOWN

FORMAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

There are only two branches of government in Reed Town: the legislative and executive branches. (For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the national and the local government, see chapter 4.) District courts and family court branches are found in all major cities, and nearly 600 summary courts are located in principal cities, towns, and villages. Reed Town does



Figure 3. Administrative Structure of Reed Town

not have any of these courts. I shall deal only with the town administration in this section. Figure 3 provides a summary view of the administrative branch of Reed Town's government, which is typical of the formal local government structure in small Japanese communities. The mayor is the only official elected by the people; the rest of the positions are appointive. The next section describes the mayoral position in detail.

MAYORS IN REED TOWN

Prior to the end of World War II, mayors were not elected; since 1884 they had been appointed by the governor of the prefecture. The Town Assembly would nominate three candidates, one of whom would be appointed by the governor, except in cases where the governor did not approve of any of the three. The governor himself was appointed by the Home Ministry; the assemblymen were elected. (All these procedures were changed after the war as part of the Allied occupation reform. All the above positions became elective, and the electorate now includes not only men above the age of twenty but also women. [8]) The central government may have been little concerned with the question of what particular individual was to be appointed to the mayor's position; however, the list of mayors presented in Table 12 shows that, as the years went by, more and more nonfarmers were appointed to the position. Physicians, farmers, and company employees are well represented on the list, but there is only one businessman listed.

It is obvious that this list of mayors does not represent a cross-section of the community. Only men of comparatively high social status are appointed or elected mayor. I might also note here that not one mayor has belonged to any political party, at least not officially. The current mayor, who was elected as an independent, is actually a socialist who found it impossible to be elected as such in a political culture which discourages partisanship at the community level. He had run unsuccessfully for the Prefectural Assembly in 1955 as a socialist. Consequently, he ran for mayor as an independent in 1963 and defeated the incumbent. He was reelected in 1967, defeating three other candidates. The political culture of the Japanese town simply does not allow party affiliation in the election of a mayor, even though there is a trend toward more politicization—that is, a growing number of party members are seen at the local political level (Tsuneishi 1966:197–198). Those who attempt to increase party strength simply by increasing party membership at the local level will find themselves in a dilemma.

Although a list was prepared of the village heads of the two farming villages annexed to Reed Town, the list is not presented here because it was found that only one person on the list was not a farmer. It goes without saying that most of the village heads were large landowners. In earlier days, some of them had never actually practiced farming themselves, but this situation was completely changed after the war when all landowners had to sell any lands they did not wish to cultivate on their own.

Table 12. List of Reed Town Mayors (1889–1967)

Name	Occupation	Period
G. Tateno	Unknown	May 1889–Nov 1892
S. Takeno	White-collar worker	Nov 1892–Apr 1896
I. Yamano	Farmer	Apr 1896–Jan 1898
Y. Furui	Farmer	Feb 1898–Mar 1900
R. Tatsuno	Farmer	Mar 1900–Apr 1900
S. Fukai	Farmer	May 1900–May 1904

Name	Occupation	Period		
S. Fukai (2nd term)	Farmer	Jul	1904–Oct	1904
O. Toma	Physician	Oct	1904–Jan	1906
S. Yamanaka	Government employee	Jan	1906–Dec	1906
Y. Tatsuno	University employee	Dec	1906-Apr	1907
Y. Kurose	Farmer	Sep	1907–Mar	1909
R. Tatsuno (2nd term)	Farmer	Mar	1909–Mar	1913
R. Tatsuno (3rd term)	Farmer	Mar	1913–Apr	1917
R. Tatsuno (4th term)	Farmer	Apr	1917–Mar	1921
R. Tatsuno (5th term)	Farmer	Apr	1921–Apr	1926
Y. Tatsuno (2nd term)	University employee	Apr	1926–Sep	1927
M. Tateno	Farmer	Oct	1927–Oct	1930
S. Fuse	President, Farmers' Co-op	Jan	1931–Jan	1935
S. Yano	Government employee	Jan	1935–Jan	1936
K. Tatsuno	Dentist	Aug	1936–Aug	1940
K. Tatsuno (2nd term)	Dentist	Aug	1940–Aug	1944
R. Kōno	Corporation executive	Oct	1944–Dec	1945
K. Tatsuno (3rd term)*	Dentist	May	1946–Mar	1948
K. Abe	Former secretary to MP	May	1948–Apr	1951

Name	Occupation	Period
J. Fuji-i	Proprietor (bus company)	May 1951–Feb 1955
J. Fuji-i (2nd term)†	Proprietor (bus company)	Mar 1955–Apr 1959
N. Enoki	Farmer	May 1959–Apr 1963
K. Abe (2nd term)	Former secretary to MP	May 1963–Apr 1967
K. Abe (3rd term)	Former secretary to MP	May 1967

* *First popularly elected mayor*

† *First mayor of New Reed Town*

Elections for mayor are held every four years. The three most recent elections held after the amalgamation have shown a competitive spirit in the community. There was only one candidate in 1955, but there were three candidates for the mayorship in 1959. A wealthy farmer won that election, narrowly defeating the man who is the current mayor of Reed Town. The latter received 3492 votes, only 50 less than the winner. The third candidate, who is now president of the Town Assembly, won 1042 votes. This election, held on 30 April 1959, shows a very high voting turnout of 91.34 percent, which was somewhat higher than the 87.7 percent turnout for the Prefectural Assembly election held on the same day.

Although it is difficult to assess the candidates' value orientations, it is believed that the man elected mayor represented conservative values, whereas the top contender represented the more progressive segments of the community. These two candidates competed for the mayorship again in 1963, just prior to my visiting the community. The election was held on 30 April. The voting turnout was 88.30 percent, somewhat lower than in the previous election. The current mayor won a decisive victory over the incumbent, with votes of 4674 to 3472.

The first task of a mayor upon completion of a successful campaign is to look for a suitable deputy mayor, who acts as his "wife" [9] during his tenure, and a treasurer. The selection of men to fill these two principal executive positions is an important task, for the mayor must often balance factions among

the leaders of the community by appointing the "right" men, with the consent of the Town Assembly. An incident described in chapter 6, concerning the unification of school systems in the community, actually had its inception in the dissatisfaction of a powerful assemblyman over the selection of the men for these two positions.

We shall now move from the executive branch of the town government to the legislative branch.

THE TOWN ASSEMBLY

Elections for the Town Assembly are held every four years. Assemblymen, as well as mayors and governors, are subject to recall. A study shows that there were 943 cases of recall in all of Japan from 1947 to the middle of 1956. This figure represents about 14 percent of the total number of local and prefectural governments (Hoshino 1961:113). However, no case of recall has been reported in the community under study.

The chairman and vice-chairman of the assembly are elected by the members of the assembly following the election. There are four standing committees: General Affairs, Education, Welfare, and Industry and Development. Ad hoc committees are formed to handle specific matters as they occur. Each assemblyman, excluding the chairman, must belong to a standing committee but to not more than one. The Town Assembly meets regularly once every other month.

There were fifty-one assemblymen at the time of amalgamation, obviously too large a number for the new town. The number of seats was reduced to twenty-six at the Town Assembly meeting of 16 March 1955, in accordance with local autonomy regulations. It was also decided to divide the newly created town into three electoral districts based upon the old boundaries, for the purpose of assembly elections. This gave twelve assemblymen for old Reed Town and seven each for the adjoining communities.

The first election for the new assemblymen was held on 5 February 1956. In the First District, there were nine candidates for seven seats. There were nineteen candidates for twelve seats in the Second District (old Reed Town), and ten candidates for seven seats in the Third District. The average competition rate was 1.46, which was slightly higher than the national average of 1.3 (Hoshino 1961:105). The voting turnout was a high 92.13 percent.

Among those who were elected to the first Town Assembly since the amalgamation were fourteen incumbents, eight new assemblymen, and four former assemblymen (Table 13). The mean age of the assemblymen was forty-eight years. The youngest member of the assembly was only twenty-six years old, a man elected for the first time; the oldest was sixty-five. As many as ten assemblymen were in their forties.

Nearly 70 percent of the assemblymen were farmers, which roughly corresponds to the proportion of farmers in the community. There were eighteen farmers, three proprietors, two dentists, one woman physician, one priest, and one white-collar worker.

The second election was held on 3 February 1960, a very cold day. The voting turnout was 86.67 percent, which was lower than that of the previous election. The lowest turnout was recorded at a polling station in the center of the town. It should also be noted that there were only twenty-seven candidates for twenty-six seats. All assemblymen were elected at large in this election. The assembly had abolished the original system whereby the community was divided into three districts in accordance with the old village boundaries. The competition rate was only 1.05.

Table 13. New Town Assemblymen (5 February 1956)

Name	Age	Votes	Experience	Occupation
First District				
K. Morita	44	349	Incumbent	Farmer
T. Enoshita	48	287	Incumbent	Farmer
S. Maruyama	63	234	Incumbent	Farmer
G. Hosono	45	224	Incumbent	Farmer
T. Ota	60	221	Former	Farmer
T. Suzuki	50	206	New	Priest
Z. Sase	63	205	Incumbent	Farmer
Second District				

Name	Age	Votes	Experience	Occupation
T. Hamada	49	350	Former	Farmer
H. Endō	47	341	Incumbent	Proprietor (bookstore)
S. Sasaki	39	327	Incumbent	Dentist
Y. Numata	26	253	New	White-collar worker
H. Sassa	47	246	New	Physician (female)
Y. Tatsuno	48	242	Incumbent	Farmer
Y. Nishikawa	34	221	New	Proprietor (beauty shop)
S. Yoshino	28	204	New	Farmer
T. Fujise	39	190	Incumbent	Farmer
T. Emoto	51	187	Incumbent	Dentist
R. Uetake	51	176	Incumbent	Proprietor (retail store)
S. Fusano	58	166	Former	Farmer
Third District				
K. Horita	38	387	New	Farmer
M. Fujino	49	317	Former	Farmer
K. Takeyama	43	262	New	Farmer
I. Okano	65	224	Incumbent	Farmer
H. Mano	50	218	Incumbent	Farmer
M. Senzaki	64	198	New	Farmer
M. Matsumoto	47	191	Incumbent	Farmer

The low rate of competition should not be taken as showing disinterest in town politics, just as the high turnout of almost 87 percent in this election should not be taken as a valid indicator of genuine interest on the part of the rank-and-file members of the community. My conversations with informed citizens of the community revealed that as a rule people would go around informally at least two months in advance of the election to settle the issue of who would run from what districts. [10] Thus, the fact that the competition rate declined from 1.46 to 1.05 in this election implies that there was more of a consensus in this election than had existed in the first election after the amalgamation.

Eleven of the newly elected assemblymen were incumbents (Table 14). Five were former assemblymen who had served under the old system prior to the amalgamation. Ten new faces appeared in the Town Assembly. It goes without saying that none of them ran as a member of any political party, although I found at least one member who definitely had a close relationship with a party. The average age was again forty-eight years. The youngest was thirty; the oldest was sixty-five. Nearly one-half of the assemblymen were in their fifties, and this time there were no assemblymen younger than thirty.

In terms of occupational background, I find (see Table 14) that there were fifteen farmers, four proprietors, two Buddhist priests, one Shinto priest, one dentist, one veterinarian, one railroad worker, and one life insurance salesman. Businessmen and priests seem to be more often represented than factory workers and other working-class people. I tried to find out the various social positions held by these assemblymen, but without success in some cases. Most of the farmers who were elected had occupied some official position in the Farmers' Co-op. It is safe to infer that the farmers represented in the Town Assembly were not average farmers but were either prosperous or had been active in some group activity.

As stated earlier, the three-district system was abolished before this 1960 election was held. However, the results show that the old system was maintained informally. Eight representatives were from the First District (one more than represented the district in the previous election); six were from the Third District, one less than before. The same number of assemblymen were elected from the Second District as previously.

One last note to be made here is that one person of foreign origin was elected to the Town Assembly. He has a Japanese name but most people knew that he is a Korean. He received

better than the average number of votes. One might conclude, at the least, that this could not have happened before 1945. However, one must keep in mind what one knows from the Whites' treatment of Blacks in communities where Blacks remain a very small minority: that men in power are not likely to discriminate against a minority as long as it is not a threat to the established structure of power in the community (Campbell et al. 1960:278–279). There were only a handful of residents of non-Japanese origin in the community. Also, I might report here that there were no *Burakumin* (an ethnic minority) in Reed Town, as far as I was able to ascertain. I used the word *Burakumin* in the questionnaire, and many of the respondents reacted differently to it than anticipated. They would have understood the term better had I used the word *Eta,* which has a derogatory connotation. [11]

Table 14. Reed Town Assemblymen (1960–1964) (3 Fabruary 1960)

Name	Age	Votes	Experience	Occupation
T. Emoto	55	440	Incumbent	Dentist
T. Fujise	43	397	Incumbent	Farmer, Farmers' Co-op pres.
Y. Nishikawa	38	391	Incumbent	Proprietor (beauty shop)
M. Yazaki	54	364	New	Farmer
K. Sano	37	359	New	Farmer, Farmers' Co-op official
A. Oda	53	351	Former	Farmer, insurance sales rep.
E. Enomoto	64	342	Former	Priest, Farmers' Co-op official
K. Tobari	65	330	Former	Farmer, Farmers' Co-op official
M. Otani	59	327	New	Farmer, Farmers' Co-op official
J. Ueno	57	316	Former	Farmer

Name	Age	Votes	Experience	Occupation
K. Matsuno	45	315	New	Proprietor (food store)
K. Itō	35	313	New	Railroad worker
H. Endō	51	292	Incumbent	Proprietor (bookstore)
T. Hamada	53	283	Incumbent	Farmer, Dairy Farmers' Assoc. pres.
A. Tottori	52	280	Incumbent	Farmer (deceased)
K. Morita	48	268	Incumbent	Farmer, PTA pres.
T. Enoshita	52	244	Incumbent	Farmer
Y. Numata	30	237	Incumbent	Proprietor (farm equipment)
J. Nakano	56	230	Former	Life insurance salesman
T. Suzuki	54	228	Incumbent	Priest, former treasurer
T. Otani	50	227	New	Farmer
B. Amano	50	217	New	Priest, former treasurer and deputy-mayor
M. Togasaki	38	212	New	Farmer, Fire Dept. official
B. Yamano	33	210	New	Farmer, Farmers' Co-op official
H. Imai	34	197	New	Veterinarian
S. Yoshino	32	185	Incumbent	Farmer

TOWN FINANCE

How a town collects its revenue and how it spends that revenue is of concern to political scientists. Table 15 presents the town's expenditure and the sources of its revenue for selected years. As is the case in the United States, the largest part of the expenditure goes to education, which is considered an important part of the local government activity. As a rule over one-half of the town's revenue comes from a town tax, as shown in the table.

Table 15. Town Finance (%)

	1957	1960	1961
Expenditure			
Town Hall	21	18	21
Industrial (agricultural) development	4	14	6
Education	43	34	42
Election and assembly expenses	2	7	4
Construction	4	8	5
Fire and Police departments	7	6	4
Health and insurance	2	4	2
Bonds	4	4	6
Miscellaneous	3	5	10
Total	100	100	100
Revenue			
Town tax	60	44	56
Prefectural tax	13	26	25
Central government	6	12	8
Bonds	11	4	7

	1957	1960	1961
Others	10	14	4
Total	100	100	100

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

Having discussed the elected positions and finance in Reed Town, we shall now examine the history of elections through macroanalytic data gathered at the Town Hall and reported in newspapers.

Since the end of World War II, any citizen of Japan who is over twenty years of age and who has resided in a district for a period of at least three months is eligible to vote in local elections. Persons who have had to leave their community because of natural disasters or any other unavoidable reason may vote as long as they have reported the circumstances to the proper local Election Administration Committee. The only citizens who are not allowed to participate in elections are those who have committed certain crimes, as specified in the Public Office Election Law (Steiner 1965:378). Thus, formal participation in politics is not as restricted as it is in the United States.

To be eligible for election to the office of mayor or to the Town Assembly, Prefectural Assembly, and House of Representatives, one must be at least twenty-five years of age. To run for governor or for membership in the House of Councillors, one must wait until one is at least thirty years of age. As is the case in Great Britian, there are no residential requirements for candidates in Japan.

I shall view the voting statistics of Reed Town in two ways. First, I am interested in the extent of electoral participation in the town. Table 16 shows the rate of voting turnout in Reed Town. The nationwide voting turnout for general elections is about 70 percent. The percentages shown in the table certainly indicate that people in Reed Town vote more often than do people in the average Japanese community. One may keep in mind that in Japan the people in rural areas vote more often than the urbanites, which partially explains the high participation rate of Reed Town residents. Another inference one can make from the table is that more residents vote in local elections than in national elections. This, too, is a characteristic of Japanese politics, which relates to the first finding that a larger

percentage of the people vote in rural areas than in urban areas. This situation is in direct opposition to what one would expect in any American community.

Second, I am interested in the party preference of Reed Town residents. Table 17 is constructed to show the party preferences of the residents in relation to the national averages. There are several observations one can make from the table. The Liberal-Democratic Party appears to be losing its vote-getting power, whereas the socialist parties seem at a standstill. This trend is more acute in Reed Town, where the strength of the Liberal-Democratic Party has declined from a high 88.2 percent in 1960 to 66.6 percent in 1967, a decrease of 21.6 percentage points. The decline for the same period at the national level was 8.8 percent, from 57.6 percent in 1960 to 48.8 percent in 1967. Although the gap between the nation and Reed Town, in their support for the Liberal-Democratic Party, is narrowing, I must still conclude that the community under study remains more conservative than the average Japanese community, with 66.6 percent of its votes going to the Liberal-Democratic Party.

Table 16. Voting Turnout in Reed Town (%)

Elections	Male	Female	Total	Epsilon
23 April 1955 (Prefectural Assembly)	87	83	85	+4
5 February 1956 (Town Assembly)	93	91	91	+2
7 July 1956 (House of Councillors)	85	78	82	+7
13 July 1956 (Gubernatorial)	73	66	70	+7
22 May 1958 (General Election)	87	84	85	—3
23 April 1959 (Prefectural Assembly)	88	87	88	+1
30 April 1959 (Mayoral)	91	92	91	—1
2 June 1959 (House of Councillors)	64	52	58	+12

Elections	Male	Female	Total	Epsilon
3 February 1960 (Town Assembly)	85	88	87	—3
3 July 1960 (Gubernatorial)	...	...	60	...
20 November 1960 (General Election)	88	85	87	+3
1 July 1962 (House of Councillors)	75	72	74	+3
3 April 1963 (Mayoral)	87	90	88	—3

One can formulate two generalizations at this time with regard to the voting status of this community vis-à-vis the average community in Japan: (1) the voters in Reed Town vote more often than those in the average Japanese community; (2) the voters in Reed Town are more conservative than those in the average Japanese community. These two generalizations point to one further generalization: Reed Town is a rural Japanese community characterized by its high voting turnout and conservative political party orientation.

Table 17. Party Preference at General Elections: Reed Town and the Nation (%)

General Election	Liberal-Democratic	Socialist	Democratic Socialist	Kōmeitō	Communist	Others	Total
20 November 1960							
Reed Town	88.2	9.9	0	0	0.3	1.6	100
Nation	57.6	27.6	8.8	0	2.9	5.1	100
20 November 1963							
Reed Town	74.7	22.4	0.7	0	1.9	0.3	100
Nation	54.7	29.0	7.4	0	4.0	4.9	100

General Election	Liberal-Democratic	Socialist	Democratic Socialist	Kōmeitō	Communist	Others	Total
29 February 1967							
Reed Town	66.6	21.8	0	0	3.7	7.9	100
Nation	48.8	27.9	7.4	5.4	4.8	5.7	100

POLITICAL POSTERS IN REED TOWN

After having been away from Japan for over a decade, I found one of the most noticeable phenomena in Reed Town to be the presence of anti-American posters placed on utility poles everywhere in the downtown section of the community. They read: "Withdraw American bases at once!", "Destroy the Japan-Korea Conference," "Don't let American nuclear subs visit Japan," and the like. This is part of the environment in which the inhabitants of the community live. To what extent are they aware of this particular aspect of their environment? To what extent are they in agreement with these signs? These questions, which came to my mind as I entered the town, led me to include the following questions in the major questionnaires, using them for the sample of the general population as well as for the leadership study:

1. Have you seen posters with such slogans as "Withdraw American Bases!" or "Destroy the Japan-Korea Conference" in Reed Town?
   1) Yes (N = 30)
   2) No (N = 237)
   3) NA (N = 20)
2. Do you know who put up these posters on utility poles?
   1) Yes, correct answer (Communist Party) (N = 9)
   2) Yes, wrong answer (N = 4)
   3) No (N = 87)
   4) NA (N = 187)
3. Do you agree with these slogans?
   1) Agree strongly (N = 6)
   2) Agree (N = 24)
   3) Disagree (N = 20)
   4) Disagree strongly (N = 3)

5) Don't care (N = 103)
6) NA (N = 131)

The figures in parentheses indicate the number of the general population sample respondents for each category of answers. About 10 percent of both the general population and the leaders claimed to have seen the omnipresent posters. Since the percentage of communists in Reed Town is very small, one might say noncommunists are among those who have seen these posters. However, a great majority of the people are not even aware of this particular part of their political environment. This finding indicates that these posters are taken for granted by many who pass through the downtown area. If such signs were found in American communities, they might attract more attention.

Only nine respondents from the general population sample and one leader were able to identify those responsible for placing these posters, although "Japan Communist Party" was written on every poster.

With regard to the third question, only 9 sample residents had a strong reaction to these signs, 44 had mild feelings, and as many as 103 did not care. The leaders were no more observant than the general population, but differed in that they were concerned about the slogans. Only two of the nineteen leaders said that they did not care; twelve disagreed strongly, one disagreed, one agreed, and three gave no definite answer.

Thus, one might infer here that *what strikes an outside observer may not affect the residents of the community at all.* Moreover, although the residents of the community vote quite dutifully in elections, particularly local elections, they are not really much concerned with politics, particularly at the national level.

Having examined at least one aspect of the environment, I shall now describe various characteristics of the respondents.

PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

This section reports findings on the characteristics of the community residents as shown in the results of my general population sample survey. The items reported here were selected on the basis of their relevance in understanding the ensuing data analysis.

Socioeconomic Status Three indicators are often used to measure the socioeconomic status (SES) of respondents: income, occupation, and formal schooling. I included all three in my questionnaire. As high as 27 percent of the respondents failed to give my interviewers a direct answer to the question, "Within which of the following income categories was your total family income (before taxes) for Showa 37 (1962)?" The respondents were obviously not very willing to disclose their income. Even when they answered the question, the size of family turned out to be an important independent variable affecting the family income. The range of family size in the community is great, which further complicates the problem of using income as an indicator of social class. When one controls the variable of the size of family in running the income categories against other variables, the numbers become so small that further analysis of the data becomes meaningless. The use of income categories as an indicator of the SES was thus abandoned.

The question used to determine the occupational background of the respondents read as follows: "What is your regular occupation (be specific)?" Table 18 reveals that nearly one-half, or 47.2 percent to be exact, of the sample respondents were farmers. Approximately 4 percent of the respondents failed to give any definite answer, which is a much lower percentage than in the inquiry on income. The next largest category consisted of those who were not gainfully employed, which included housewives and students. Relatively small percentages of the professional and managerial classes were found among the respondents in this predominantly farming community.

Table 18. Respondents' Regular Occupations

Occupation	Example	N	%
Professional	Professor, physician, priest, engineer, lawyer	5	1.7
Managerial	High government official, business manager, proprietor	25	8.7

Occupation	Example	N	%
Clerical	Clerk, insurance salesman, policeman, store clerk	27	9.4
Skilled labor	Carpenter, electrician, machinist	8	3.1
Semiskilled or unskilled labor	Bus driver, switchman, laborer	27	9.4
Farming		136	47.2
No gainful employment	Housewife, retired person, student	45	15.7
Service	Waiter, barber, and others not classified elsewhere	3	1.0
Not ascertainable		11	3.8
Total		287	100.0

The last SES indicator to be discussed is the extent of formal schooling. Questions concerning social status often produce "reactive" effects of measurement, as noted by Webb et al. (1966). As elsewhere, the older people in Japan are not as well educated as the younger ones. Because compulsory education was extended from six to nine years after World War II, a decision was made to separate the postwar-and prewar-educated respondents, on the basis of completion of formal schooling before or after 1945. It was felt that this might elicit from the older respondents a more valid response than they would otherwise give. Also, one hypothesis which I wanted to test was that there is a qualitative difference between a postwar education and a prewar education. The question used was: "What is your educational background?" Eight answer categories were provided. Table 19 shows that ten respondents either declined to give a definite answer or admitted that they had no formal education.

Table 19. Respondents' Formal Schooling

Schooling	N	%
Prewar elementary school	81	28
Prewar secondary school	80	28
Prewar middle school	15	5
Prewar high school or college	4	1
Prewar university	1	0
Postwar middle school	62	22
Postwar high school	30	11
Postwar university	4	1
Not ascertainable	10	3
Total	287	99

There appear to be no appreciable differences between the figures shown in Tables 10 and 11 on the one hand and those in Table 19 on the other. About one-fourth of the respondents are prewar elementary school graduates. Another fourth are prewar secondary school graduates. Only about 2 percent of the respondents had a college or university education; about the same proportion appear to have had no formal schooling.

Of the three SES indicators described above, educational categories are clearly the best indicator of SES for the purposes of the data analysis. The income question yielded contaminated results in the sense that the income level depended partly upon the size of the family. I find that nearly one-half of the respondents were farmers. This predominance of farmers makes it inconvenient to use occupational categories as the indicator of SES except on a few occasions. This leaves the level of formal schooling as the only useful indicator of SES for data-analysis purposes.

To summarize, one ought to keep in mind that the general population sample I am dealing with comprises mostly non-college graduates, about one-half of whom are farmers.

The rest of this section deals with other social background materials regarding the respondents. Since the entire questionnaire is reproduced in the appendix, no more tables will be presented here. The reader is asked to refer to the appendix for detailed information on the number of responses to each category of answers and so on. What is considered relevant will be selected from the questionnaire. A summary at the end of this section will attempt to relate the various findings in a meaningful manner.

Where Reared (*Q8*) A great majority of the respondents (226, or 79 percent) were raised in Reed Town or its vicinity. This figure is higher than that for most of the cities in the western United States but lower than that for other parts of the United States (Campbell et al. 1960). Thirty-six respondents had grown up in S Prefecture (in which Reed Town is located) but not in Reed Town, whereas twenty-four hailed from other prefectures in Japan. Of the nineteen reputational leaders who were interviewed, it was found that eighteen grew up in the town and its vicinity; only one came from elsewhere in the prefecture. One member of the Town Assembly (1960–1964) was of foreign origin, although he grew up in the western part of Japan. Thus, in comparison with many communities studied in the United States, here is a stable community which has not experienced a great population increase. A word of warning must be added, however: at the time of the survey there was a relatively large flow of people both in and out of the community. Official reports released by the local government indicate that in 1962 some 436 people moved into Reed Town and 421 moved out of the community. In 1963, from January through August, 325 people had moved in and 375 had moved out, indicating an increase in population movement.

Although, as I have said, the great majority of the people in the town were born and reared there, one must remember that this community is less than one hour from the center of Tokyo. Many of its residents work outside the town. It is not an isolated town away from a large metropolis.

Length of Residence in the Community (*Q13*) Nearly every respondent had lived in the town at least twenty years or had lived there all his life. Only a handful of the respondents (thirty-nine) had lived in the community for less than twenty years.

It has been reported that in the United States leaders in the community or politically active citizens tend to be long-time residents of the community. This is surely true in this

Japanese community, where the population influx is minimal All the leaders had lived there either for more than thirty-one years or for their entire lives.

Desire to Move Away (*Q24*) Will such people as have been described thus far ever want to move from the community? Seventeen percent of the respondents said that they would move away from the town if they had a satisfactory opportunity to do so. One of the leaders stated that he would. One of the headaches for the older farmers in the community is that none of their young teenagers want to remain farmers. Informal conversations I had with schoolteachers, farmers, and children led me to conclude that younger people in this community are not going to stay in Reed Town. Even if they should stay, many of them would not follow their father's occupation. The next question reveals that even among those who would have refused to move out of Reed Town, many did not feel that their community was an excellent one in which to live.

Living in Reed Town (*Q23*) Only 17 percent (fifty-one) of the respondents felt that Reed Town was an excellent town to live in. Even among the leaders, only five out of nineteen felt that it was an excellent place to live. A majority of the respondents (176) stated simply that it was a good community to live in; 17 percent flatly stated that it was not. This 17 percent corresponds with the 17 percent who were willing to move out of the community.

Marital Status (*Q9*) A majority (199, or 70 percent) of the respondents indicated that they were married. Approximately 20 percent indicated that they were single. Furthermore, twenty-nine respondents (10 percent) were widowed. Two respondents failed to give definite answers. None claimed to be divorced. Of nineteen leaders, only one was widowed and the rest were married. I am not convinced that there were no divorces among the respondents, but at least one may infer here that divorce is looked down upon by the people in Reed Town.

Number of Children (*Q10*) One of the questions asked was: "How many children do you have?" Nearly one-third of the respondents (ninety-six) said that they had three to four children, and forty-nine respondents had more than four; seventy-four respondents said they had one or two children, and sixty-five had none. The relatively large number of respondents with more than two children may be attributed to the rural nature of Reed Town.

Family Size (*Q14*) Approximately one-third of the respondents belonged to households having seven to nine members, indicative of the traditionally large farming families in Japan. This community, as discussed on pages 83–86 of this chapter, is not a typical Japanese community, where today the average size of family is less than four.

Religion in Life and Politics (*Q20*) As can be seen in the appendix (Q20), fewer than one-third of the respondents thought religion was important in their daily lives; the rest felt it to be of little importance. As argued earlier, religion is just not very important to the Japanese any longer. Secular thoughts and skepticism are not new to Japan, as is evidenced by the moving picture *Rashomon,* which is set in medieval Japan. [12]

SUMMARY

To summarize briefly, it may be said that I am dealing with a very stable group of people in this community, although many of them are not too satisfied with living in Reed Town. They seem to possess most of the characteristics of rural and traditional Japan. On the question of religiosity, I find that Reed Town residents represent more or less the average Japanese community, since I find that about one-third of the respondents in a nationwide survey believe in religion (Tōkeisūri Kenkyūjo 1961, 1966).

In this chapter, I have been concerned with the description of Reed Town and its residents to prepare the reader for the ensuing data analysis. Having examined my theoretical framework, research methods, operational definitions, and finally the community under study, we are now ready to move into the data analysis.

4
The Place of Local Government in the World of Politics

INTRODUCTION

As I embark on an analysis of Reed Town politics, using the methods and techniques presented in chapter 2, my first task is to place local politics, as viewed by the residents of Reed Town, into the world of politics at large. Enough has been said in chapter 3 about Japan's unitary system, where local governments play rather an insignificant role as compared with American local governments. And yet, for the reasons given in chapter 2, one expects to find that the Japanese people regard local politics as being more important than national politics even though the central government plays a more powerful role in Japan than the government in Washington, DC does in the United States, where national politics is considered more important than local politics as evidenced in low electoral turnouts for local elections.

Following the hypothesis introduced in chapter 2, the hypothesis concerning the residents' perception of local politics will be tested first. The findings on the hypothesis will be followed by a section which attempts to place the residents' perception of local politics in comparative perspective, to explain the implications of these findings, and to make some predictions.

A related and more interesting question to be raised is this: How does the nature of the local community power structure relate to the impact of the prefectural and central government on the local community? To answer such a question obviously requires considerable research of its own. I would concur with Vidich and Bensman (1958:215), who state in this regard that no simple theory of politics "is sufficient to exhaust the concrete

and detailed data which make up the political life of Springdale." It has been said in chapter 3 that the local government acts both as an autonomous local entity and as an agent of the central government. In this chapter I can describe the different functions performed by the local government in general, and then perhaps I can generate some hypotheses about the relationship between the nature of the local community power structure and the impact of the prefectural and central governments on the local power structure. Thus, following the testing of the hypothesis, this chapter will attempt to answer the preceding question.

FINDINGS

In Table 20, which shows political interest at different levels, the NA's are eliminated from the data tabulation. There is a statistically significant association between the level of politics and that of interest: the higher the level of politics, the less interest there is in politics. Twenty-three percent of the respondents showed no interest in local politics. Portions of those who are not interested in politics vary from 23 percent at the local level to 40 percent at the prefectural level, 45 percent at the national level, and a high 64 percent at the world level.

Table 20. Political Interest at Different Levels (%)

	Politics			
Interest	Local	Prefectural	National	World
Very interested	12	6	10	6
Somewhat interested	65	54	45	30
Not interested	23	40	45	64
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	271	264	263	257

Note: $\chi^2 = 99.98$, $df = 6$, $P < 0.001$

DISCUSSION

A number of studies seem to indicate that my finding is valid. It coincides with the findings in several Japanese voting studies undertaken by American political scientists (e.g., Mendel 1957:850–851; Steiner 1956:195, and 1965; and Ward 1960) as well as with the voting turnout records in Reed Town shown in Table 16. Furthermore, public opinion survey results also agree with my finding. For instance, a nationwide sample survey conducted in April 1963 by the *Yomiuri* (one of the three most widely circulated newspapers in Japan) showed that 48 percent of the respondents were most interested in local elections, 25 percent in the House of Representatives elections, and 3 percent in the House of Councillors elections, whereas 24 percent gave miscellaneous and "Don't Know" answers (Naikaku Soridaijin Kanbōkōhō-shitsu 1965:213). A few other surveys indicate similar results (e.g., Naikaku Soridaijin Kanbōkōhō-shitsu 1966:190, 196). The only contradictory finding comes from a study of Uji City, which reports that its residents show a slightly higher interest in the House of Representatives election than in local elections (Miyake et al. 1967:338–351). The researchers attributed their finding, which contradicts other studies, to the highly urbanized character of the city they studied.

One other observation to be made here is that there is a close relationship between the extent of interest in a given level of politics among Reed Town residents and the actual voting turnout at that level. In other words, *not only are they interested in local politics but they in fact vote more often in local elections.* Thus, in this sense there seems to be an agreement between their perception and their behavior.

In summary, my finding, although perhaps not applicable to large metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, is applicable to Japan as a whole at this time.

In the Western nations, in such varied countries as Great Britain, Germany, Norway, the United States, and Yugoslavia (Boskoff and Zeigler 1964:16–21 and the references listed there; Key 1956:135–140; Lane 1959: 318–319; Milbrath 1965:103–104; Rokkan and Campbell 1960; Rokkan and Valen 1962; and Verney 1955:177), but with the notable exception of France, one finds exactly the opposite pattern, where people are less interested in local than in national politics and vote less frequently in local balloting than in national elections. [1] Kesselman (1966) reports that the smaller the community in

France the higher the turnout for local elections as compared with that for national elections. He offers no explanation for his finding. Kesselman adds that in small communities the electorates vote more frequently in local than in national balloting, irrespective of competition. France appears to be an exceptional case in the Western world as far as one could discern from the available literature today.

Jennings (1967) reports that among high-school seniors selected at random from all high schools in the United States, the higher the level of politics, the greater his respondents' intrest in politics. They were most likely to follow public affairs at the international level, then at the national, state, and local levels in that order. I am not making a direct comparison here of the voting turnout rates in each country, which would be likely to produce errors because of the problem in establishing equivalences, but I am dealing with what Rokkan (1962) refers to as "second-order" comparisons. I am comparing relationships between two variables in the Western nations with those in Japan. What, then, contributes to such a diametrically opposed pattern?

The difference in the forms of government found in Japan and the United States cannot be used to explain the opposite patterns presented above. Japan operates under a unitary form of government; if anything, it would seem logical for the Japanese people to have more interest in national than in local politics because of the centralized nature of the governmental structure. Great Britain, which operates under the same form of government as does Japan, shows the pattern found in the United States.

Lane (1959:320) offers four reasons for greater interest in national politics than in local affairs:

> Among the significant reasons for superior popular interest in national, as contrasted to both state and local, affairs are: (1) Local affairs are more "managerial" in character while national affairs deal with more controversial policy problems. (2) The community to which most popular emotion is attached is the national community. (3) The national circulation of much of the media leads them to focus attention on national leaders and events. (4) The drama of war, diplomacy, and foreign affairs (invested with strong feelings of in-group versus out-group) is national in character.

Lane's reasons are useful in explaining the difference within the American or European nations, but with the possible exception of the first reason, they are not applicable in Japan and in France. Nationalism or patriotism in Japan does not seem any less than what one would expect to find in any modern nation, as evidenced by their enthusiasm in hosting the 1964 Olympic games. The Japanese mass media definitely place more importance on national than local affairs. Hometown newspapers are unknown to the Japanese, and there are no local television or radio stations to speak of. The reporting of international and national events is equally evident in the United States and Japan. In short, Lane's reasons are limited in the sense that they do not explain why one finds an opposite pattern in Japan, where the conditions he describes also exist.

Can the degree of urbanization or industrialization be used to explain the difference between the Americans and the Japanese in their perception of politics? The first answer is negative, for I find less-urbanized nations, such as Norway, following the American pattern of political perception. However, I should point out here that there are some data which indicate that urbanites in Japan show about the same degree of interest in local and national elections (Miyake et al. 1967:338–351; and Watanuki 1967: 202–203). Furthermore, residents in *danchi* (suburban apartment complexes) vote less often in local than in national elections (Watanuki 1967: 202–203). Indeed, the voting pattern of *danchi* residents comes close to the pattern found in the Western nations. The *danchi* residents' low interest in local politics is attributed to three factors, which also account for low voting turnouts elsewhere in Japan: many are white-collar workers; they move often; and they do not own their own homes (Watanuki 1967:202). Thus, one may speculate here that *urbanization and industrial ization seem to have some independent effects on the Japanese pattern aside from cultural factors.* Kesselman's finding on the French voters suggests that this speculation may be useful also in explaining the French pattern, which coincides with the Japanese pattern. But if urbanization is a sufficient condition for producing the type of political perception pattern found in Europe and the United States, the Japanese and the French should also have the same type of perception, for both France and Japan are urbanized and industrialized nations. Despite the emerging new pattern found among some urban communities and particularly among the *danchi*

residents, the Japanese as a whole still seem to regard politics in the way that my respondents in Reed Town do (Naikaku Soridaijin Kanbōkōhō-shitsu 1965:212–213 and 1966:197).

Another question to be raised is whether the extent of competition in elections can be used as an explanation. One would assume that the more competitive an election is, the more interest a voter shows. Is there more competition in local than in national elections? Hoshino (1961:198–200) reports that local elections are less competitive than national elections. Likewise in France, Kesselman states that competition does not relate to the pattern he found there.

What kinds of cultural factors, then, affect the Japanese person's perception of local politics as being more important than national politics? [2] Although some of the factors were given in chapter 2, an elaboration may be in order at this time.

Some authors attribute this aspect of the Japanese rural political pattern to a "collectivity orientation," as it is termed by Dore (1958) and Matsumoto (1960). Similar explanations are offered by many others. [3] The Japanese, and particularly rural residents, are said to be collectivity-oriented in contrast to the individually oriented urban Americans. Results of factor analysis on my respondents' answers to a number of attitudinal questions presented in chapter 3 are certainly in agreement with this line of reasoning. However, I am still at a loss as to why individually oriented French voters behave like the Japanese. Thus, the collectivity hypothesis, too, is as culture-bound as Lane's hypotheses. In addition to the French voters, there are other Western voters who behave like the Japanese in this regard. This pattern of political interest seems to exist in such places as the American South, where De Grazia (1954) reports that the people are more interested in state politics than Easterners are. [4]

There are several other aspects of the Japanese pattern worthy of expanding at this time. First, there is empirical evidence suggesting that *the extent of political participation, as manifested in such political activi ties as attending political gatherings, is about the same in both rural and urban Japan, as is true also in the United States and other Western coun tries.* Mendel (1957), for example, reports that there is very little difference in the level of political participation, as in campaigns, between the rural residents and urbanites in Japan, in spite of the fact that the urbanites vote less often than their country compatriots. Although it is difficult to make any generalizations in a cross-cultural context, a few studies made of

American and European voters show that there is also little difference in the level of political participation among the voters in these countries. This is interesting in view of the fact that, in terms of voting turnout, the American voters rate lower than the European or Japanese voters (Agger and Ostrom 1956; Converse and Dupeux 1962; and Kuroda 1965d).

Second, and the last empirical finding to be mentioned here, *rural Japa nese citizens are no more informed about politics than are their urban compatriots, who vote less often than they do* (Soma 1963:141–143). Thus, one should not take the rural citizens' high voting turnout or their intense interest in local politics as a good indicator of political sophistication. This leads one to believe that it is not the information level that determines the rural residents' interest in community politics.

Third, an argument to be presented here is that *one should not take the Japanese people's collectivity orientation to mean that they are less selfish in their political actions than are people in other parts of the world.* It is true that individuality is still suppressed in Japan, in spite of the industrialization and urbanization of the past century. A communist city councilman writes that the reason people do not vote as often in national elections as they do in local elections is that there is less pressure placed upon them to vote in national elections (Sugiura 1961:227). *However, voting is not simply a means of ratifying authority in a community; it is also a means by which the rural residents get what they want.* In this sense, they act as an interest group attempting to obtain a greater share of the "pork barrel." Each district within a community receives a certain amount of local government service. It could be that the voters regard local elections, for example, as a zero-sum game in which the limited amount of payoff is distributed among the districts. If so, conforming to the local norms has its reward. [5]

Fourth, human relations, in small communities in particular, are diffused and are indeed primarily group-oriented. To be active in politics means also to be active in other social aspects of community affairs. The rule of the game is that one either becomes active in many social activities, which include politics, or one isolates oneself from the rest of the community. Politics, then, is regarded as an integral part of community life.

Consequently, one develops many close relationships with members of the community, including its leaders. Citizens become familiar with their local leaders, whom they get to know only indirectly, most of the time through either mass media or campaign workers. *Thus, it is not the ex tent to which politics*

at a given level affects an individual citizen in a community that determines the extent of his interest in that level of politics; rather, it is the closeness of his relationship to his community leaders.

Thus far, my discussion has been limited to the question of why the citizens of Reed Town regard local politics as being more important than national politics. Perhaps it is appropriate to compare the public's interest in politics with that of the leaders.

POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS: THE PUBLIC AND ITS LEADERS

All but two of the nineteen leaders in Reed Town, identified through the use of a variant of Hunter's reputational technique as described in chapter 2, said that they were interested in politics at all levels. The two exceptions said that they were not interested in world politics.

It is evident that the public and its leaders regard politics in different ways. The leaders are interested in all levels of politics. Perhaps they are more cognizant of the relationship between different levels of politics than the public is. Thus, the leaders' interest in politics may be determined more by their *cognitive capacity* than by their affectivity or love for politics at all levels. Although it has been demonstrated through the use of the semantic differential and other scaling methods that one's attitude toward a given object is determined more by one's affectivity than by other factors, I would raise a question of whether or not the citizens' political interest is also a product of their cognition and not their affectivity. This question is based upon the assumption that people in Japan do not necessarily love their local politicians more than their national politicians, but that they see local political figures as being relevant to their everyday lives. Although it may be true that some political figures are respected and others hated, *one's interest in a given level of politics is determined not by one's affection for or dislike of particular men but by how relevant that level is to one's life.* And this relates back to the collectivity orientation discussed earlier. The leaders in local politics are known to the individuals, often on a personal basis, and this fact leads the citizens to view local politics as being most important.

IMPLICATIONS

Finally, the implications of the findings for studies of comparative community politics and Japanese politics should be examined. First of all, my findings demonstrate that to citizens of Reed Town, as well as to a majority of individuals in Japan, community or local politics is more important than national or international politics. Japanese area specialists, as well as comparative politics specialists, ought to be cognizant of this fact and approach the study of Japanese politics accordingly. [6] Obviously, this is not to state that political scientists will find local politics more important than national politics, in attempting to explain the nature of Japanese politics.

Second, those who are interested in comparative community politics ought to keep in mind that the importance of community politics to the people varies from one nation to another and from one generation to another. What is important to the reader at this time is that the present study of Japanese community politics has much more meaning to the Japanese than a similar study of an American community would have to American voters.

Third, there is a seeming paradox presented here. On the one hand, my empirical finding indicates that the people regard local politics as being more important than national or world politics. On the other hand, as was pointed out in chapter 3, Japan operates under a unitary form of government and there is relatively little local autonomy. Why is it that the people regard local politics as being the most important in Japan, where the central government maintains such a control over the local government as is described in chapter 3? An answer lies in the Japanese people's groupism or collectivity orientation and their monistic proclivity. They feel strongly attached to their community and its leaders. Local autonomy conflicts with their monistic tendency. This is not to say that the Japanese desire no local autonomy but that their expectation of the extent to which local governments operate autonomously is much less than that of the American people, who are accustomed to "home rule."

Fourth, urbanization and industrialization seem to have been insufficient to produce among the Japanese the Western pattern of political perception, because of the cultural factors mentioned earlier. But what will become of the rural residents' political perception as Japan becomes further urbanized and industrialized? If one takes the voting patterns of the *danchi* residents as an indicator of the future voting pattern in the nation,

then the Japanese will move toward the Western pattern. The Japanese pattern may draw nearer to the Western pattern in the future, without closely approaching it.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

The preceding discussion dealt with the predisposition of the citizens toward different levels of politics. This section is provided in order to generate some hypotheses about the impact of prefectural and central governments on the local community power structure before I describe the community power structure in chapter 5.

Unlike the situation in the United States, where juries selected from among ordinary citizens are empowered to pass judgment on matters brought to local courts, local autonomous entities in Japan have no judicial power. [7] There are only two branches of local government in Reed Town: legislative and executive. As mentioned in chapter 3, judicial matters are left to trained judges and not to common folks who lack the confidence to judge their fellow citizens. This obviously is a part of the Japanese culture which separates Japan from the United States. Thus, my discussion of the local government functions will be limited to legislative and administrative functions.

Affairs handled through the local government may be divided into (1) *Koyū-jimu* (local matters) and (2) *Inin-jimu* (delegated matters). *Local matters* consist of business conducted by the local government as an autonomous unit. Included here are matters pertaining to the management of schools, water system, gas and electricity, refuse collection, hospital, and market. Although some of these functions of the local government are required by law, not all of them are. Thus, local matters can be further bifurcated into (1.1) *Hitsuyō-jimu* (required matters), such as the maintenance of the school system, and (1.2) *Zuii-jimu* (optional matters), such as the public pawn shop. Regardless of whether a particular function is required or optional, these matters are carried on for the welfare of local communities by the local government as an autonomous decision-making unit with a minimum of interference from the central or prefectural government. On the other hand, the *delegated matters* are functions performed by the local government for the central or prefectural government. These affairs include

such functions as the establishment and maintenance of public health centers, isolation hospitals, and unemployment relief work. There has been a constant increase in the functions classified as delegated in recent years, resulting in less and less autonomy for the local government. There are also two kinds of delegated matters: (2.1) *Dantai Inin-jimu* (matters delegated to the local governmental body) and (2.2) *Kikan Inin-jimu* (matters delegated to the local administrative machine). The first category (2.1) refers to such business as is delegated by the central or prefectural government to the local autonomous body, which includes not only the administrative branch of the local government but the legislative branch as well; matters in the second category (2.2) are delegated by the central government only to the mayor or the governor. The examples of delegated matters given earlier, such as the management of isolation hospitals, belong to the first category (2.1) of matters delegated to the entire local autonomous body. The second category (2.2) includes such functions as family registry, national election, and management of rivers; the local town assembly has no right, in principle, to interfere with these and other matters in this category. The local administration simply acts as the representative of the central government in carrying out these activities. This system allows the central government to strengthen its power over local governments, for it precludes any legislative interference. A trend is for the central government to attempt to place many matters under this category in order to strengthen its power.

There is another classification of local government functions. Those matters which require the use of authority, force, or violence are referred to as (3) *Gyōsei-jimu* (administrative matters). These include such functions as police work in general, control and protection of mentally ill patients, fire protection, flood control, traffic control, and other matters which may involve the use of force in their execution. All these fell under the jurisdiction of the central government before 1945 but now, with the exception of matters explicitly defined as central government functions, are under the control of the local autonomous body.

There are no scientific methods by which one can precisely define and divide the activities of the local government in such a way that one can measure the scope of the central government's influence on it. The new constitution clearly made an attempt to decentralize power and to avoid the use of force in the conduct of local government business. Thus, as one can

see from the preceding discussion, only those matters classified under *Kikan Inin-jimu* (2.2) come under the direct influence of the central government. Various authors (Isomura and Hoshino 1961; Hoshino 1961; Steiner 1956, 1965) on the Japanese local government report an increasing trend toward recentralization of the government.

Many techniques are used to facilitate this recentralization. For one thing, as in any country, it is clear to everyone that the central government's grants-in-aid programs of various sorts are an effective means to control the local government.

But perhaps the most important point to be made concerns the postwar trend toward amalgamation of towns and villages. From the time when the central government initiated its plan to promote the amalgamation of communities in October 1953, many communities have followed its counsel, as did Reed Town. In 1953, there were 9868 cities, towns, and villages. By the end of 1959, the number had decreased to 3543, or 36 percent of the 1963 figure. [8] This is indeed a remarkable accomplishment for the central government, which encouraged amalgamation in the name of rationalization and efficiency. Promises were made by the central government to aid communities which were willing to merge with other communities. Obviously, the central government did not do this without some basic reasons. Its plan was to reduce the number of local governments, which would result in a reduction in the number of prefectural governments. The Autonomy Ministry in the central government has drafted a plan to establish regional prefectural federations. A next step might be to make the governorships appointive. There are probably good reasons for the amalgamation and the reduction in prefectures, since the nation is not very large and the communication system is now well established. But perhaps the central government is paving the way for the abolishment of the present prefectural system and the establishment of a regional state system, wherein the executive position would be filled by an appointee from the central government. All these attempts by the central government lead to a further weakening of local autonomy and popular democracy.

Another example of the trend toward recentralization is seen in the police system. The existence of small and poor communities lacking funds to support an adequate police force led to the creation of forty-six prefectural police forces in 1954. They are under the indirect control of the prime minister in the sense that the Prefectural Public Safety Commission in each prefecture, made up of individual citizens, operates under the

control of the National Public Safety Commission, an agency of the prime minister's office. Similarly, the smaller and poorer communities are encouraged to form special regional public bodies (*Tokubetsu Chihō K ōk y ō -Dantai*) for handling affairs which require a large sum of money. There were about 2600 such bodies in 1952. [9]

In the field of education, the postwar reform measure requiring that local school board members be elected was revised in 1956, when the positions were made appointive. Mayors or prefectural governors now appoint members of the school board with the consent of local legislative bodies at both levels.

Now, the crucial question is: How do all these forces of the central government affect the nature of the local power structure? The preceding description of the local-central government relationship suggests that *the executive branch of the local government and especially the mayor are most subject to central government pressure.* Inasmuch as no judicial powers are given to any local government, there is no question concerning the central government's supremacy over the local government in the judicial field. All judges in Japan are appointed by the central government. Legislative and executive branches of the local government are subject to central government pressure and instructions in what is known in Japanese as the *Dantai Inin-jimu* (2.1), covering such matters as school affairs, refuse collection, and so on. However, in addition to this, the mayor's office is open to central government control under the *Kikan Inin-jimu* (2.2), which includes such matters as national elections and family registry. *Thus, the central government bureaucracy finds the way to affect the local government bureaucracy throughout Japan.* Since most of the bureaucrats are appointed, they are relatively free from local pressure.

As reported earlier, Mayor Abe of Reed Town was elected as an independent although he was actually a socialist. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the electors simply expect local politicians to be independents. Second, Mayor Abe's dealings with the central and prefectural governments will be much easier for him as an independent than as a member of the major opposition party. As an independent he will be able to work more effectively with them, which will enable him to gain more support for what he wants to do for Reed Town than he could have had as a socialist. *All the circumstances under which the mayor must operate tend to favor the Liberal-Democratic* (*conservative*) *rule in Japan.*

Thus, one would expect most of the leaders who constitute the local community power structure to be of conservative ideological orientation. A socialist, for example, will find it extremely frustrating to be caught between local pressure and pressure from the central and prefectural governments. If he desires to do things for his constituents, he must obtain the necessary resources from the central and prefectural governments, who are most likely to represent the party he opposes (the Liberal-Democratic Party).

Obviously, all community leaders are aware of the importance of the prefectural and central governments in the governing of a community, as evidenced in the concern shown by Reed Town leaders for all levels of politics.

Although I am unable to measure just how much influence the central and prefectural governments have on the local community, I have specified at least the areas in which the central and prefectural governments can legitimately influence the local community. From the preceding discussion one gets the impression that *the community in Japan does not enjoy as much local autonomy as the community in the United States.* This leads me, then, to conclude this chapter by saying that the local government in Japan does not play as important a role as the local government in the United States, although the Japanese people regard the local government as being more important than the national or the central government. Keeping these differences in mind, we shall now examine the power structure of Reed Town.

5
The Community Power Structure

INTRODUCTION

Having placed in perspective community politics as perceived by the residents of Reed Town and having discussed the relations among the different levels of government in Japan, which enabled me to point out some of the cultural and legal differences between the American and Japanese political systems, it is now time to describe the community power structure of Reed Town by using the techniques delineated in chapter 2. First, I shall report on the results obtained from the knowledgeables. Whom do they consider to be important leaders, and in what area of community decision-making? The knowledgeables' perception of the community power structure will be compared with that of the leaders themselves. This modified reputational approach to the study of Reed Town's community power structure is supplemented with the inclusion of the economic dominants. A further supplement to the original reputational approach is made through the examination of the role played by the reputational leaders in the major issues. My description of the community power structure ends with a brief note on the factionalism which prevails in Reed Town and which can be found as well at any level and in any place in Japan. I wish to add here that the existence of deep-rooted factionalism is not limited to Japan; it prevails in many parts of the world to varying extents (Miller 1965 and Riggs 1966). The last section in the chapter points out some of the salient hypotheses and findings which are of theoretical or methodological importance in cross-cultural perspective.

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AS VIEWED BY THE KNOWLEDGEABLES

Table 21 presents a summary of the leadership nomination obtained from the knowledgeables through the operational procedure described in chapter 2. In constructing the table, persons whose names appeared only once were eliminated. There were sixty such names in the area of local government in general, forty in the economic sphere, and thirty-three in education, all of which are excluded from my discussion.

In examining the data given in Table 21, I shall first of all attempt to determine the extent to which the leaders are considered competent in more than one of the following areas of community decision-making: local government in general, education, and economic activities. The questions are these: Can one consider the reputational leaders listed in the table as being the "power elite" in the sense that they are thought to be powerful in all three areas of decision-making? Are there general leaders or only specialized leaders in Reed Town?

The data shown in Table 22 indicate that there are *only* two leaders who are considered influential in all three areas of decision-making. There are thirteen leaders who are perceived to be influential in two areas. *In other words, 30 percent of the leaders are considered to be general leaders in the sense that they are powerful in more than one area. Furthermore, what is significant here is that the data indicate that the more nomina tions a leader received the more likely it is that he has influence in more than one area.* This finding is in agreement with D'Antonio and Erickson's study of American and Mexican communities (1962). Only 20 percent of the top ten leaders are influential in only one area of decision-making. The percentage of specialized leaders increases rapidly, reaching 100 percent toward the bottom of the leadership structure. Thus, although the general leaders are in a minority (30 percent), they are most likely to be found at the top levels of the power structure.

In terms of particular areas of decision-making (Table 23) I find that 24 percent of the leaders are in education and 14 percent in the economic area. If we combine the "local government in general" group (32 percent) with the "multiple" group, a total of 62 percent may be considered as general leaders.

An additional point is to be made: *eight of the top ten leaders were best known for their competence in one area.* With the exception of Hirata and Enoshita, the top ten received an

average of about 70 percent of their nominations in one area of decision-making. Thus, to depict the power fully, more is required than the simple description of "power elite" or "pluralistic democracy." If I were to conclude, on the basis of the preceding discussion, that the power-elite type of power structure was found in Reed Town, I would have to qualify my finding by saying that even though I found "general" leaders among the top ten, there were none who were considered equally powerful in all three areas of decision-making, with the possible exception of Hirata. Furthermore, I would also have to point out that nearly all lower-ranking leaders were specialized leaders.

Table 21. Reed Town Leaders Ranked by Number of Votes Received from Knowledgeables

			Area of influence			
Name	**Occupation**	**Position**	**Govt.**	**Econ.**	**Educ.**	**Total votes**
1. Akamine	Businessman	C of C & I* president	2	16	0	18
2. Endō	Businessman	TA†, Education Committee	11	0	6	17
3. Akita	Businessman	Welfare Commission member	4	9	0	13
4. Fujise	Farmer	TA, Farmers' Co-op official	3	9	0	12
5. Enomoto	Priest	TA, Farmers' Co-op president	10	2	0	12
6. Amano	Priest	TA, TA president	9	0	2	11
7. Hirata	Farmer	PTA president	3	3	4	10
8. Hara	Businessman	School Board	0	0	9	9
9. Enoshita	Farmer	TA	4	0	4	8

			Area of influence			
Name	**Occupation**	**Position**	**Govt.**	**Econ.**	**Educ.**	**Total votes**
10. Enoki	Farmer	Former mayor	8	0	0	8
11. Emoto	Dentist	TA, former TA president	4	0	3	7
12. Ikeda	Physician	School physician	4	0	3	7
13. Furuya	Priest	Election Management Board	0	0	6	6
14. Abe	None	Mayor	6	0	0	6
15. Fujino	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op, former vice-mayor	2	2	2	6
16. Oda	Farmer	Vice-mayor	4	0	2	6
17. Okada	Farmer	School Board	0	0	5	5
18. Morita	Farmer	TA	2	0	3	5
19. Fuji-i	Businessman	Former mayor	2	2	0	4
20. Fujimoto	Farmer	Welfare Commission member	4	0	0	4
21. Furushō	Farmer	School Board	0	0	4	4
22. Hamada	Farmer	TA	4	0	0	4
23. Okubo	Farmer	School Board	0	0	4	4
24. Yamamoto	Priest	Teacher	0	0	4	4
25. Ohara	Businessman	School Board	0	0	4	4

			Area of influence			
Name	**Occupation**	**Position**	**Govt.**	**Econ.**	**Educ.**	**Total votes**
26. Nishikawa	Businessman	TA	2	0	2	4
27. Noda	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	4	0	4
28. Gotō	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	3	0	3
29. Uno	Farmer	SEC‡ member	3	0	0	3
30. Honda	Contractor	C of C & I vice-president	0	3	0	3
31. Takahashi	Businessman	Election Management Board	3	0	0	3
32. Suzuki	Priest	TA	3	0	0	3
33. Morishige	Farmer	School Board	0	0	3	3
34. Ishihara	Businessman	C of C & I official	0	3	0	3
35. Itō	Worker	TA	3	0	0	3
36. Hase	Retired	Retired Town Hall official	2	0	0	2
37. Sasaki	Dentist	Former TA	2	0	0	2
38. Seki	Farmer	Block Leaders' president	0	2	0	2
39. Sano	Farmer	TA	2	0	0	2
40. Nakamura	Carpenter	Former TA, SEC member	2	0	0	2

			Area of influence			
Name	**Occupation**	**Position**	**Govt.**	**Econ.**	**Educ.**	**Total votes**
41. Inouye	Farmer	Not ascertainable	2	0	0	2
42. Imai	Veterinarian	TA	2	0	0	2
43. Kaji	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	2	0	2
44. Katō	Worker	Not ascertainable	0	0	2	2
45. Yamada	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	2	0	0	2
46. Masaki	Businessman	Fire chief	2	0	0	2
47. Matsumoto	Farmer	Former TA	0	0	2	2
48. Matsui	Businessman	TA	0	0	2	2
49. Matsuno	Businessman	TA	0	0	2	2
50. Maruyama	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	2	0	2

* *Chamber of Commerce and Industry*

† *Town Assembly*

‡ *Social Education Committee*

Table 22. Specialized vs. General Leaders: Influence

		Number of areas in which leader is considered competent				
			Multiple			
Leadership level	N	Single	2	3	Single/Total	Ratio (%)
Top level	10	2	7	1	2/10	20

	Number of areas in which leader is considered competent					
Second level	8	3	4	1	3/8	38
Third level	9	7	2	0	7/9	78
Fourth level	8	8	0	0	8/8	100
Fifth level	15	15	0	0	15/15	100
Total N		35	13	2		
Total %		70	26	4		

Table 23. Specialized vs. General Leaders: Competence

Competence areas	N	%
Specialized—education only	12	24
Specialized—economic area only	7	14
Specialized—government only	16	32
Multiple	15	30
Total	50	100

If an individual had been regarded as a leader in a given area of power competence by every knowledgeable included in my survey, he would have received eighteen nominations. One leader, Tarō Akamine, came very close to obtaining the maximum of eighteen votes by being nominated sixteen times in the economic activity area. Thus, Akamine's leadership in the economic area appears unchallenged. There are no comparable leaders in the other two areas of community decision-making.

Furthermore, in the area of economic activity, the number of names nominated more than once was the smallest of the three areas. Only fourteen appear, and, with the notable exception of three individuals—Akamine, Akita, and Fujise—they received only a few votes. I found that thirty-three individuals in the general local government area and twenty-two individuals in the educational area were nominated more than once. These

data lead me to conclude that *the leadership in the area of economic activity is more concentrated than the leadership in the other areas of the community leadership system.*

The finding that the leadership is most concentrated in the area of economic activity might be what some of us would expect to find in any capitalistic community. Power appears to be shared more widely among leaders in the area of education, which, after all, is explicitly an area of public concern. In a capitalistic political culture, one might further expect the leaders to be limited to a few of the richest men, who make most of the important decisions. The data from this capitalistic community do not fully support this hypothesis in that the president of the largest company in Reed Town has practically nothing to do with community politics. Rather, the leadership in the area of economic activity is exercised, to a large extent, by Akamine and Akita in the area of business, and Fujise in farming. Fujise, who since the time of this survey has dropped out of his position of leadership, is not rich but he heads the Farmers' Co-op. Akamine's influence is based mostly upon his formal position and wealth. He is one of the highest taxpayers in the county, although he employs about the same number of persons as do most other business firms. Akita is an elusive individual who dislikes being exposed to the public. Even Akamine, who had had a number of opportunities to become a formal political leader by election to the Town Assembly, had thus far refused to be officially involved in politics. Akamine received only two votes in the area of local government. There is, therefore, not as much overlapping between those who are regarded as influential in local government matters and those influential in economic activities as one would expect to find in a community dominated by the economic dominants in a capitalistic society.

In summary, a leader's scope of influence is limited, and in some areas of decision-making the power is more specifically allocated than in others.

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE: OCCUPATION

While examining Table 21, the reader may have noted that there are some patterns relating to occupational background and the leadership structure in Reed Town. Many authors have theorized that political leaders are not recruited from all segments of a society but from limited sectors only (Goldstein 1964; Kuroda 1962; Marvick 1961; Matthews 1954; Michels 1949; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935; and Polsby 1963). Furthermore,

many of them have pointed to the importance of the role of occupation in the process of political recruitment. Still others have concluded that important positions in business are a necessary condition to entering the room at the top. [1] To what extent and in what way does occupation relate to the leadership structure as viewed by the knowledgeables in this community? Keeping in mind that we are looking at only one community in Japan, which has the characteristics described in chapter 3, let us examine Table 21 for occupational patterns.

If one considers, for the purpose of analysis, only those who were nominated five or more times, one comes up with eighteen leaders whose occupational backgrounds are: farmers (eight); businessmen (four); priests (three); dentist (one); physician (one); and no regular occupation (one). [2] If one observes those who were nominated three or four times, one finds an almost equal number of farmers and businessmen. Although there are more farmers than businessmen among the top eighteen leaders, it is interesting to note that the top three are businessmen. *Most of the farmers are found in the middle and toward the lower end of the list.* However, one should also note that the first and third businessmen are known to be influential mainly in the economic area and not in all areas of the community leadership system. Hideo Endō, the second businessman, has a reputation that is intriguing. He is considered most important in local government in general and, in spite of the fact that he is a businessman, he is not once recognized as an influential figure in the area of economic activity. A reason for this apparent paradox may be that he has been a member of the Committee on Education in the Town Assembly for some time. He owns a store selling stationery and school supplies.

There are three priests among the top eighteen leaders. This, however, should not be taken as an indicator of religious strength in community politics, for two-thirds of the Japanese today are without any religious faith (Tōkeisūri Kenkyūjo 1961:180). This community is no exception to the generalization, as was shown in chapter 3. The presence of priests, both Buddhist and Shinto, in the leadership structure may be attributable to two facts: priests have a relatively more flexible schedule than farmers or salaried workers; they are often well educated in relation to farmers and workers.

At least one large landowner is included among the farmers who were selected as leaders. Enoki was once mayor and still seems to be an important figure in the community leadership system. In fact, he heads the second largest faction in community politics, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Table 24 shows how each occupational category is represented in the leadership system. It is quite obvious that *the leadership population does not represent a cross-section of the general population.* This, however, is not sufficient evidence to conclude that not all segments of Reed Town are represented in the leadership system of the community, for one's occupation alone, although an important contributory factor, is not a sufficient condition to determine a man's value orientation, which is, after all, the crucial factor in deciding whether or not a political system is a representative democracy.

Table 24. Occupational Background of Respondents and Leaders in Reed Town (%)

Occupation	Public	Leaders
Professional	2	18
Managerial	9	26
Clerical	9	0
Skilled labor	3	2
Semiskilled or unskilled labor	9	4
Farming	47	46
No gainful employment	16	4
Service	1	0
NA	4	0
Total %	100	100
Total N	287	50

Two percent of the public (general population) sample are professionals and 9 percent are persons in managerial positions. Table 24 indicates that these two occupational groups are well represented among the leaders in Reed Town. Farmers as a whole are adequately represented in this community. The underrepresented groups are the clerical workers, and skilled as well as unskilled workers. These findings are no surprise to anyone, to be sure.

One finding which deserves to be discussed is that *businessmen and professionals tend to rank much higher than farmers in the leadership system*. Why is this so? Farmers are, proportionately speaking, as well represented as any group can hope to be. But although they are well represented quantitatively among the leaders, they do not fare as well qualitatively or in the degree of power attributed to each leader. The analyses and discussion on pages 121–126 imply that there are no such groups as economic elites who run the town. Rather, I find (in Table 21) businessmen and professionals occupying important positions among the leaders, one-half of whom are farmers. Many reasons may be suggested to explain the position held by these professionals and businessmen in the leadership system of Reed Town. One is that farmers deal with machines, rice, vegetables, and other objects in their work, whereas professionals and businessmen interact with people. Everything else being equal, it appears reasonable to speculate that those whose lives center around people must develop personalities fit for successful interaction with others, which is a necessary ingredient for leaders (Davies 1963; Greenstein 1967; Kuroda 1965a; Lasswell 1954, 1962; Milbrath 1965). Another explanation may be that most of the leaders who come from the old section of Reed Town are professionals and businessmen, whereas leaders from the two villages which joined old Reed Town in 1955 are farmers. It could be that leaders from old Reed Town are thought to have more influence just because they are in the center of Reed Town, where most of the important civic buildings are found and where the decisions are made. [3] And last, farmers throughout Japan are leaving their land to seek a better life in other occupations. Even in this predominantly farming community, nonfarmers may enjoy higher prestige than farmers. This factor is more important today because of the radical land reform after World War II which destroyed the centuries-old absentee land-ownership system. [4]

Lest the reader receive the impression that professionals and businessmen make all the important decisions, he should examine the table in more detail. The top three positions are filled by businessmen, but note that Akamine and Akita are considered to be influential only in the economic sphere; Endō's competence in the two areas other than economic activity has already been discussed. Unlike Akamine, Endō is not very active in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE: SEX AND AGE

In addition to occupation, age and sex are often said to be important factors in understanding the leadership structure.

Women are underrepresented in the leadership structure as perceived by the knowledgeables in this community. No woman's name appears on the list of leaders shown in Table 21, although several women were nominated once. Male dominance in politics appears to be nearly universal (Bell et al. 1961:34–55; Duverger 1955; Kuroda and Kuroda 1968). And in this Japanese community, the desire for political power on the part of men is much higher than in an Oregon community, at least (Kuroda 1967b). Not only do women desire political power and influence less strongly; they also participate less than men (Kuroda and Kuroda 1968). Nearly 70 percent of the political activists in Reed Town—those who partipate in politics beyond mere voting—are men (Kuroda 1965d). However, when other relevant factors such as education are held constant, the difference between the sexes in political involvement is attenuated in many cases. Still, the generalization of Bell et al. (1961:53) is applicable to this Japanese community: "By any method one chooses to use in defining or in locating public leaders—from official rank to informal everyday personal influence—women appear as a minority among leaders." Somewhat universal cultural factors, at least in modern nations, discourage women from being recruited into political leadership.

Another biocultural factor affecting the leadership structure is age. Although not every leader in Table 21 was interviewed, nineteen leaders who received eight or more votes, from either the knowledgeables or the leaders themselves, were given a long questionnaire used for the general population sample. The tabulation of the data shows that one belongs to the 40–44 age group, five to the 45–54 age group, and ten to the 55–64 age group; three were 65 or over. We know from chapter 3 that the mean age of the assemblymen elected in 1960 was forty-eight

at the time of the election. Their mean age at the time of this survey (1963), then, was fifty-one. Thus, one finds that the high-ranking leaders, selected through a variant of Hunter's reputational technique, are older than the positional leaders. The fact that some who had held positions in the past are included among the reputational leaders may account for this difference.

ELECTED AND APPOINTED POSITIONS

We observe that almost all of the leaders have some official position in an organization or government. (There were some whose positions I failed to investigate in detail.) Fifteen assemblymen were mentioned at least twice by the knowledgeables. Although this number represents over half of the 26-member assembly, it is obvious that being an assemblyman is not a sufficient condition to be named as influential. The current mayor (Abe) was not nominated as most influential, even within the local government area of community decision-making. A reason for this might be that he was newly elected at the time of the survey. Akita, a man who did not want to be ostensively involved in politics, turns out to be the third most powerful individual. He claims that he dislikes being regarded as head of any organization, although I believe that he could be an effective leader. Akita is in high repute not only among the knowledgeables but also among the fifty leaders themselves. These findings can be taken as an indicator of the validity of the technique employed. Also, they can be taken as a basis for the hypothesis that a formal position in government is not a necessary condition for recruitment into the leadership segment of a community.

Among those who were regarded as leaders in the area of economic decision-making are members of two organizations, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Farmers' Co-op. It should be noted that farming is considered an important economic activity since the community still depends largely upon farming for its income. The role of businessmen in community decision-making will be discussed in more detail in a forthcoming section on economic leaders.

School Board members are thought to be influential in educational decision-making, which involves, among other things, the construction of new school buildings. In addition to the board members, members of the Committee on Education within the Town Assembly and officials of the PTA are often considered influential. A dentist and a physician received a

few votes in the educational area, probably because they are a school dentist and a school physician, whose job it is to give annual checkups to schoolchildren.

Formal governmental positions that are considered important are assemblyman, mayor, deputy mayor, and member of the Election Management Board.

One conclusion that can be drawn from these data is this: *an official title is not sufficient reason for a man to be influential in the community power structure, although it seems to constitute an important contributory condition for most leaders.* The major bodies from which the leaders are recruited in this community are the Town Hall, Town Assembly, Election Management Board, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Farmers' Co-op.

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AS VIEWED BY THE LEADERS

In order to investigate the way in which these reputed leaders see each other, a second phase of the reputational approach was employed. We asked all persons who were nominated more than once (with the exception of the four men whose names appear at the bottom of Table 21) whom they considered influential among themselves. The results of this second phase are presented next.

In selecting the knowledgeables, I made an effort to obtain individuals I did not expect to have much influence in community decision-making, although these men had to be aware of what was going on in the town. My reasoning in asking the leaders themselves to select the most important among them was that I should thus be able to recognize those leaders who not only have potential or reputed power but who also really practice their power. The results, shown in summary form in Table 25, confirm my initial assumptions.

LEADERS' PERCEPTION VS. KNOWLEDGEABLES' PERCEPTION

The ranking based on the leaders' own judgment might be considered an inside view of the decision-making system. A most interesting point revealed in Table 25 is that although most leaders received more votes from the leaders than they received from the knowledgeables, there were several who received fewer votes. Endō is a case in point: he received four

fewer votes than before. Fujise, who manages the Farmers' Co-op, received only three votes as compared to twelve. Akamine, too, was not considered by the leaders themselves to be as influential as the knowledgeables had thought him to be. My short stay in the community did not allow me to look into this matter in more detail.

Mayor Abe stands at the top of the leadership structure as viewed by the leaders, and the president of the Town Assembly comes second. The third position, however, is held by Akita, a man without any important public position. This evidence indicates that the leaders did not simply give me "who-the-important-leaders-are-supposed-to-be" answers in accordance with the formal positions held by these leaders.

One man who received only two votes from the knowledgeables turned out to be an important leader. Hase collected eleven votes from the leaders. We subsequently interviewed him and discovered that he is a retired local government official who no longer has any public position but who probably plays the role of consultant in the making of many important decisions. Others who were considered to be important by the leaders but not by the knowledgeables include Fuji-i, Fujimoto, Furushō, and Gotō.

Table 25. Reed Town Leaders Ranked by Number of Votes Received from Leaders Themselves

Name	Occupation	Position	Leaders' votes	Knowledgeables' votes	Difference	Top leaders*
1. Abe	None	Mayor	34	6	+ 28	X
2. Amano	Priest	TA** president	27	11	+ 16	X
3. Akita	Businessman	Welfare Commission member	22	13	+ 9	X
4. Enomoto	Priest	TA, Farmers' Co-op president	20	12	+ 8	X
5. Akamine	Businessman	C of C & I† president	19	18	+ 1	X

Name	Occupation	Position	Leaders' votes	Knowledgeables' votes	Difference	Top leaders*
6. Fuji-i	Businessman	Former mayor	16	4	+ 12	X
7. Emoto	Dentist	TA, former TA president	16	7	+ 9	X
8. Endō	Businessman	TA, Education Committee	13	17	– 4	X
9. Enoki	Farmer	Former mayor	13	8	+ 5	X
10. Enoshita	Farmer	TA	13	8	+ 5	X
11. Fujimoto	Farmer	Welfare Commission member	12	4	+ 8	X
12. Ikeda	Physician	School physician	11	7	+ 4	X
13. Furushō	Farmer	School Board	11	4	+ 7	X
14. Hase	Retired	Former Town Hall official	11	2	+ 9	X
15. Gotō	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	10	3	+ 7	X
16. Hara	Businessman	School Board	9	9	0	X
17. Hamada	Farmer	TA	9	4	+ 5	X
18. Hirata	Farmer	PTA president	8	10	– 2	X
19. Furuya	Priest	Election Management Board	8	6	+ 2	X
20. Fujino	Farmer	Former vice-mayor	8	6	+ 2	X

Name	Occupation	Position	Leaders' votes	Knowledgeables' votes	Difference	Top leaders*
21. Uno	Farmer	SEC‡ member	8	3	+ 5	X
22. Honda	Contractor	C of C & I vice-president	8	3	+ 5	X
23. Oda	Farmer	Vice-mayor	7	6	+ 1	
24. Sasaki	Dentist	Former TA	7	2	+ 5	
25. Seki	Farmer	Block Leaders' president	7	2	+ 5	
26. Morita	Farmer	TA	6	5	+ 1	
27. Sano	Farmer	TA	6	2	+ 4	
28. Takahashi	Businessman	Election Management Board	5	3	+ 2	
29. Suzuki	Priest	TA	5	3	+ 2	
30. Okada	Farmer	School Board	4	5	– 1	
31. Okubo	Farmer	School Board	4	4	0	
32. Yamamoto	Priest	Teacher	4	4	0	
33. Nakamura	Carpenter	Former TA, SEC member	4	2	+ 2	
34. Fujise	Farmer	TA, Farmers' Co-op official	3	12	– 9	X
35. Ohara	Businessman	School Board	3	4	– 1	
36. Morishige	Farmer	School Board	3	3	0	
37. Nishikawa	Businessman	TA	2	4	– 2	

Name	Occupation	Position	Leaders' votes	Knowledgeables' votes	Difference	Top leaders*
38. Noda	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	2	4	– 2	
39. Imai	Veterinarian	TA	2	2	0	
40. Inouye	Farmer	Not ascertainable	2	2	0	
41. Ishihara	Businessman	C of C & I official	1	3	– 2	
42. Itō	Worker	TA	1	3	– 2	
43. Kaji	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	1	2	– 1	
44. Katō	Worker	Not ascertainable	0	2	– 2	
45. Yamada	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	2	– 2	
46. Masaki	Businessman	Fire chief	0	2	– 2	
47. Maruyama	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	0	2	– 2	
48. Matsui	Businessman	TA	0	2	– 2	
49. Matsuno	Businessman	TA	0	2	– 7	
50. Matsumoto	Farmer	Former TA	0	2	– 2	

** Those nominated eight or more times in either survey*

*** Town Assembly*

† Chamber of Commerce and Industry

‡ Social Education Committee

Mayor Abe, having served in that office once before, obviously is acquainted with community decision-making procedures. Although he was cooperative in many ways, he nevertheless tactfully avoided sensitive questions when I interviewed him. By August, he had apparently established himself in the eyes of the reputed leaders as a positive man who gets things done. The president of the Town Assembly received the second highest number of votes. He is a deliberate man, one who was careful in answering any questions. He was defeated in the mayoral election in 1959.

Enomoto, who ranked fourth, is a man we failed to interview despite repeated call-backs. [5] Enomoto could wield great power when he wanted to, at least as an obstructionist, as is illustrated in the case of the school amalgamation described in chapter 6.

In terms of occupational background of the leaders, I again find nonfarmers dominating the top positions. In fact, the top eight leaders are nonfarmers. Professionals and businessmen are the two groups that appear to be most influential in this predominantly farming community.

On the whole, however, there is substantial agreement between the knowledgeables' view of the town's leadership structure and that of the leaders themselves, as evidenced by a high product-moment correlation of . 76. [6]

LEADERS' AND KNOWLEDGEABLES' VOTES COMBINED

A decision was made to define a top leader as one who received eight or more votes from either the knowledgeables or the leaders. Twenty-three men met this requirement. To illustrate the results of this decision, Table 26 was constructed. In it, the votes received from the knowledgeables and the leaders are combined. As is clearly shown, the twenty-three who rank highest in terms of combined vote are, with one exception (Oda received only seven votes as shown in Table 25), identified with those who met my definition of top leader. An X in the last column indicates that that person was given the long questionnaire used for the general population sample survey. Four who qualified as top leaders were not interviewed, for one or another unavoidable reason. The results of the interviewing of nineteen of the top leaders were then used to determine the answer to this question: "To what extent and in what areas do the top leaders represent the attitude of the general population?"

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AS VIEWED BY THE PUBLIC

So far I have presented only two views of the community power structure, those of the knowledgeables and those of the leaders. How do the rank-and-file citizens of the community regard the power structure? A partial answer to this question is derived from a series of questions included in my questionnaire for the general population sample survey. Respondents were asked to name people they believed to be "actually very influential" rather than people they thought should be influential. [7] They were asked to provide names of specific persons, rather than positions, in three areas of the community leadership system: school affairs, local government matters, and problems in general. Table 27 presents a summary of the findings.

All individual names which appear in Table 27 are included in the top third of the leaders listed in Tables 21 and 25. Mayor Abe was assigned the largest number of votes: thirty-nine. Another forty-five were cast simply for "the mayor." *The second-ranking individual, who received thirteen votes, is the person who led the rebellion in the school unification incident described in chapter 6 .* I find it difficult to explain what, other than the school unification incident, made him seem to be an authority on school affairs among the general population sample respondents. He is not so recognized by either the knowledgeables or the leaders. He accumulated ten votes in the area of school affairs but not a single vote in the area of local government affairs, although he is a member of the Town Assembly. His visibility appears to be solely a result of the role he played in the school unification incident.

When the votes of knowledgeables and leaders are combined, the ranking is altered but nine of the ten individual names that appear in Table 27 are found among the top ten leaders (Table 26). *Thus, there is considerable agreement as to who constitutes a leader among the rank- and-file citizens, the knowledgeables, and the leaders themselves.* We shall now move to an examination of the economic dominants.

THE ECONOMIC DOMINANTS

As described in chapter 2, economic dominants are defined as persons who employ more than ten workers. Economic strength is considered an important source of power and influence which can be used if the possessor has the desire to do so and if the environment allows him to be active in community politics.

Table 26. Reed Town Leaders Ranked by Total Votes Received from Knowledgeables and Leaders

Name	Occupation	Position	Total votes	Top leaders	Long questionnaire interview
1. Abe	None	Mayor	40	X	X
2. Amano	Priest	TA* president	38	X	X
3. Akamine	Businessman	C of C & I† president	37	X	X
4. Akita	Businessman	Welfare Commission member	35	X	X
5. Enomoto	Priest	TA, Farmers' Co-op president	32	X	
6. Endō	Businessman	TA, Education Committee	30	X	X
7. Emoto	Dentist	TA. former TA president	23	X	X
8. Enoki	Farmer	Former Mayor	21	X	X
9. Enoshita	Farmer	TA	21	X	X
10. Fuji-i	Businessman	Former mayor	20	X	X

Name	Occupation	Position	Total votes	Top leaders	Long questionnaire interview
11. Ikeda	Physician	School physician	18	X	
12. Hirata	Farmer	PTA president	18	X	
13. Hara	Businessman	School Board	18	X	
14. Fujimoto	Farmer	Welfare Commission member	16	X	X
15. Furushō	Farmer	School Board	15	X	X
16. Fujise	Farmer	TA, Farmers' Co-op official	15	X	X
17. Furuya	Priest	Election Management Board	14	X	X
18. Fujino	Farmer	Former vice-mayor	14	X	X
19. Hase	Retired	Former Town Hall official	13	X	X
20. Gotō	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	13	X	X
21. Hamada	Farmer	TA	13	X	X
22. Oda	Farmer	Deputy mayor	13		
23. Uno	Farmer	SEC‡ member	11	X	X
24. Honda	Contractor	C of C & I vice-president	11	X	X
25. Morita	Farmer	TA	11		

Name	Occupation	Position	Total votes	Top leaders	Long questionnaire interview
26. Sasaki	Dentist	Former TA	9		
27. Seki	Farmer	Block Leaders' president	9		
28. Okada	Farmer	School Board	9		
29. Sano	Farmer	TA	8		
30. Takahashi	Businessman	Election Management Board	8		
31. Suzuki	Priest	TA	8		
32. Okubo	Farmer	School Board	8		
33. Yamamoto	Priest	Teacher	8		
34. Ohara	Businessman	School Board	7		
35. Nakamura	Carpenter	Former TA, SEC member	6		
36. Nishikawa	Businessman	TA	6		
37. Noda	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	6		
38. Morishige	Farmer	School Board	6		
39. Imai	Veterinarian	TA	4		
40. Inouye	Farmer	Not ascertainable	4		
41. Ishihara	Businessman	C of C & I official	4		
42. Itō	Worker	TA	4		

Name	Occupation	Position	Total votes	Top leaders	Long questionnaire interview
43. Kaji	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	3		
44. Yamada	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	2		
45. Katō	Worker	Not ascertainable	2		
46. Maruyama	Farmer	Farmers' Co-op official	2		
47. Masaki	Businessman	Fire Department official	2		
48. Matsumoto	Farmer	Former TA	2		
49. Matsui	Businessman	TA	2		
50. Matsuno	Businessman	TA	2		

* *Town Assembly*

† *Chamber of Commerce and Industry*

‡ *Social Education Committee*

Table 27. Reed Town Leaders Ranked by Total Votes Received from General Population Sample

Name	Occupation	Position	School	Govt.	General	Total
*		"Mayor"	13	32	0	45
Abe	None	Mayor	0	31	8	39
*		"Town Assembly"	0	13	18	31
Enomoto	Priest	TA president	10	0	3	13

Name	Occupation	Position	School	Govt.	General	Total
Endō	Businessman	TA, Education Committee	4	0	1	5
Akamine	Businessman	C of C & I president	0	0	5	5
Amano	Priest	TA, TA president	0	4	0	4
Enoshita	Farmer	TA	0	4	0	4
Enoki	Farmer	Former mayor	0	4	0	4
Hara	Businessman	School Board	3	0	0	3
Akita	Businessman	Welfare Commission member	0	0	3	3
Emoto	Dentist	TA, former TA president	0	2	0	2

* *No specific name given*

There is a large factory in Reed Town, a toy factory that produces mostly for export to the United States. At the time of my survey, about 200 workers were employed by the company, either on a full-or part-time basis. This figure fluctuated greatly, depending upon a number of economic factors. The owner and high executives of the company had visited the United States on several occasions. The president appeared friendly to my interviewer. (The company filed a bankruptcy petition a few years after the survey was made.) Not once during my survey was the owner of the toy company named as a leader of the town. Surprisingly enough, he did not even belong to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He had no close relationship with any important leader in Reed Town. There are several reasons for this interesting phenomenon. First, he was an outsider, coming from another prefecture, as did many of his employees. Second, he was a young man in his late twenties. Youth is not an asset in the process of political recruitment in this Japanese community. Third, his company specialized in toy manufacture, which is not

a very stable industry, and although most communities want to have new industries, they prefer industries which bring nothing but profits.

Table 28. Economic Dominants

Name	Occupation	No. of employees
Toyoda	Toy manufacturer	200
Tozaki	Trucking business	32
Honda	Contractor	20
Toyama	Metal plater	20
Ueno	Dye works	18
Akamine	Wholesale liquor	13
Ueki	Dye works	13
Uzaki	Rice straw manufacturer (rope)	12
Umeki	Same as above	10

Table 28 lists the economic dominants, the nine employers of ten or more workers. Only two of them—the president (Akamine) and vice-president (Honda) of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry—are included among the top leaders. The rest of them seem to have very little to do with politics. Conclusions reached in the next chapter, in which issue participation of the leaders is discussed, coincide with this observation. Even though Akamine and Honda rank among the top leaders, they have no formal positions in the local government. Their area of competence is almost entirely limited to economic activity, as can be seen from the entries in Table 21.

The other businessmen who ranked high among the top leaders are relatively small businessmen whose economic resources are meager. The case of Endō was discussed earlier; his influence is primarily in the area of local government. Akita is another businessman who is influential to some extent in the local government, although he has greater influence in the eco-

nomic sphere (Table 21). Akita is the man who did not want to have any appointed or elected position; with the exception of membership on the Welfare Commission—not a very influential organization in the community—he remained free of such positions.

These two findings, then, lead me to conclude that *there is no such group as an economic elite that runs the town.* A similar conclusion is reached by Jennings (1964) in his study of Atlanta. However, there is at least one published study which reports a case of a large company influencing the decision-making in a Japanese community (*Shakaikagaku Tōkyū* 1965). In the study of K City, undertaken by a team of social scientists at the Social Science Research Institute of Waseda University, it is reported that T Company men exerted a strong influence on the decision-making process of the city. Apparently, the company policy is such that its employees are encouraged to be active in community affairs. This certainly is not true in Reed Town. The difference in my findings may result from differences in the communities selected. K City is a rapidly growing community, which, in the language of Schulze (1961), is in a "pre-bifurcation period." Also, there is no large company located in Reed Town, with the possible exception of the toy manufacturer.

THE TYPE OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

Having identified the leaders, top leaders, and economic dominants in Reed Town, we now move toward an examination of the attitudes of the top leaders, the economic dominants, and the citizens, in an effort to determine the kind of community power structure found in Reed Town. This is done in accordance with the operational procedures described in chapter 2.

Two key questions used to determine the type of community power structure as envisaged in chapter 2 are: How homogeneous or heterogeneous are the attitudes of the leaders? To what extent do they represent the attitudes of the public? These are questions which can be answered, but the difficulty which was not spelled out in the proposed typology is in deciding what to include in probing the attitudes of the leaders. What are the most pertinent attitudinal questions to be included in the operational phase of this study, in order to maximize the utility of the proposed typology? Inasmuch as no one has done any sub-

stantive work on such a problem, I shall include all relevant items in my operational procedures and at the end I shall attempt to suggest what ought to be included in future studies.

COMMUNITY ISSUES

Four community issues considered to be most important were selected, and the top leaders, the economic dominants, and the general population sample respondents were asked to state their attitude toward these four issues. The first issue selected was the movement to attract new industries to Reed Town. The second issue was the construction of new swimming pools, which were completed while the survey was being conducted. The third issue was an attempt to bring the national railway through Reed Town, a project which is now in the stage of actual construction. The largest cargo depot in Japan is expected to be built near Reed Town. The last issue was one on school unification (see chapter 6 for details).

Before I discuss the extent of homogeneity among members of each group, it may be worthwhile to examine the extent to which each group was involved in the four issues. Table 29 summarizes my findings on the extent to which each group had participated in the four selected issues. First of all, over one-half of the top leaders had taken an active part in all four issues, whereas one-third or less of the economic dominants had had something to do with the issues. An issue in which the largest proportion of the people participated, regardless of whether they were leaders or not, was the construction of swimming pools. Ninety percent of the top leaders, 43 percent of the economic dominants, and 19 percent of the citizenry had taken part in the project to build the pools in the summer of 1963. This issue was not only the most recent but also involved the collection of contributions from just about every family, which perhaps accounts for the high proportion of people involved in it.

Table 29. Involvement of Top Leaders, Economic Dominants, and the Public in the Four Issues (%)

	Industry			Pools			Railway			School		
Responses*	TL†	ED†	GP†	TL	ED	GP	TL	ED	GP	TL	ED	GP

	Industry			Pools			Railway			School		
Never heard of	0	43	33	0	0	8	0	0	18	0	14	28
Does not matter	0	0	10	0	0	14	0	0	10	0	0	15
Interested	0	0	27	0	29	26	5	29	36	5	29	26
Talked about it	42	43	22	10	29	27	32	43	29	32	57	22
Taken an active part	58	14	2	90	43	19	53	29	2	63	0	4
NA	0	0	6	0	0	6	0	0	5	0	0	6
Total %	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100
Total N	19	7	287	19	7	287	19	7	287	19	7	287

** For more details see last page of questionnaire in appendix.*

† TL: top leaders; ED: economic dominants; GP general population.

Two-thirds of the residents seemed to be familiar with the issues asked about in the survey. The pool construction was familiar to nearly everyone, while the movement to attract new industries was least known to those outside of the leadership structure. One-half of the economic dominants had never heard of such an issue. Although the number of the economic dominants who were interviewed was only seven, this finding fits with the rest of my findings about the economic dominants. *They do not have much to do with the community decision-making.* The case of the toy manufacturer has already been mentioned. Even when they have heard about an issue such as the school unification or railway proposal, the economic dominants do not take an active part in the community decision-making.

Table 30 presents the attitudes of the three groups toward the four issues. With the exception of one top leader on one issue and one economic dominant on another issue, all leaders

supported the issues in question. Leaders are known to support most community programs and issues. [8] The leaders as a whole supported the issues, whereas the public showed more divergent views. Furthermore, the citizens' attitudes are not as intense as those of the leaders. The attitudes of the economic dominants showed that they were in agreement with the top leaders on the first three issues, although they sided with the general public on the school unification issue.

Several conclusions emerge from these observations. First, the top leaders' attitudes toward the issues are more homogeneous than those of the public and the economic dominants. Second, the top leaders are more likely to support the programs than any other group. Third, although the economic dominants showed that they did not participate strongly in any of these issues, they are more likely to share the attitudes of the top leaders than is the general public.

What do these findings imply in terms of the theoretical framework proposed in chapter 2? The findings suggest that although the economic dominants do not actually participate (behavioral level) in community decision-making, their attitudes are more likely to resemble those of the top leaders (attitudinal level) than those of the public. Thus, in terms of the scheme presented in Figure 2, Reed Town should be classified as Type 2, where the top leaders and economic dominants share values and attitudes while the general public disagrees with the attitudes of both groups. This is true at the attitudinal and value levels, but the behavioral data show that the economic dominants do not participate in any important decision-making and behave more like rank-and-file citizens than like top leaders. Therefore, in terms of behavioral data, Reed Town could be classified as Type 3, a community power structure where the economic dominant is more like an ordinary citizen than a top leader.

Table 30. Responses of Top Leaders, Economic Dominants, and the Public to Community Issues (%)

	Industry			Pools			Railway			Schools		
Responses	TL*	ED*	GP*	TL	ED	GP	TL	ED	GP	TL	ED	GP
Strongly approve	84	86	36	95	86	36	95	100	40	89	57	18

	Industry			Pools			Railway			Schools		
Approve	11	14	37	5	14	44	5	0	38	11	14	32
Undecided	0	0	8	0	0	7	0	0	9	0	14	17
Disapprove	5	0	6	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	10
Strongly disapprove	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	14	4
Don't care	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	8
NA	0	0	8	0	0	6	0	0	8	0	0	11
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	100
Total N	19	7	287	19	7	287	19	7	287	19	7	287

* *TL: top leaders; ED: economic dominants; GP: general population.*

Although one cannot draw any definite conclusion as to the type of community power structure in Reed Town from the data provided here, the findings suggest that *Reed Town is either what is referred to in chapter 2 as a "simple democracy' or a "stable power elite."* The attitudes of the top leaders certainly cannot be considered as heterogeneous, judging from the data shown in this section. However, they do seem to represent the attitudes of the citizenry on three out of the four issues examined. As Table 30 indicates, they do not reflect the attitudes of either the economic dominants or the citizenry on the school unification issue. Two additional sets of data, presented next, may throw light on this question. Although party preference and scale item data are not directly related to community politics, they are certainly worthy of examination in view of the lack of definitive evidence to classify the community power within the proposed perspective.

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

Table 31. Party Preference of Top Leaders, Economic Dominants, and the Public (%)

Party preference	TL	ED	GP
Liberal-Democratic Party	95	100	43
Democratic Socialist Party	0	0	0
Socialist Party	0	0	14
Communist Party	0	0	1
No preference	5	0	35
NA	0	0	7
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	19	7	287

Table 31 shows the party preference of the top leaders, of the economic dominants, and the public. All the top leaders and economic dominants, with the exception of one who refused to be identified with any specific party, informed us that they were Liberal-Democrats. The one who said that he was an independent was in reality a socialist who, for political reasons, refused to be identified as a member of the Socialist Party. While there were a few socialists among the members of the Town Assembly, there were no admitted socialists among the top leaders, a fact that shows a rather narrow range of political party preference in a community where at least 20 to 25 percent of the voters vote progressive in most elections. Although only 14 percent of the respondents identified themselves with the Socialist Party, the voting records in Reed Town show that many of the independents, who constitute 35 percent in Table 31, vote for the Socialist Party. In any case, there is clear evidence that the top leaders are almost exclusively conservative in their party choice.

Next, I shall examine the attitudes of the top leaders and the citizenry toward domestic and international leaders. Figure 4 presents a summary of the two groups' reactions to two do-



Figure 4. Attitudes toward Ikeda and Kawakami

mestic political figures. The question asked was: "What do you think of the following political figures?" Nearly one-half of the top leaders strongly supported the leading Liberal-Democrat, Ikeda, whereas only 9 percent of the public did so. The citizenry as a whole appeared to support Ikeda, but only mildly, whereas the top leaders did so rather enthusiastically.

The top leaders' view of Kawakami, the leading socialist, was definitely negative, more so than the general public's. This fits with my finding that the top leaders are more conservative than the public. One other observation is that about one-third of the citizenry apparently did not know who Kawakami was. It is safe to conclude that *the top leaders definitely favored the conservative political figure over the progressive politician to a greater extent than did the public.*

Figure 5 indicates the reactions of the two groups toward the world political figures, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Nehru. It shows that Kennedy was respected by both groups almost as much as Prime Minister Ikeda. [9] The only difference is that,

like any other foreign political figure, Kennedy was not as well known as Ikeda. Approximately one-third of the citizenry indicated their ignorance of all three political figures.

The top leaders' reaction to Khrushchev is interesting in that nearly one-half of them disapproved strongly, whereas only 5 percent of the public did so. The public's reaction to Khrushchev was neither very favorable nor very unfavorable, as indicated by the large percentage of people falling into the undecided category. The top leaders' attitudes were quite similar to those of the public, as shown in Figure 5, except for this strong disapproval of Khrushchev. It should be recorded here, however, that a few of the top leaders approved of Khrushchev as the masses did.

Reactions to the neutralist leader Nehru were favorable on the whole, and the top leaders seemed to feel even more approval than the general public did.

Thus, of the two groups, I found that the top leaders were definitely more conservative in their basic reaction toward political figures. *The top leaders tended to favor conservative politicians, whether Japanese or non- Japanese, more than the public did.* Before I reach any conclusion as to the type of community power structure found in Reed Town, I shall move into a similar examination of the three groups in reference to their reactions to various scale items and opinion questions included in the survey questionnaire.



Figure 5. Attitudes toward Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Nehru

ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

The first task is to examine the extent of dispersion in the top leaders' response to a battery of items. Of the twenty-three top leaders, we were able to interview nineteen. One of the nineteen was eliminated at random from the tabulation of my data in order to make a leadership sample which could be readily compared with the rank-and-file citizen sample, for the purpose of performing T Tests. Of the seven economic dominants, one was deleted for the same reason.

Table 32 presents means and standard deviation scores for the three samples on all relevant scale items and current-issue questions specified in chapter 2. Mean response categories range from 1.00 for "agree strongly" to 6.00 for "disagree strongly." For example, the average response of the rank-and-file citizens to the second item in the F Scale is 2.22 or "agree somewhat," whereas the economic dominants' average response is 3.17 or about "agree slightly." Standard deviation (sigma) scores indicate the extent of variation in responses. The more heterogeneous the responses of each group, the larger the sigma scores. The data for the economic dominants and the general population sample were included in Table 32 for comparative and reference purposes.

In order to summarize and make meaningful the data relevant to this section, Table 33 is presented. A preponderant homogeneous response pattern is found among the top leaders in the following scale items: political obligation, ideological orientation, political cynicism, and anti-Americanism. Items on the F Scale, political efficacy, nationalism-internationalism, peace-war orientation, war anticipation, anti-Russianism, and current issues solicited relatively heterogeneous reactions from them.

It is understandable that one finds the top leaders reacting homogeneously to items related to political obligation (Table 32). They all thought that every citizen ought to participate in politics. The feeling of civic duty was uniformly high. It is remarkable that the first political obligation scale item produced a completely uniform response of "disagree strongly." All eighteen top leaders responded in exactly the same manner, yielding a zero standard deviation. A similar uniform response pattern is observed among the economic dominants. The positive association between the sense of civic duty and the extent of political participation has been pointed out by many authors (for example, Milbrath 1965). Those who are the core members in political activities should believe that their activities are important and worthy of everyone's attention. This finding, in fact, may be considered as an indicator of construct validity for identifying the top leaders in Reed Town. [10]

Table 32. Items, Means, Standard Deviations, and Differences among Three Groups

	Means			Standard deviations		
Items	GP* N=287	ED* N=6	TL* N=18	GP N=287	ED N=6	TL N=18
F scale						
1. What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.	2.06	1.83	2.56	1.16	1.06	1.38
2. Most of our social problems could be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, feeble-minded, and crooked people.	2.22	3.17	2.28	1.04	1.57	1.48
3. People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the Japanese way of life.	2.28	1.67	1.78	1.15	1.49	1.08
4. The findings of science may someday show that many of our most cherished ideas are wrong.	2.96	3.00	2.81	1.41	1.67	1.54
Political efficacy						
1. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.	2.65	1.83	2.83	1.34	1.46	1.67
2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person	2.79	2.00	3.72	1.41	1.41	1.85

	Means			Standard deviations		
like me can't really understand what's going on.						
3. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	3.09	2.17	3.94	1.49	1.21	1.54
4. I don't believe that public officials care about what people like me think.	2.98	2.83	4.06	1.38	1.86	1.26
Political obligation						
1. So many other people vote in the general elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.	5.56	6.00	6.00	0.97	0.00	0.00
2. It is not so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win.	5.07	3.33	5.94	1.24	2.35	0.22
3. A good many local elections are not important enough to bother with.	4.96	5.33	5.94	1.33	1.10	0.22
4. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it	4.20	6.00	5.72	1.86	0.00	0.55
Ideological orientation						
1. If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government ought to give them the money they need.	1.67	1.00	1.39	0.84	0.00	0.48

	Means			Standard deviations		
2. The government ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.	1.56	1.00	1.17	0.76	0.00	0.37
3. The government ought to help people get medical and hospital care at low cost.	1.52	1.00	1.11	0.81	0.00	0.31
4. The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle.	3.92	4.33	3.50	1.65	2.05	1.77
Political cynicism						
1. In order to get nominated, most candidates for political offices have to make basic compromises and undesirable commitments.	4.42	5.33	5.50	1.76	1.49	1.01
2. Politicians spend most of their time trying to get reelected or reappointed.	2.52	1.67	1.78	1.27	1.49	0.71
3. Money is the most important factor influencing public policies.	2.26	1.17	1.56	1.21	0.37	0.68
4. A large number of city and county politicians are party hacks.	3.07	2.00	4.28	1.43	1.41	1.44
5. People are often manipulated by politicians.	2.69	1.33	2.33	1.26	0.47	1.05

	Means			Standard deviations		
6. Politicians represent the general interests more frequently than they represent the special interests of groups.	1.96	1.17	1.33	1.04	0.37	0.57
7. Most politicians in the community are probably more interested in becoming known than in serving the needs of their constituents.	2.57	1.33	3.22	1.26	0.47	1.13
Nationalism-internationalism						
1. The United Nations is just a plot by the “one-worlders” to sacrifice the sovereignty of Japan on the altar of world government.	4.44	5.50	5.33	1.45	0.50	0.99
2. I am not willing to surrender my allegiance to Japan in order to give it to a world government	2.67	1.33	2.11	1.52	0.47	1.28
3. International exchange of students, scientists, farmers, and other personnel should be encouraged and expanded.	1.52	1.67	1.06	0.87	1.49	0.22
4. I would prefer to be a citizen of the world first, and a citizen of one country second.	3.28	3.60	2.89	1.66	2.15	1.66
5. I’m for my country, right or wrong.	2.52	4.83	3.94	1.36	1.77	1.61
Peace-war orientation						

	Means			Standard deviations		
1. The major goal of our nation should be to obtain peace at any price.	1.72	1.00	1.94	0.96	0.00	1.12
2. We should not fight any war, even though it seems to be to our advantage.	1.52	1.67	1.94	1.78	1.49	1.71
3. Peaceful coexistence (between the USA and the USSR) is our best bet for survival.	1.67	1.00	1.18	0.88	0.00	0.38
4. In this atomic age, we must not proclaim peaceful negotiation as a national policy.	4.39	5.17	4.72	1.53	1.86	1.66
5. We should rearm our country at once.	4.40	3.67	4.33	1.73	1.69	1.37
War anticipation						
1. There will be a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union within the next decade.	4.20	5.00	5.35	1.50	1.41	0.76
2. We will eventually bring about world peace.	2.35	3.00	2.39	1.28	2.16	1.67
3. We will never be able to eliminate war from this world.	3.40	3.00	3.61	1.69	2.08	1.86
4. There will be no world war in the next decade.	2.68	3.33	2.53	1.45	1.88	1.81
Anti-Americanism						

	Means			Standard deviations		
1. The United States is a democratic nation in general.	2.12	1.67	1.89	0.99	0.37	0.93
2. The United States is imperialistic.	4.09	5.33	4.83	1.35	1.10	1.11
3. The United States is by and large the best country I can find in the world today.	2.84	2.00	2.78	1.25	1.41	1.27
4. The United States is not really trying to bring about peace in the world.	3.86	5.67	4.72	1.45	0.47	1.09
Anti-Russianism						
1. The Soviet Union is a democratic nation in general.	4.11	5.83	4.83	1.40	0.37	1.46
2. The Soviet Union is imperialistic.	3.55	1.50	2.78	1.38	0.76	1.68
3. The Soviet Union is by and large the best country I can find in the world today.	4.31	5.83	5.17	1.21	0.37	1.01
4. The Soviet Union is not really trying to bring about peace in the world.	3.25	2.50	2.89	1.53	1.70	1.36
Political opinions						
1. The government ought to cut taxes, even if it means putting off some important things that need to be done.	2.16	1.50	3.00	1.06	0.76	1.59

	Means			Standard deviations		
2. In the last analysis, material well-being is more important than political freedom.	2.96	3.17	5.11	1.53	1.77	1.14
Current Issues						
1. The *Shushin* should be revived.	2.10	1.40	2.50	1.32	0.48	1.34
2. I am opposed to the Japan-Korea Conference.	3.70	5.00	4.78	1.46	1.82	1.27
3. The United States should withdraw its troops and bases (from Japan).	2.15	1.33	2.61	1.37	0.47	1.25
4. Japan should trade with Communist China.	1.96	1.33	1.39	1.00	0.74	0.59
5. The atomic-powered submarine (US F104) should not be allowed to visit Japan.	4.25	3.33	3.44	1.48	1.24	1.42

* *GP: general population; ED: economic dominants; TL: top leaders.*

In contrast to a relatively homogeneous response to items on political obligation, the top leaders' sigma scores on political efficacy items indicate some degree of heterogeneity (Tables 32 and 33). Their varied response may be indicative of a hierarchy among the top leaders.

The uniform responses to the ideological orientation items deserve close attention. The top leaders' responses to three of the four items show extreme homogeneity. The exception, the last item, deals with the role of government in the nation's economy, whereas the other items deal with the kinds of services the government should provide for the people. *The top leaders apparently agreed that the government should provide all these services for the welfare of the people, and yet they*

disagreed when they were asked about the proper role of the government in the nation's economy. This suggests that I would have gotten more conflicting views had I included more items on the proper role of government in controlling private enterprise. Related to these items are the two items listed toward the end of Table 32 under Political Opinions. The top leaders showed heterogeneous aspects in their attitude on the tax-cut question, whereas they expressed homogeneous views on the political freedom question.

Items on political cynicism and anti-Americanism elicited relatively homogeneous responses from the top leaders. It occurred to me while I was classifying each response in four categories, ranging from highly heterogeneous to highly homogeneous, that items dealing with domestic issues tended to elicit more homogeneous responses than those dealing with international issues. All the items appearing in Table 32 were, therefore, divided into two categories: domestic issues and foreign issues. The items on the F Scale, political efficacy, political obligation, ideological orientation, political cynicism, and political opinions are all considered to deal with domestic issues. Placed in the foreign-issue category were the rest of the scale items, with the exception of the first of the five current-issue items. The item on *Shūshin* was considered to be a strictly domestic issue. The results of this tabulation appear in Table 33.1 find that fifteen of the twenty-six domestic issues (58 percent) elicited homogeneous responses from the top leaders, whereas only eleven of the twenty-six foreign issues (42 percent) did so. One can extract from this finding the following generalization: *the top leaders tend to have conflicting views on interna tional issues but not on domestic issues.* The top leaders showed divergent attitudes in their responses to such important domestic issues as the teaching of *Shūshin* or morals and the proper role of the government in the nation's economy. Conversely, they presented a rather uniform response (sigma = 0.59) on an item relating to Japan's trade with Communist China. On the whole, as shown in Table 33, 49 percent of the items examined in Table 32 are classified as homogeneous (sigma = 0–1.25). A further look at Table 32 shows that the top leaders have less diverse attitudes than the rank-and-file citizens in thirty-two out of fifty-two items. This finding suggests that *Reed Town leaders have a narrower range of attitudes than do the citizenry.*

Table 33. Sigma Scores of Top Leaders by Scale Items

Scale items	High heterogeneous (2.50–1.71)	Heterogeneous (1.70–1.26)	Homogeneous (1.25–0.81)	High homogeneous (0.80–0)
F scale	0	3	1	0
Political obligation	0	0	0	4
Political efficacy	1	3	0	0
Ideological orientation	1	0	0	3
Political cynicism	0	1	3	3
Nationalism-internationalism	0	3	1	1
Peace-war orientation	1	2	1	1
War anticipation	2	1	0	1
Anti-Americanism	0	1	3	0
Anti-Russianism	0	3	1	0
Political opinions	0	1	1	0
Current issues	0	3	1	1
Total %	10	40	23	26
Total N	5	21	12	14
Domestic issues	2	9	5	10
Foreign issues	3	12	7	4

Now we move into an examination of the relationship among the top leaders, economic dominants, and the public in reference to their reactions to each scale item. I shall keep the order followed in Table 32.

Table 34. F Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	High	Middle	Low	Type of relationship
1	–	–	–	ED	GP	TL	8
2	–	–	–	GP	TL	ED	8
3	+	–	–	GP	TL	ED	7
4	–	–	–	GF	TL	ED	8

F Scale Items [11] Table 34 contains three sets of information. The item number on the extreme left corresponds to the item number in Table 32. The data presented in the left half of the table indicate the presence or absence of any significant relationship between two groups. Plus signs indicate the lack of a statistically significant relationship as measured by the T Test. The data in the right half of the table show how each group ranked on each item, in relation to the other two. And the extreme right column of the table denotes the type of relationship discovered among the three groups, as described in chapter 2 (see Figure 2).

All three groups appear to share the same sentiments on three of the four authoritarianism scale items. As for ranking among them, one finds that the economic dominants scored lowest on all but the first F Scale item, a question dealing with nationalistic and traditional aspects of authoritarianism. They seem, therefore, to be the least authoritarian. This finding appears to be a function of the specific kinds of F Scale items included in the questionnaire. The second F Scale item has to do with getting rid of crooked people. It is possible that businessmen might think some people regard them as dishonest and immoral in their business dealings; if so, they could hardly agree with such a scheme. Whatever the reason, they disagreed with this item more than with any other in the group. The third and fourth items pertain to one's attitudes toward new ideas. Competitive businessmen are willing to make changes in order to maximize their goal values, and so it is not strange that they would be more likely to go along with the new ideas and scien-

tific inventions. Had I included items dealing with social status, such as the relationship between employers and employed, the results would probably have been different.

Presthus (1964:346–364) found leaders in two American communities scoring lower than the general public on F Scale items, just as I did in Reed Town. Although his scale items were not formulated in such a way as to circumvent the tendency toward acquiescence of the general public, the leaders in both studies showed slightly less authoritarian tendencies than the citizenry did.

Table 35. Political Obligation Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			**Ranking**			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	High	Middle	Low	Type of relationship
1	+	+	–	TL & ED		GP	2
2	+	–	+	TL	GP	ED	3
3	+	–	–	TL	ED	GP	7
4	+	+	–	ED	TL	GP	2

Political Obligation Scale Items The next scale to be presented (Table 35) is what some authors refer to as the "sense of civic duty." As expected, I find statistically significant differences in the relationships between the leaders and the general population respondents. All three groups tend to have a sense of political obligation to different degrees, although the top leaders and the economic dominants share their sentiments to some extent. With the exception of the second question, *the public sample respondents feel the least political obligation to their political community.* It is generally expected that leaders everywhere have a higher sense of political obligation than the general population has.

Table 36. Political Efficacy Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	High	Middle	Low	Type of relationship
1	–	–	–	TL	GP	ED	8
2	+	–	+	TL	GP	ED	3
3	+	–	+	TL	GP	ED	3
4	+	–	–	TL	GP	ED	7

Political Efficacy Scale Items Closely related to the sense of political obligation is the sense of political efficacy, where the same expectation prevails. The entries in Table 36 indicate that *the economic dominants and the general population have about the same degree of sense of politi cal efficacy, whereas the top leaders reacted quite differently to this series of items. The top leaders feel most politically efficacious; the economic dominants feel least efficacious.* These findings support an earlier finding that the economic dominants do not play a significant role in the politics of Reed Town. In spite of their relatively high sense of political obligation, they feel impotent in their ability to influence political decisions. The leaders should and usually do feel efficacious, since they are the ones who make the decisions. Wildavsky (1964:294) also reports that his leaders scored higher than the public on the political efficacy items.

Table 37. Ideological Orientation Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Cons.	Neutral	Liberal	Type of relationship
1	–	+	+	GP	TL	ED	4
2	+	+	–	GP	TL	ED	2
3	+	+	–	GP	TL	ED	2
4	–	–	–	GP	TL	ED	8
5	–	+	+	GP	TL	ED	4

Ideological Orientation Scale Items [12] The most significant differences are observed in the relationships between the economic dominants and the public (see Table 37). The top leaders tend to take a neutral position between the two extremes. Contrary to the expectations of some readers,
perhaps, I find that *the economic dominants are the most liberal, whereas the public is the most conservative.* It would be dangerous, indeed, to make generalizations beyond this community on the basis of this finding, for I am of the opinion that this finding is a result of the particular kind of role these businessmen play in this community. And, as will be pointed out later, they are not willing to pay for the increasing cost of running the government, although they are all for expanding the scope of government. Thus, the position taken by the economic dominants is an ambivalent one. Obviously, whether leaders in a community are more liberal or conservative than the citizenry will vary from one community to another, depending upon a number of factors. For example, Presthus (1964:327– 330) found the leaders he surveyed to be more conservative than the public. This, however, is not to deny that certain limited aspects of political liberalism may be the elusive result of educational training, and since leaders tend to come from similar social backgrounds, one should not be surprised that Stouffer (1966) found the leaders in his study to be more tolerant of minority groups than were their followers.

Table 38. Political Cynicism Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Cynical	Neutral	Trusting	Type of relationship
1	+	–	–	GP	ED	TL	7
2	+	–	–	ED	TL	GP	7
3	+	+	–	ED	TL	GP	2
4	+	–	+	ED	GP	TL	3
5	–	+	+	ED	TL	GP	4
6	+	+	–	GP	TL	ED	2
7	+	+	+	ED	GP	TL	1

Political Cynicism Scale Items To what extent does a person hold politics and politicians in disrepute? That is the concern here. When a person's sense of political efficacy is low in spite of his high sense of political obligation, it is reasonable to believe that that person views politicians in a different perspective from that of an individual who has a high degree of both political obligation and political efficacy. [13] Table 38 shows that there is not even one item where all three groups share similar sentiments toward politicians; this is indicated by the complete absence of any Type 8 patterns. The economic dominants definitely hold politics in disrepute, in spite of their high sense of political obligation. As expected, the top leaders, by and large, tend to trust politics more than do any other group. Rose (1967:165–180) reports that he found leaders to be more trusting than the masses, who felt alienated. Similar findings are reported by Presthus (1964:332–339) and Wildavsky (1964:295). Those who are politicians should trust politics, since they would otherwise be painting themselves as untrustworthy. Yet Item 6 shows the economic dominants as more trusting than the others. A close examination of this exception suggests that this is a function of that particular item, which reads: "Politicians represent the general interests more fre-

quently than they represent the special interests of groups." The economic dominants might have felt that, since they, as a special interest group, find themselves incapable of exerting any significant influence on community politics, politicians must represent general interests.

Table 39. Nationalism-Internationalism Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			**Ranking**			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Nat'l	Neutral	Internat'l	Type of relationship
1	+	–	–	GP	TL	ED	2
2	–	+	+	ED	TL	GP	4
3	+	–	–	ED	GP	TL	7
4	–	–	–	ED	TL	GP	8
5	+	+	–	GP	TL	ED	2

Nationalism-Internationalism Scale Items Having dealt with the political orientation of individuals concerning domestic politics, the next five sections will be concerned with politics at the international level. Five items employed in the construction of the nationalism-internationalism scale (see Table 39) attempt to ascertain the respondent's loyalty to Japan as opposed to humanity or supranational authority. There is some difference among the three groups on these items but not as much as was found in the political cynicism questions. *The top leaders take a neutral posi tion, whereas the economic dominants tend to be the most nationalistic.* [14] The top leaders' neutral stance may be explained in terms of their position: that is, leaders find it useful to employ nationalism as a means to an end—a means to obtain public support.

Peace-War Orientation Scale Items [15] The next scale to be examined is the peace-war orientation scale, a scale which attempts to measure the degree of one's desire for peace vis-à-vis war. There are some differences among the three groups as to their attitudes toward peace; to a large extent they seem

to agree among themselves in their response to the five items, as indicated by three relationships of Type 8 (Table 40). Although the overall relationship is not clear-cut, it appears that *the top leaders are more peace-oriented than the public is.* It was found earlier that in Reed Town active participation in politics leads one to an increased peace orientation, irrespective of ideological orientation (Kuroda 1966b). Thus, this earlier hypothesis about the relationship between active political participation and peace orientation is upheld. A related scale, to be dealt with next, is concerned with the anticipation of war in the near future.

Table 40. Peace-War Orientation Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			**Ranking**			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	War	Neutral	Peace	Type of relationship
1	–	+	+	ED	GP	TL	4
2	–	–	–	GP	ED	TL	8
3	+	+	–	GP	TL	ED	2
4	–	–	–	GP	TL	ED	8
5	–	–	–	ED	TL	GP	8

War Anticipation Scale Items With one exception, there are no statistically significant differences among the three groups with regard to the four items on this scale (Table 41). Although the differences are not statistically significant, *the economic dominants anticipate war in the near future most often; the least anticipation of war is expressed by the top leaders.* The economic dominants, who desire peace, appear to anticipate war. They are least likely to believe that war can be eliminated. It may be that the competitive nature of business, with which they are familiar, leads them to think that it is impossible to eliminate conflicts between nations.

Table 41. War Anticipation Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	War	Neutral	Peace	Type of relationship
1	+	–	–	GP	ED	TL	7
2	–	–	–	ED	TL	GP	8
3	–	–	–	ED	GP	TL	8
4	–	–	–	ED	TL	GP	8

Anti-Americanism Scale Items I was unable to find many significant differences among the three groups on the peace-war and war anticipation scales. Table 42 shows that there are some statistically significant differences among the three groups on the anti-Americanism scale. On only one item was there a Type 8 response, indicating no significant difference found among the three groups. The ranking among the three groups is consistent in this scale: *the economic dominants are the most pro-Ameri can and the general public is the least pro-American on all four items included in the scaling.* Businessmen may think of the United States as a center of modified capitalism at work and may consider it a pattern for Japan to follow. This finding relates to the next scale to be discussed.

Anti-Russianism Scale Items Again I find a considerable degree of difference among the three groups, with the exception of the last item. The economic dominants are the most critical of the Soviet Union, whereas the top leaders again find themselves in a neutral position, as shown in Table 43. All three groups, on the whole, tend to favor the United States over the Soviet Union.

Political Opinion Scale Items It is one thing to advocate an expanding scope of government for the purpose of public welfare, but it is quite another thing to pay for it, as far as the economic dominants are concerned. Table 44 presents the finding that the top leaders are definitely against the cutting of taxes and a subsequent cut in government service. All three groups have different ideas on this question of a tax cut. The

economic dominants are for cutting taxes at all costs. This shows a definite demarcation between the attitude of the top leaders and the economic dominants. The top leaders are consistent in responding to my questions, whereas the economic dominants tend to take a somewhat inconsistent position, probably because they are not in positions of responsibility as far as Reed Town's policy decisions are concerned. The economic dominants may also feel that they have to carry a larger share of the tax burden than the public. The top leaders, on the other hand, will gain credit through increased government service.

Table 42. Anti-Americanism Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Type of relationship
1	–	+	+	ED	TL	GP	4
2	+	+	–	ED	TL	GP	2
3	–	–	–	ED	TL	GP	8
4	+	+	+	ED	TL	GP	1

Table 43. Anti-Russianism Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Type of relationship
1	+	+	+	GP	TL	ED	1
2	+	+	+	GP	TL	ED	1
3	+	+	+	GP	TL	ED	1
4	–	–	–	GP	TL	ED	8

Table 44. Political Opinion Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			Ranking			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Tax cut	Neutral	Govt. service	Type of relationship
1	+	–	+	ED	GP	TL	3
				Freedom	Neutral	Welfare	
2	+	–	+	TL	ED	GP	3

This finding is in agreement with a finding by Boskoff and Ziegler (1964:45–59) that people of high income and high perceived status are more likely to adopt various bond issues. An additional finding in this Japanese community study is that the economic dominants are not as willing to pay for government service as the top leaders are.

The second item deals with the importance of politics to different groups of individuals in a community. Since the frequency distributions on this item for the top leaders and the public present such a good example of cleavage between two groups, Figure 6 is designed to show how the two differ in their pursuit of what is to be gained in a political community.

First of all, the top leaders reacted with extreme intensity, with 95 percent of their responses falling into the “somewhat” or “strongly” categories. The public shows less concern. Second, the top leaders definitely prefer political freedom, whereas the general population sample would rather have material well-being than political freedom. This finding coincides with Stouffer’s finding (1966:26–57) that civic leaders are more tolerant of political differences than are rank-and-file citizens and with Zeitlin’s study of Cuban revolutionary workers (1967), which show political involvement and formal schooling to be the most important variables affecting the extent of their desire for political freedom. The reasons for such findings may vary to some extent from one political culture to another, although some of them may be transcultural. For example, it might well be that the top leaders’ ability to see more things in a given situation and to realize that people are not the same accounts for their greater tolerance and respect for political freedom. They



Figure 6. Political Freedom vs. Material Well-being

might also be more satisfied with the materialistic aspects of their life, which allows them to seek something beyond material well-being. Or it could be that they know the importance of political freedom from their own experience in politics.

The general population, on the other hand, can find many reasons why they should be more concerned with satisfying their material needs, especially in a modified capitalistic political culture in which buying is encouraged to the extent that many live today on tomorrow's income. In such a world, such abstract notions as political freedom are not as meaningful as materialistic gain. And political freedom as a concept remains abstract among the rank-and-file citizens as long as they remain inactive political citizens.

An alternative explanation is that the public is alienated, not in the sense that they do not vote in elections, but in the sense that they feel they cannot do much to bring about any significant political change. They feel that political freedom, democracy, and so forth, are hollow phrases for all but the power elite. Political freedom has no meaning to those who are at the bottom of the scale. Under such circumstances, it may be a rational act on the part of these people to get as much money as they can get. The well-known saying that man does not live by bread alone probably originated among those who had enough to eat. For those who do not have enough to eat or for those who no longer consider religion a useful part of life, the acquisition of material things has much more meaning than political freedom. The economic dominants in Reed Town, because they do not exercise political power, must feel much the same way the public does, as is shown in Table 44. The top leaders, then, for reasons given above, may see this issue of political freedom vs. material well-being as an important one, whereas neither the economic dominants nor the general public see it as crucial.

One might go a step further here to speculate on why it is that at least a minority of the inactive citizens do indeed desire political freedom over material welfare. Who are they? What is their view of politics? They may be idealists who realize what the situation is and yet take the view that political freedom is more important than the satisfaction of their material needs.

Table 45. Current-Issue Scale Items

	Relationship between groups			**Ranking**			
Item	GP & TL	GP & ED	TL & ED	Cons.	Neutral	Liberal	Type of relationship
1	–	+	+	ED	GP	TL	4
2	+	–	–	ED	TL	GP	7
3	–	+	+	ED	TL	GP	4
4	+	–	–	GP	TL	ED	7
5	+	–	–	TL	ED	GP	7

Current-Issue Scale Items Several issues of the day included in the questionnaire may throw some light on the political orientation of the economic dominants, who have displayed some ambivalent values and attitudes. For lack of more appropriate terms, an arbitrary decision was made to divide the groups into conservative-neutral-liberal categories. Policy positions associated with the Socialist Party are classified as liberal; those of the Liberal-Democratic Party are classified as conservative. Table 45 indicates that there are some statistically significant differences among the three groups, as manifested in the absence of a Type 8 relationship. Contrary to their showing on prior items dealing with ideological questions, *the economic dominants are shown to take the most conservative stand on the first three questions:* those issues dealing with the *Shūshin,* the Japan-Korea Conference, and the withdrawal of the United States forces from Japan. The economic dominants took the most liberal stand on one issue—that of Japan's trade with Communist China. They seem to be conservative on both domestic and international issues, except when the question deals with trade. They are in favor of trade with Communist China, even though they show sentiments against the Soviet Union. One can infer from this that a somewhat eclectic position is taken by the economic dominants; this may be because of their extremely flexible, pragmatic philosophy. *The top leaders, on the other hand, appear to take a moderate stand on most issues.* Of course, all these findings and speculations relate to the role that economic dominants play in community politics. If they were integrated into the power structure of Reed Town, they might very well possess values and attitudes similar to those of the top leaders.

Before one infers how well the attitudes of the top leaders fit those of the citizenry, a summary of the salient characteristics of these groups may be in order.

First, I shall deal with the general population. Inasmuch as they, as a group, are of lower socioeconomic status, they tend to be highly authoritarian. They also rate low on political obligation and not so high on political efficacy, are conservative in ideological orientation, and are interested in material welfare over political freedom. On world politics, they are less peace-oriented and more anti-American and pro-Russian than the other groups. They tend to take liberal stands on current issues. To a large extent, these characteristics appear to be a result of the fact that they are of lower socioeconomic status than the top leaders and economic dominants.

Second, the economic dominants show a high sense of political obligation, associated normally with high political involvement. However, they feel politically impotent, hold politicians in distrust, and have a cynical view of politics in general. These findings suggest that they are willing to participate in politics but are somehow not encouraged to get involved in community politics, which in turn leads them to hold politics in disrepute. *I believe that this is sufficient evidence to conclude that the eco nomic dominants do not run the community.* The top leaders obviously do not always represent their attitudes. This may account for their comparatively liberal views on items relating to the scope of government. They are, however, not willing to pay for increased public welfare. They are peace-oriented, pro-American, and anti-Russian.

Third, the top leaders seem to possess many characteristics associated with high political participation. Unlike the economic dominants, they possess consistent patterns of attitudes. They are low on the F Scale, a characteristic which is associated with high political involvement in non-authoritarian political cultures (Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Kuroda 1966a; Lane 1955; and Sanford 1950). Their sense of political obligation, as well as that of political efficacy, is high. They value political freedom over material welfare to a much greater extent than the general population does. They naturally trust politics and politicians. They hold neutral views, in comparison with the economic dominants and the general public, on various other scale items, indicating moderate attitudes in sensitive areas of politics, with the exception of the one item on tax cuts and public welfare. They definitely prefer to maintain the present scope of government activity rather than reduce government services in order to cut taxes. Perhaps the single most important difference found between the top leaders on the one hand, and the public and the economic dominants on the other, is the top leaders' definite preference for political freedom over material well-being.

Which of the relationship types described in chapter 2 are most often found in the items I have just examined? To what extent do all three groups share their attitudes? There are the questions with which the last part of this section is concerned. The answers to these questions, gained in accordance with the procedures described in chapter 2, will then be used to generalize on whether or not the top leaders represent the interests of the general public in Reed Town.

Table 46. Relationship Types

Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Frequency	9%	19%	11%	15%	0%	0%	19%	26%

Table 46 is designed in accordance with the operational procedures described in chapter 2. The entries show that *there is more agreement than disagreement among the three groups,* as indicated by the fact that 9 percent of the items fall into Type I vis-à-vis 26 percent in Type 8. Type 8, a situation in which there is no statistically significant difference among the three groups, is clearly the most prevalent type.

Types 2 and 7 rank in second place with a figure of 19 percent. Type 2 refers to a situation in which the public has a unique attitude vis-à-vis the other two groups. The prevalence of this type would suggest a community run by leaders who share attitudes with the economic dominants. Type 7 represents a relationship in which the economic dominants take a neutral position and the top leaders and citizens fall at opposite ends of the continuum. These two types together thus suggest *a cleavage in atti tudes between the top leaders and the followers.*

Next comes Type 4 with a 15 percent representation. The existence of this type indicates *the isolation of the economic dominants from both the top leaders and the public,* which coincides with my finding that the economic dominants are not involved in community politics.

Eleven percent of the items fall into Type 3, which suggests a cleavage between the leaders on the one hand and the public and the economic dominants on the other. The leaders seem to possess attitudes not found among the public and the economic dominants.

In contrast to the prevalence of Type 7, no cases are found of Types 5 and 6. All three of these types describe a situation in which one of the three groups takes a neutral stand while the other two take an extreme position. Thus, the entries in Table 46 show that whereas there are a number of cases in which the economic dominants take a neutral position between the top leaders and the citizens, there are no cases in which either the public or the leaders take a neutral position between the other two groups.



Relationships	Types	Total %
GP & ED	3, 5, 7, 8	11 + 19 + 26 = 56
GP & TL	4, 5, 6, 8	15 + 26 = 41
ED & TL	2, 6, 7, 8	19 + 19 + 26 = 64

Figure 7. Agreement Patterns

Hence, I find more situations in which all three groups share attitudes than I find of the opposite situation, in which each group possesses an attitude different from the others. It goes without saying that this may be partly a function of the kinds of attitudinal items included in the questionnaire. It is also common to find two groups sharing attitudes, while the third group takes a different stance, as shown by the relative prevalence of Types 2, 3, and 4. On the other hand, it is uncommon to find one group taking a neutral position while the two other groups find themselves on opposite ends of the continuum, with the notable exception of the economic dominants, who often find themselves in this position.

Figure 7 presents the frequency of agreements between the groups, taken two at a time. It shows that the economic dominants and the top leaders are most likely to agree, whereas the least frequent agreement is recorded in the relationship between the general population sample respondents and the top leaders. The public is more likely to have attitudes in common with the economic dominants than with the top leaders. The figure presents these relationships graphically through the use of a triangle. *One must keep in mind that all these findings are true at the attitudinal level but may not hold true at the behavioral level.* As was the case with the economic dominants' noninvolvement in the four community issues discussed earlier, their

sharing of values and attitudes with the top leaders does not necessarily mean that they play important roles in community decision-making.

The evidence presented above thus leads me to believe that the top leaders of Reed Town are not representative of the general public in terms of the kinds of attitudes and opinions examined in the present study. This is not to deny that there are attitudes shared by the top leaders and the public, but there appear to be more areas in which they find themselves on opposite ends of a continuum. This finding also coincides with my finding in the last section that the top leaders are almost exclusively conservative in political party preference. Although the economic dominants do not get involved directly in community politics, their attitudes are somewhat better represented by the top leaders than are those of the general public. The homogeneous nature of their social backgrounds may account for this finding.

I might add here that on such a crucial scale as that of political cynicism, I found significant differences between the top leaders and the followers. Table 38 shows that statistically significant differences between them were found in six of the seven items on political cynicism. The two groups apparently view politicians in radically different ways.

One of the most controversial aspects of community power structure studies has been the question of the extent to which the leadership serves the public will. Hunter's conclusion that Atlanta's leadership serves the interests of economically dominant aspects of the city, rather than the will of the general public, caused certain political scientists, among them Dahl, to offer an alternative characterization of American communities in the mid-twentieth century. Dahl (1961) contends that leaders in New Haven are specialized in given areas of decision-making, and if a leader is competent in more than one area of decision-making, he is very likely to be a public official such as a mayor. Obviously, Dahl assumes that it is legitimate for a mayor to be powerful in many areas of decision-making, since he is subject to public sanction through elections. Elections are instituted in order to make sure that the public will prevails.

One difficulty in ascertaining the validity of either of these alternative hypotheses presented by sociologists and political scientists is that all of them use different methods of testing their hypothesis. I proposed to test the extent to which the public will was being served by the leadership, by comparing the attitudes of both groups, as outlined in chapter 2. Many au-

thors have pointed out cases where leaders are not representative of the citizenry (Agger et al. 1964; Cantril 1965; Luttbeg 1965; McClosky et al., 1960; Miller and Stokes 1963; Presthus 1964; and Wildavsky 1964). Luttbeg, for example, concludes that leaders are more likely to represent the interests of the higher social classes. And they are most likely to favor special issues or projects. Three sets of evidence were presented in the preceding sections in order to place Reed Town in terms of the typology introduced in chapter 2.

The first set of data from the four community issues indicated that the top leaders' attitudes toward the issues were narrower than those of either the economic dominants or the general public. The nature of the data gathered for this phase of the survey did not allow me to draw any definite conclusion about how well the top leaders represented the attitudes of the general public.

The second set of data on political party choice and political figures showed a definite cleavage between the public and its leaders in terms of their party preference and their views toward domestic and international political figures. There was only one socialist among the top leaders. There was at least one additional socialist among the fifty leaders, but he ranked very low among them. A significant point here is that the mayor refused to identify himself as a socialist in our interview with him. This further suggests that although there are a few leaders who are progressive and who represent the interests of the liberal segments of the community in Reed Town, they are insignificant when one views the community power structure as a whole. Thus, I conclude from the second set of data that Reed Town's top leaders do not represent the interests of the rank-and-file citizens.

The third set of data presented substantiates for the most part my findings from the first two sets of data: that the top leaders' attitudes are relatively homogeneous and do not represent the attitudes of the citizenry. *Thus, I must conclude here that Reed Town has a stable-power-elite type of power structure.* I must hastily add to this conclusion that the type of power elite I found in Reed Town is not the kind that Hunter found in Atlanta, where the economic elite appear to have controlled the decision-making. My model introduced in chapter 2 and my subsequent findings clearly indicate that what was discovered to be the power elite includes only a few economic dominants. In fact, there is a preponderance of past or present office-holders in local government among the top leaders. Many

of them are subject to public sanction in the sense that they must be elected. Dahl (1961) justifies his pluralistic democracy thesis by using the line of reasoning that a leader in a pluralistic democracy may be powerful in many areas of decision-making as long as he is subject to popular election. *Thus, the power elite in Reed Town is, in limited ways, democratic, even though the nature of the leadership is stable power elite.*

There are several comments to be made at this time, both on the theoretical framework used and on the operational problems involved in cross-cultural work. First of all, if one accepts the model introduced in chapter 2 as a useful framework for the analysis of community power structure, the problem is how to operationalize it in such political cultures as Japan's where, at least in smaller communities, one cannot find many issues which divide a community. All official decisions are made unanimously. One can find no differences at the behavioral level. There are no ways of finding out how homogeneous or heterogeneous the leaders' actions are on a given issue, thus making it impossible also to find out how well they represent the people in a community. The only alternative in the face of such a political culture is to try to obtain what one wants through more indirect methods. One can ask the leaders and the citizens about their attitudes toward certain values. What are their attitudes toward conservatism, school building programs, and economic development? Through an examination of these attitudinal data, one may be able to infer how a leader might act in the decision-making situation. It would be difficult, indeed, to verify such an inference unless one became a participant observer in the decision-making process.

Second, one factor not included in my theoretical framework was consideration for factionalism. An investigation revealed that there are factions in Reed Town politics. A report on their activities has been made elsewhere (Kuroda 1968a). It is relevant to point out that these factions, although they exist, do not appear to be formed on the basis of any significant attitudinal or value differences. Actually, the two largest factions are headed by Mayor Abe and by Enoki, a former mayor. Mayor Abe is more liberal and is considered to be more progressive, but only a few of the citizens appear to consider this ideological dimension very important in their factional activities. Thus, what is inferred here is that factional activities make no difference in this analysis, since I am more concerned with what the leaders represent in community politics than with their social backgrounds. One leader of Korean origin was included in the study.

Koreans as a whole are held in low regard in Japanese politics. This man ranked very low in the leadership ranking. His presence among the leaders affected my conclusion very little as far as the present study is concerned, for I found, through informal conversations with informants during my stay at the research site, that his attitudes are not radically different from those of any other leader.

There are several factors which lead me to recommend that, in future research into community power structure in Japan as well as in other non-Western nations, the study of factional activities be incorporated into the theoretical consideration. The pioneering effort made by Scoble (1961) to view factional politics as an integral part of a community study appears to have been forgotten by many students of community politics. His emphasis on the role of factions in community power structure is of special significance to those who are interested in comparative local politics.

It should be realized that factional activities in Japan and other non-Western societies are much more elaborate and prevalent than in the United States. Each faction in the Japanese National Diet maintains its own office in the diet to facilitate its activities. Although factions at the local level are neither as elaborate nor as important as those at the national level, the fact that partisan activities are almost nonexistent in local-level politics in Japan is another reason why factions ought to be recognized as a factor to be considered in future study of community politics in Japan. The lack of partisan politics at the community level gives an added importance to the role of factions in Japanese local politics. Furthermore, an investigation of factional politics in conjunction with more standardized community power structure studies provides an indicator to determine the validity of methods employed to discover a power structure. For instance, I found Mayor Abe, who ranks first among the fifty leaders in Reed Town, to be the leader of the largest faction in the community. Enoki, who ranked ninth in the power structure, leads the second faction, which has a considerably smaller number of followers. These findings coincide with the variant of Hunter's reputational technique employed for the present study. Thus, for both substantive as well as methodological reasons, an inclusion of factional politics into any study of community politics in cross-cultural perspective appears extremely desirable.

Third, the lack of direct participation by the economic dominants in Reed Town politics was shown on a number of occasions throughout this analysis. It was also shown earlier that the economic development of Reed Town was hampered by a lack of coordination among an important group, the economic dominants. At the time of my survey, Reed Town's economic dominants played an insignificant role in community decision-making. Those businessmen who were found among the top leaders are mostly small businessmen who do not fit my definition of economic dominants. However, at the time of this writing in 1969, a new railroad is being constructed which will connect Reed Town directly with Tokyo. My hypothesis is that the community power structure must be going through some basic changes as a result of this construction. A sizable number of farmers sold their farms to make way for it. When the largest cargo train depot in the nation is completed here, it is very likely to change the characteristics of Reed Town. The community is apt to become either another bedroom community for Tokyo or a thriving industrial community. The direct train from Reed Town will carry passengers to the center of Tokyo within half an hour. The state of community development in Reed Town is definitely different from that in the community studied by the Waseda University team (*Shakaikagaku Tōkyū* 1965).

The team studies at Waseda (*Shakaikagaku Tōkyū* 1965) imply that the role played by the economic dominants in the process of further urbanization and industrialization will determine the question of who governs. To what degree this will be applicable to Reed Town can be answered only after a follow-up study is completed in the future. My study certainly points to the need for a longitudinal study of community power structure.

Studies of community politics have interested both political scientists and sociologists, not only for their substantive findings about the communities in which we live but also for the methodological disputes involved. The several checks made on my selection of the leaders in Reed Town indicate that the technique employed in this study yielded valid results. A few points of methodological importance are presented next.

It is easy to find oneself critical of someone else's approach because of his conclusion. As an old saying in a Buddhist political culture goes, "He who hates priests hates their surplices." [16] Perhaps a disappointment to some, this study of a Japanese community suggests that *the use of a variant of Hunter's reputational approach does not necessarily produce a conclusion similar to Hunter's in his study of Regional City.* A

study by the Waseda University team supports this suggestion, as do also the findings of Abu-Laban, Agger, Erickson, and Walton. [17] My findings in Reed Town duplicate at least some of Dahl's findings in New Haven in spite of the fact that we used different approaches to the study of community power structure. In both New Haven, USA, and Reed Town, Japan, professionals play an important role in community decision-making. In neither community does one find the kind of power elite that Hunter found in Regional City. Studies by Blankenship (1964), Freeman et al. (1963), Jennings (1964), and Presthus (1964) suggest that we social scientists definitely need more comparative community studies—in various parts of the world and over a period of time—before we can make any definite statements concerning the use of different methods of power structure identification which can be acceptable to all students of community politics.

6
Community-Issue Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The last chapter examined political, structural, and psychological aspects of Reed Town's power structure. This chapter concerns itself with issues facing Reed Town. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first examines the extent of issue involvement among the leaders and the rank-and-file citizens; the second describes the specific case of the school building issue.

Functions of the community power structure include the resolution of community conflicts and the prevention of any serious open conflicts. Those who are in leadership positions are there at least in part to legitimize whatever they decide to do. Certain issues discussed in this chapter may not be issues in the sense that some people support one point of view while others oppose it; these issues may be more appropriately considered simply as projects. Because of the operational difficulties involved in thus distinguishing between projects and issues, any matter that concerns the leaders and the citizenry is defined as an issue in this study.

INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES

The major interest in this section is to discover the extent to which and the ways in which the leaders, economic dominants, and general population are involved in the major issues of Reed Town.

THE LEADERS

Two questions were asked of the fifty leaders and nine economic dominants: "What do you feel are the major problems or issues facing Reed Town now or in recent times?" "Were you or are you directly involved in these issues?" Table 47 presents a summary of the data obtained from the leaders in response to these two questions. The leaders' names are arranged in order of the frequency with which they were nominated by the knowledgeables and the leaders themselves. An *x* represents an issue which was mentioned by a leader as important and in which he was directly involved. A *y* refers to an issue which was perceived to be important by a leader but in which he did not directly participate. Thus, for example, a large number of *x* scores implies a leader's active participation in many issues. The last column on the right shows the total number of issues a leader was involved in, followed by the total number of issues thought by him to be major issues. For example, 1/4 means that he mentioned four main issues facing the community and was involved in only one of them.

All the issues identified are classified into thirteen categories as follows:

1. Streets and roads
2. School buildings and related issues
3. Bringing in new industries
4. Railroads
5. Other transportation problems
6. New Town Hall construction
7. Welfare issues
8. Elimination of bosses and factions, more democracy
9. Public health
10. Cultural facilities
11. Farmers' problems
12. Personnel problems at Town Hall, such as the selection of the deputy mayor and treasurer
13. Miscellaneous

Forty-one of fifty leaders answered the questions. The total number of issues mentioned is 135. Ninety-four cases of involvement are reported in the table ($x = 94$). The mean number of issues identified is 3.29, and the mean for *x* or involvement is 2.29 for the entire leadership. Clearly, the leaders did not participate in all issues they identified.

Direct participation in an issue denotes access to the community decision-making mechanism. Without this access, an individual cannot exercise power unless he is influential, as defined earlier. An important question to be raised here is this: Do the top leaders (N = 23) participate more often in the resolution of these issues than do the lower-ranking leaders?

The mean for all issues identified by the top leaders is 3.30; the mean for their involvement is 2.29. The means for the lower-ranking leaders are 3.29 and 2.38 respectively. These findings indicate that *there is no appreciable difference between the top leaders and the lower-ranking leaders regarding the quantity of issues identified. However, the lower- ranking leaders are involved in more issues than are the top leaders.*

Freeman et al. (1963) suggest that the reputational technique is apt to uncover what they refer to as "institutional leaders" who enjoy prestige and legitimize community decisions. These leaders do not necessarily participate directly in each decision-making process in the community, although they may be aware of the many issues existing in the community. It could be that those lower-ranking leaders in Table 47 are what Freeman et al. refer to as "effectors," those who do the "legwork" in community decision-making. They may be the ones who solicit donations from various sources to construct school swimming pools, for instance. This may explain my finding that there is no appreciable difference between the frequency of the leaders' participation in major issues and that of the top hierarchy of the leadership system.

A closer examination of each issue, however, reveals some interesting findings. There are four kinds of major issues presented in Table 47. First of all, there are the issues everyone is concerned about, regardless of his position in the leadership structure, issues such as streets and roads. Second, there are some issues which attract leaders from various ranks, although not as totally as the first category mentioned; for example, such issues as railroads, buses, and public health. Third, there are issues, such as the construction of a new Town Hall building or personnel problems at Town Hall, that attract the attention of high-ranking leaders. Finally, there are issues which concern only the middle-and lower-ranking leaders in the community, issues such as the elimination of "bossism" and factionalism and farmers' problems of various sorts.

Most of these issues appear to be such that they can be classified into a set of categories presented in the issue-involvement model described in chapter 2. Table 48 gives a summary of my

findings within this framework. *It shows that there are no signs of immediate change in the leader ship structure, as evidenced in the absence of issues falling into either the A1 or A2 categories.* Note that Issues 1 and 2 attracted the attention of practically every leader regardless of his ranking. *The problems of streets and schools apparently constitute a common problem for all leaders.* Issues 6, 7, and 12 fall into the B1 category. These are considered to be major problems by high-ranking leaders exclusively. Issues 6, 7, and 12—the new Town Hall building, welfare, and personnel problems at Town Hall—are obviously limited problems in that they do not concern those who are not directly connected with these matters, although the construction of a new Town Hall building may become everyone's concern in due time. Also, the choice of personnel may invite serious conflicts, as it did in the case study described in the next section. However, normally this would not create any serious problem for the entire leadership.

Table 47. Issue Involvement and the Leaders

Name	Issue Number													Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
Abe	x		x	x									x	4/4
Amano	x	x				x			x					4/4
Akamine		x										x	x	3/3
Akita	y	y		y			x							1/4
Enomoto	x	x			x								x	4/4
Endō		x							y					1/2
Emoto	x	x			x					x			x	5/5
Enoki	R*													R*
Enoshita	y	x	y											1/3
Fuji-i	x	x		y										2/3
Ikeda		x				y								1/2
Hirata	x				x									2/2
Hara	NA													NA
Fujimoto	NA													NA
Furushō	y	x												1/2
Fujise	x					y							y	1/3
Furuya	x	y	y											1/3
Fujino	x	x		x		x	y					x		5/6
Hase		x		y	y									1/3
Gotō	y	y	y									x		1/4
Hamada	x		x										x	3/3
Oda		x	x	x	x	x								5/5
Uno		x	x									x		3/3
Honda	y							y	y					0/3
Morita	x	x									y			2/3
Sasaki	x		y				x		x					3/4
Seki	y	y									x		x	2/4
Okada			x	y							x			2/3
Sano	x	x										y	x	3/4
Takahashi	y	x		x				y		x				3/5
Suzuki	x	x						x						3/3
Okubo	x				x				y				y	2/4
Yamamoto	y	x												1/2
Ohara		x												1/1
Nakamura			x					y						1/2
Nishikawa	x		x	x					x	x			x	6/6
Noda											x			1/1
Morishige		y		y		y				y				0/4
Imai	x			x	x			x			y		y	4/6
Inouye	x													1/1
Ishihara	y		x	x										2/3
Itō	NA													NA
Kaji	y	x									x			2/3
Yamada	NA													NA
Katō	x	x			x									3/3
Maruyama	NA													NA
Masaki	NA													NA
Matsumoto	x								x					2/2
Matsui	NA													NA
Matsuno	NA													NA
Means														2.29/3.29

* Refused to respond.

Table 48. Involvement of Leaders in Major Issues

Concentrated			
Intensity	Upper	Lower	Dispersed
High	A1 None	A2 None	A3 1. Streets 2. School

Concentrated			
	B1	B2	B3
Low	6. New Town Hall	8. Elimination of "bossism"	3. New industry
	7. Welfare	11. Farmers' problems	4. Railroad
	12. Personnel problems		5. Bus system, etc.
			9. Public health
			10. Cultural facilities

Issues 8 and 11 are potentially dangerous in the sense that if they should move into the A2 category, there would be a conflict between the high-and lower-ranking leaders within the leadership structure. Issue 8 is definitely such a potential problem. *Five lower-ranking leaders will ingly mentioned that the town ought to eliminate "bossism" and factional ism in order to make the town a more open community.* [1] The leaders who expressed this sentiment were obviously dissatisfied with the way many decisions were made in the community. Only two of them, however, said that they were doing something about the problem. As for issue 11, *prob lems connected with farming are found important by the lower-ranking leaders, probably because many of them are farmers.*

The rest of the problems and issues attract the attention of many persons throughout the leadership structure. The fact that *not very many leaders are concerned with bringing new industries into the community* may indicate a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the leaders for this important aspect of community development. Also, this could mean an isolation of business leaders or the economic dominants from the mainstream of community decision-making.

THE ECONOMIC DOMINANTS

We interviewed the first seven economic dominants on the list, but were not able to interview the last two. Honda and Akamine are the only two who were listed as members of the leadership

structure in Table 26. Akamine is a high-ranking leader, whereas Honda is found at the bottom of the top leadership list. The small number of persons involved prevents one from making any definitive statements, although it is quite obvious that there are many *y*'s but only a few *x*'s in Table 49. *For the economic dominants, issue involvement seems to be the exception rather than the rule.* The leaders claimed to have been involved in 94 out of 135 issues listed; the economic dominants reported having participated in only 4 out of 16. In terms of percentages, the leaders participated in approximately 70 percent of the issues that appear in Table 48, as opposed to participation by the economic dominants in only 25 percent of the issues listed in Table 49. Likewise, mean issue involvement and identification for the economic dominants are much lower than those for the leaders (0.58/2.29 vs. 2.29/3.29).

Furthermore, one observes that three out of seven economic dominants expressed their desire to eliminate factions and bosses from the town in order to establish a more open and democratic community, although none of them were doing anything about this particular issue. This and other evidence presented above confirms once again my hypothesis set forth in chapter 5: *the economic dominants were not directly involved in commu nity decision-making.* It is also pertinent to point out that at least three economic dominants appeared interested in becoming involved in community decision-making, as manifested by their desire to make recruitment to the community political leadership more open and democratic. *This evidence certainly points to the validity of the reputational approach in ascertaining community power structure.*

Finally, it is of interest to point out that only one of the economic dominants mentioned the bringing of new industries as an important issue facing the community. This suggests the nature of the economic dominants found in Reed Town. They are not aggressive in the sense of being actively engaged in any systematic plan to bring in new industries. This task appears to be carried out by others in the Town Hall and Town Assembly. The relationship between the power structure and the economic dominants might be considered mutual in the sense that neither seems to communicate much with the other and they do not seem to show any signs of cooperation for the purpose of promoting the economic activities of Reed Town. [2]

Table 49. Issue Involvement and the Economic Dominants

	Issue number*													
Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total
Toyoda	*y*													0/1
Tozaki	*x*		*y*					*y*						1/3
Honda								*y*	*y*					0/2
Toyama	*y*							*y*						0/2
Ueno	*y*	*y*												0/2
Akamine		*x*										*x*	*x*	3/3
Ueki	*y*	*y*							y					0/3
Uzaki.	NA													NA
Umeki	NA													NA
Means														0.58/2.29

** 1. Streets and roads*

2. School buildings and related issues

3. Bringing in new industries

4. Railroads

5. Other transportation problems

6. New Town Hall construction

7. Welfare issues

8. Elimination of bosses and factions, more democracy

9. Public health

10. Cultural facilities

11. Farmers' problems

12. Personnel problems at Town Hall

13. Miscellaneous

THE GENERAL POPULATION

The general population sample respondents were asked questions similar to those asked of the leaders concerning the issues facing Reed Town. My aim here was to discover any meaningful difference that might exist between the leaders' perception of issues in the community and that of the general population. Two open-ended questions included in the questionnaire (QIV-35 and QIV-41) were: "What in your opinion are the most important issues, problems, or projects facing Reed Town at the present time?" "If you have discussed any matters with anyone (family, friends, leaders), often or once in a while, what matters have you discussed?" The second question was the second part of a larger question.

Although the respondents were allowed to mention as many issues as they wished in answer to the first question, the data presented in Table 50 include only those problems mentioned first by each respondent. Nearly one-half of the respondents felt that there were definitely some important issues in the community; the rest did not feel there were any worth mentioning. Of those who mentioned one or more issues, as many as sixty-two considered problems related to streets to be the most important issue facing the town. Thus, more than one out of five persons in the town felt that there ought to be something done about the streets. As stated earlier, leaders also considered the street problems as being important. Streets in Reed Town, as elsewhere in Japan, are narrow and crowded with cars and pedestrians. Only central parts of the town had paved streets at the time of the survey. Dust created by buses and cars is unbearable to homeowners and pedestrians alike. Paved, as well as unpaved, roads go unrepaired at times, which aggravates the citizens. In my last visit to Reed Town in 1971, I found more streets paved and significant improvements in the streets, but now there are also more cars than there were in 1963. Other problems mentioned did not seem to attract nearly as much attention.

As for the second question, street problems again top the list. How ever, the number of respondents who had discussed street problems is less than one might expect in view of the importance assigned to them. Three school swimming pools were constructed in the summer of 1963, which fact was apparently fresh in their minds when the question was asked, for many of them had contributed their share toward the construction

of the pools. Election matters are something they discuss with members of their family, their friends, and their leaders but not something they consider an issue in the town.

Table 50. Issue Involvement and the General Population

Issues mentioned	N	%
QIV–35		
1. Street problems	62	22
2. Economic and industrial development	26	9
3. Education problems	16	6
4. Railway, bring in new railway	15	6
5. Agricultural problems	7	2
6. Sanitary problems	3	1
7. Recreational facilities	1	0
8. Development of town in general	12	4
9. NA	145	50
Total	287	100
QIV–41		
1. Streets and highways	22	7
2. Schools, swimming pool construction	17	6
3. Economic and industrial development	12	4
4. Election matters	11	3
5. Sanitary problems	4	1
6. Railways	2	1

Issues mentioned	N	%
7. Others	31	14
8. Not applicable: never discussed with anyone	125	43
9. NA	63	22
Total	287	101

In Table 51, the pattern of the public's responses is compared with that of the leaders and the economic dominants. Keeping in mind that the questions used in the general population survey were not exactly the same as those used in the leadership study, one finds here the evidence for several hypotheses.

It appears that the leaders are concerned with a wider range of issues than is the general population. Yet, the leaders and the citizenry are in substantial agreement on what they consider to be the most important issues and problems in Reed Town. Problems and issues related to streets, education, economic development, and transportation systems are considered by all people in Reed Town, leaders and the masses alike, to be important. The masses of people see street problems as being by far the most important (44%), whereas the leaders see problems related to the field of education (19%) as being as important as street problems (22%). (This may be explained, in part, by the fact that the leaders are well aware that the most costly project for the town budget is education.) What each person wants to do in connection with each project might be different, but at least one finds here a perception shared by the leaders and the rank-and-file citizens. Obviously, however, one should not forget that about one-half of the general population failed to mention any issue facing the community. Thus, this hypothesis should be modified by qualifying the rank-and-file citizens to include only those citizens who are politically perceptive.

Table 51. Issues in Reed Town: Leaders, Economic Dominants, and Citizens (%)

Issues	TL	ED	GP
1. Street problems	22	31	44
2. Educational problems	19	19	11
3. Economic development	10	6	18
4. Railroads	8	0	11
5. Other transportation	6	0	0
6. New Town Hall	4	0	0
7. Welfare	2	0	0
8. Elimination of bosses, etc.	4	19	0
9. Public health	5	13	2
10. Cultural facilities	3	0	0
11. Farmers' problems	4	0	5
12. Personnel problems at Town Hall	4	6	0
13. Miscellaneous	8	6	9
Total %	99	100	100
Total N	135	16	142

Note: N's represent total number of issues enumerated by top leaders, economic dominants, and general population. Total N for general population is small because only the first issue mentioned by 142 individual respondents is included.

The finding that only 142 of 287 respondents were willing to mention at least one issue facing Reed Town is significant when one considers the fact that over 90 percent of the residents turn out in most local elec tions. An inference here is that many Reed Town residents are willing to cast their vote without really

knowing what important issues are confronting the community. Voting, then, cannot be taken as a good indicator of meaningful political participation in Reed Town.

In the next section, I shall deal with a particular issue which shook the whole community for almost a year. This case study may not be typical of the way in which an important decision is made for the community, but it represents the more dramatic and spectacular parts of community political life.

THE SCHOOL UNIFICATION INCIDENT [3]

THE ORIGINAL PLAN

There were no major problems when the new Reed Town came into being by the amalgamation of two neighboring villages and old Reed Town on 1 March 1955. Everyone felt that his life would be improved by the amalgamation. However, there were unsolved problems for the new Reed Town to tackle. One of these was the unification of school systems.

Clause II of the "Establishment of a New Reed Town Plan" stated that an attempt would be made to set up a new school district system or to unite the existing schools into one at some appropriate time in the future. This plan was passed by the assemblies of the three communities prior to the formal amalgamation on 1 March. On the basis of Clause II, Mayor Fuji-i, Deputy Mayor Enoki, Treasurer Nagura, Head of the General Affairs Department Hino, President of the Board of Education Kōno, and others proposed a plan to unify the three middle schools into one large middle school in February 1959, four years after the amalgamation. Mayor Fuji-i made the following statement:

> The unification of school systems is a popular trend in our country today, but the purpose of unification is not only to gather students in one place in order to educate them. As it is stated in the Law of Education, unlike elementary education, middle-school education requires many specialized facilities. We can no longer allow middle schools to be mere adjuncts to elementary schools. This is the reason why the national government is providing us with its aid in strengthening our middle-school system.
>
> There are three matters which must be taken into consideration in the unification of the middle schools: (1) one school should consist of 12 to 20 classes; (2) the location of the middle

school is important for students; (3) other miscellaneous factors also must be considered, such as the residents' opinions, the town's financial status, and the elementary schools.

Those who are concerned with the unification of schools, such as members of the Board of Education and the town government, have been trying to work toward the goal of unifying the middle schools ever since the amalgamation in 1955, but so far we have only added a few classrooms here and there. We have been meeting and discussing the problem of unification since 1957. The best plan we have come up with thus far is to build a new middle school in the center of Reed Town.

In spite of these efforts, the new middle school in the heart of Reed Town was never built, owing to the lack of funds, land acquisition problems, and the problem of distance. The most strongly voiced objection was from those who lived in the eastern parts of town. Some of their children would have had to walk as far as 8 kilometers (5 miles) to go to the proposed middle school. Thus, this original plan was rejected by the Town Assembly in March 1959.

THE ALTERNATIVE PLAN

As a result, the mayor called an informal meeting in order to present an alternative plan: to build two schools instead of one. One middle school would be built in the eastern district and another one in the western part of old Reed Town. Members of the Town Assembly from old Reed Town and both districts and the block leaders from the same areas were invited to this informal gathering. Everyone present, with the exception of one block leader from the western district, agreed with the new unification plan. The dissenter stated that he wanted to talk to his people before he made up his mind. The president of the Farmers' Co-op, Eizen Enomoto, who represented the same district, harshly criticized the lone dissenter, saying, "Why in the hell do you have to disagree with a plan which is aimed at the advancement of education? You decide right now, right here!" The block leader acquiesced. Thus, unanimous consent was given to this new plan to establish two schools. Subsequently, an emergency session of the Town Assembly was called on 26 March 1959, and the new proposal was passed. The budget for the establishment of new school buildings was incorporated into the 1959 budget at this same meeting. The minutes of the Town Assembly show that details of the plan, such as personnel and

management of the new schools, were to be decided by the Board of Education. The plan called for the opening of the two new middle schools one year hence, in April 1960. (The academic year begins in April in Japan.) Thus, it looked as if the town would finally have new and modern schools for its children by 1960.

TOWN HALL VS. THE WESTERN DISTRICT

About one-third of the town's 17-million-yen budget, in addition to the national government's assistance of five million yen, was expected to be used to start construction of the new school buildings in September. On 30 April 1959, a mayoral election was held. Enoki, the former deputy mayor from the eastern district, defeated his opponents from the old Reed Town district and the western district in this election. The new mayor appointed a deputy mayor, Mitsuo Fujino, whose appointment was approved by the Town Assembly on 9 July 1959. A new treasurer's appointment was also approved by the assembly. However, there were apparently some conflicts over these appointments. There was a faction within the assembly which wanted Enomoto from the western district to be appointed deputy mayor. Enomoto, a priest, was the man who ordered the lone dissenter at the informal meeting on the new school plan to agree with the new plan. [4]

I was unable to find the causes of the serious conflict between Enoki and Enomoto, but the fact was that they were extremely antagonistic toward each other even before Enomoto was passed over for the deputy mayorship. This incident led Enomoto to be against everything the Town Hall planned. Obviously, the most important project at this particular time was the construction of the new middle-school buildings. Enomoto appears to have initiated a movement against the new school plan. The construction of the new buildings, scheduled to begin in September, had to be delayed because of the emerging opposition. Residents from the western district went to the Town Hall to complain; their complaints eventually led to the formation of an "Alliance to Stop the School Unification Plan" by the beginning of September 1959. The organization inevitably elected Enomoto to be its president. The mayor and others tried, through informal means, to persuade the alliance members not to block the school project but they failed.

On 15 September the alliance offered three reasons for its opposition to the unification plan. First, the amalgamation was carried out with the understanding that the three communities would be considered equal partners. “Why should the western district be treated differently from the eastern district, which would continue to have its own middle school?” Second, the decision concerning this new unification plan was made by “the people in the upper echelons, without any consultation with the people of Reed Town. This is against the spirit of democracy. No one can force anything on us,” they said. Third, the purpose of the alliance was “not to make unnecessary conflicts and disturb peace but to create a situation where everyone can understand each other.” Seventy-eight names were listed as organizing committee members; among them I failed to find Enomoto’s name. The obvious response of the Town Hall was that the unification plan was decided upon by the Town Assembly after prior consultation with all block leaders.

By the end of September, the situation was worse. Twenty-four block leaders in the western district resigned from their positions, saying that they would not cooperate with Town Hall. They declared they would not pay any taxes in the future. Meetings were held every day and night in order to solve the conflict. Meetings at the block leaders’ homes lasted till eleven and twelve o’clock, and this affected the farmers’ lives to a great extent. The rice harvest was delayed in many places as a result of the conflict, something unheard of in a place that had been known for centuries as the best rice-producing area in the whole of Japan. Farmers in this and nearby villages had long enjoyed the privilege of sending their products to the emperor on harvest festival days in the fall. This and other events led six members of the assembly from the western district to present their resignation papers to the assembly at the end of October.

THE STRAW-MAT DEMONSTRATION

In an attempt to resolve the conflict the mayor called an informal meeting of assemblymen, School Board members, and representatives from the western district, on 4 November 1959. Mayor Enoki told them at this meeting that the town would reconsider the original plan of having one middle school. If this plan should fail to be accepted, then the western district could maintain the existing middle school in its district. What he did, in fact, was to retreat from what had already been decided upon by the Town Assembly the previous March. It looked as if the

conflict was resolved at this gathering. However, the following day, some members of the assembly from the western district expressed their intention not to withdraw their letters of resignation. They felt that the Town Assembly had been completely ignored by Town Hall. Town Hall reacted by returning to the position of considering the possibility of constructing two middle schools, as decided by the Town Assembly in March. This opportunistic attitude taken by Town Hall enraged the representatives from the western district. Finally, they decided to have a mass demonstration on the morning of 16 November. They filed a petition with the local police to stage a mass demonstration with their straw-mat flag, which symbolizes the farmers' revolt against authority.

Two days before the date set for the mass demonstration, Yoshida, a member of the House of Councillors from this district, offered himself as an intermediary in order to ward off the mass demonstration. On the night of 14 November, Enoki and his associates met in the Town Hall, while about seventy representatives of the western district met in the community hall. They talked about the conflict separately, Yoshida acting as intermediary. According to a representative from the western district, Yoshida told him and others that there was no use fighting over this issue forever. Why not agree to a period of preparation, prior to the establishment of one middle school for the whole town? The existing middle school in the western district could be kept as an independent school until such time as amalgamation of the three existing middle schools into one could be achieved. Yoshida informed them that the mayor and his associates had already agreed to this proposal. After having been told of this plan, the seventy representatives decided not to stage what they saw to be an unnecessary demonstration. Instead, they decided simply to have their own district meeting.

It soon became apparent, however, that the mayor and his associates had not agreed to the Yoshida compromise plan. What they did agree upon at their meeting was to proceed with the construction of two new middle schools, the plan passed by the Town Assembly in March, allowing the existing middle school in the western district to remain an independent school until the new school was completed.

Some residents speculated that Yoshida must have told each side what he thought they wanted to hear. In any case, Yoshida did accomplish part of what he set out to do. He succeeded in preventing the demonstration scheduled for 16 November, be-

cause those who planned the demonstration did not find out the real position of the mayor and his associates soon enough. Rather, they discovered it the hard way.

The western district meeting was held as scheduled on the morning of 16 November. The Reed Town police reported that approximately 600 residents attended the meeting. Enomoto made a report on the series of events which led to the mass meeting. Upon hearing the report, they decided to pass two resolutions: (1) that the alliance continue its activity until it accomplished all of its goals; (2) that two individuals in the Town Hall (the deputy mayor and the industrial development section head) be singled out as persons who were uncooperative with the purposes of the alliance. Upon adjournment of the meeting, several representatives from among these 600 people went to Town Hall to present their resolutions to the mayor, who happened to be attending the annual meeting of Japanese mayors in Tokyo. The deputy mayor was not in his office because of illness. All section heads of the Town Hall had disappeared by the time the representatives arrived at the Town Hall. It was impossible to fight. There was no one there to fight with.

MORE NEW PLANS

Four days later, on 20 November, the Town Assembly met and decided to urge the mayor to proceed with the plan to build two middle schools. Also they asked the mayor to have a final plan ready within twenty days. The president of the Town Assembly, Emoto, expressed his regret over the fact that the assembly's position in the community had been ignored. He stated that if this attitude were to continue, there would be no need to have any Town Assembly.

Acting upon the request made by the Town Assembly, Mayor Enoki proposed a new plan consisting of three points. First, Town Hall would proceed with the two-middle-school plan as agreed upon in March. However, the existing school districts would be abolished altogether. Those students who planned to go into farming would attend the east middle school, and those who were interested in commerce and other areas would go to the west middle school. Thus, the two new middle schools would each be designed to meet different needs of the students. Second, the east school would be constructed in the northern section of the eastern district. The existing middle school in the eastern district would be used in the future as an elementary

school. Third, the existing middle school in the western district would remain as a branch of the new west middle school until all the new buildings were completed.

This plan did not please either faction. Again Enoki conferred only with representatives from the western district and agreed with them to have three independent middle schools. This action by Enoki really enraged the members of the Town Assembly. However, the fact that they were expecting an election on 3 February 1960 made it nearly impossible to do much.

THE FINAL SOLUTION

Nothing of importance happened until the Town Assembly election on 3 February. Enomoto ran for the assembly and was elected; moreover, at the first assembly meeting on 9 February, he was selected by his colleagues as vice-president of the assembly. A new president of the assembly was also elected: Amano, a priest from the same district. This situation offered the opportunity for the assembly to review the long and bitter conflict from a fresh point of view. Neither of these men had been a member of the assembly before.

A new proposal to build a middle school in the northern part of the town was made by the western district, a proposal the Town Hall took as an opportunity to proceed with the two-middle-school plan. After several meetings with representatives from the east and west, it was agreed upon to go ahead with this plan, which comes very close to what the mayor had offered as his compromise plan in December. Finally, the June issue of *Reed Town Bulletin* reported that the new unification plan would become effective in the fall of 1960.

REMARKS

This series of events on the unification of the school system was considered by nearly everyone I talked to as being the most dramatic and serious conflict the residents of Reed Town had ever experienced.

Three years later, when I conducted my survey, Enomoto's name was mentioned by ten respondents as being a man who was actually very influential in school affairs. In fact, his name was nominated more often than anyone else's. Residents must remember him as the man capable of doing something about school problems.

There appear to have been some political interests involved in the dispute between Enomoto and the mayor, which I did not discuss above. Although I was unable to ascertain anything concrete, I did find that these two men had quite different personalities and came from different social backgrounds. Mayor Enoki was the son of a wealthy landowner. Enomoto was an outsider who came to Reed Town in 1937. He had been active in the Farmers' Co-op for some time and was president of the co-op at the time of the survey. We attempted more than five times to interview him while we were at the research site, but with no success. He did answer a short questionnaire used on selected leaders.

Dissatisfied with the new mayor's appointment of Fujino as deputy mayor, still considered as an outsider in the community in which he had resided for thirty years, and not able to be a part of the power structure, Enomoto followed the classic strategy of taking the school building issue out of the hands of those who were in the position to make important decisions and who did not consider him as being influential in community politics. He went directly to the rank-and-file citizens of his district, among whom at least he was not rejected.

The leaders, then, had no choice but to appeal also to the masses. A game played outside of the power structure necessarily takes on more emotional flavor, as was evidenced so many times in the school building incident. Such an incident, however, can take place only if democracy is a norm. That is to say, if the opinion of the populace is not respected, the dissenter, such as Enomoto, will not find any outlet.

Dahl (1961:324) theorizes on how an appeal to the masses will end:

> The appeal may simply fail to create a stir. Interest in political matters wanes rather quickly; since complex issues of democratic norms nearly always lack a direct relation to the on-going life of an individual, they have even less capacity for holding attention than many other issues. However passionately the dissenters feel about their case, life does move on, old questions become tiresome, and the newspapers begin to shove the conflict to the inside pages. Perhaps the legitimists, buoyed by their reading of the electorate, defeat the dissenters in a clear-cut trial of strength and, having done so, close ranks and go on to the next business. Perhaps the dissenters win, or a compromise is worked out; if so the dissenters, like as not, turn into the next generation of legitimists.

Dahl's speculation is borne out in the school building incident: *a com promise was worked out and Enomoto himself was recruited into the community power structure.* For the first time he was elected a member of the Town Assembly. He assured himself of legitimacy by becoming vice-president of the assembly. He naturally found it impossible in that position to be a noisy dissenter. Once again, one finds that politics seems to operate in the same manner in Japan as it does in the West.

The techniques used to influence people in the political process appear familiar to any student of community politics. The school building incident, however, certainly indicates what can happen in what appears to be a harmonious small farming community, whose Town Assembly minutes show unanimous agreement in all decisions made in the assembly. This school issue was a colorful part of the community political life.

CONCLUSION

The materials presented in this chapter supplement my hypotheses about the power structure in Reed Town, in terms of both the methods employed and the empirical evidence found, as presented in chapters 2 and 4, respectively. For example, the lack of any positive relationship between the economic sectors of the community and the power structure is again borne out in this chapter.

Some new systematic empirical evidence was presented in this chapter, although it is not in any way unexpected data. I found that there were some issues which were the exclusive concern of the lower-ranking leaders and others which concerned only the top leaders. However, I found no major issues which were of exclusive concern to the masses. They were not concerned with any special issue which the leaders had not mentioned. An implication here is that if any changes are to be brought about in Reed Town, it will be done by the Young Turks who occupy the lower ranks in the community power structure described in the last chapter. The dissatisfied lower-ranking leaders near the bottom of the community power structure and the economic dominants who are outside the power structure—these are the ones who seem to feel frustration over the way the decisions are made in Reed Town. It should be added here that these sentiments are not shared by all Young Turks. The model presented in chapter 2 provided a

number of hypotheses and new findings which link the community power structure with possible community power structure changes.

The last half of this chapter shows, among other things, what happens to an issue when it gets out of the established decision-making framework. It shows that political games are played in a rather remarkably similar manner, regardless of cultures. This is not, however, to imply that every political game is played in the same manner everywhere. There are some cultural traits which separate Japanese community politics from that of the United States. There is no deputy mayor, as such, in the United States. Even if there were such a position, it would not be regarded as the role of a "wife" assisting her master, as it is thought of in the Reed Town political culture. Informal conversations with some leaders at the research site revealed that they refer to the role of deputy mayor as *Nyōbō-yaku,* meaning the role of wife. They maintained that the mayor should have the right to decide who is going to be his "wife." The implication here is that the position should not go to a person belonging to another faction so as to balance the power relationship that exists between factions.

Another instance which points to a difference in political culture is the fact that Enomoto was still considered an outsider by many residents of the community, in spite of his thirty-year residence in Reed Town. He had lived in the community longer than many of its young adults. It is not easy to get accepted in a Japanese community, but once accepted a person enjoys privileges not shared by outsiders. This acceptance is normally accompanied by the incurrence of many kinds of *on* and *giri* (obligations), as described by Ike (1957). An implication for foreign scholars is that it will be difficult for them to study rural Japanese community politics, a task which requires the acquisition of data not readily accessible to outsiders.

Factions formed on a regional basis appear to continue, as one is able to observe in many parts of the world today. And so does the existence (or at least the claimed existence) of bosses. This, of course, is not peculiar to Japan, but in her case one might conclude that the tendency is much greater than what one might anticipate in an American community.

Several techniques employed by Yoshida and some of the civil servants at Town Hall deserve a few comments. Yoshida acted as an intermediary for the warring groups, in order to avert a mass demonstration. He did so by leading both sides to believe that the other had somehow agreed on a compromise

plan. One interpretation, given in the chapter, is that he told different stories to the two groups. One other interpretation not previously mentioned is the possibility of misunderstanding caused by the ambiguity of the Japanese language. Japanese is a beautiful language for those who want to enjoy its artistic and poetic qualities; but, as was briefly noted in chapter 3, it has serious limitations when it comes to making clear and precise statements. If a language is an integral part of a culture, it is very likely developed in accordance with the cultural core of values. Japanese culture is heavily influenced by Confucian and other Chinese thought, which emphasizes the importance of the middle way in order to avoid any embarrassment. A typical example is the tendency to make a non-ego-involved descriptive statement, such as "The flower on the table is beautiful," rather than to say, "I like the flower on the table." Yoshida's statements may have been nebulous, and the fact that he was a man of high status (a member of the House of Councillors) may have prevented the seventy representatives who attended the western district meeting on 14 November from raising any question. They may have interpreted what he said in such a manner as not to embarrass him. The language used by people of higher status often confuses those of lower social status. There are, for example, many Japanese who failed to understand what the emperor said in his history-making nationwide broadcast announcing the end of World War II on 14 August 1945. At least, this language element in Japanese politics should not be overlooked in interpreting human interaction, particularly that involving people of different social status. Of course, Yoshida may have consciously attempted to mislead the protesters, most of whom were farmers, relatively uneducated and unsophisticated citizens of Reed Town.

Lest some readers question the adequacy of the questionnaire design and the rest of the survey results employed in the present study, I wish to make it clear here that, with the exception of one question used in the questionnaire, I have no reason to doubt the validity of the survey. Interviewers were instructed to make sure that every respondent understood what was being asked, and although interviewers were obviously not instructed to explain every word used in the questionnaire, they were requested to give the standard explanations provided for them. Shortly after the survey began, a few interviewers reported that some farmers and uneducated respondents were misinterpreting the meaning of the word *Burakumin* (QV-30). It means literally "villagers" but is used to refer to the former out-

casts in Japan who are more commonly referred to as *Eta* (dirt) or *Hinin* (nonhumans). Most of the questions in this series were used in my earlier study of the Japanese law students, who obviously were familiar with the term *Burakumin,* used by middle-class Japanese. In order to ensure the validity of the questions, a pretest had been given to a small number of residents in Reed Town just before the survey in the summer of 1963, but apparently this one question was overlooked, and so we used a middle-class euphemism which was unfamiliar to the villagers. An equivalent difference in English terms might be "nigger" as opposed to "Black" in contemporary America. We should have used the derogatory term in order to be understood by the villagers. Textbooks in research methods stress the importance of using terminologies with which every respondent is familiar. But they fail to tell one what to do when the only term the lower-class people know is quite offensive to minority groups.

In any case, I was aware of the possible problem of language ambiguity and attempted whenever possible to ensure the validity of my questions. Since the discovery of the *Burakumin* problem came too late to make any change, we allowed some of the villagers to misunderstand the word rather than explain to each individual what it meant. This particular question was subsequently eliminated from the construction of the liberal-conservatism scale. We received more or less expected responses from the rest of the questions used in the survey. Obviously we did not make any conscious attempt to be misunderstood by our respondents.

Thus, the use of ambiguous expressions may be a political technique which is not readily available in English; but it is available in Japanese. However, to ascertain the extent and ways of use of such a technique goes beyond the scope of the present study.

Another technique used in Reed Town politics was the disappearance of the deputy mayor and all section heads of the Town Hall at a time of anticipated open conflict. This reminds one of techniques used in judo, developed in a culture where open conflict is to be averted at all costs. It takes two parties to have a conflict. One cannot fight without an enemy. If a similar situation had occurred in the United States, it is doubtful whether all section heads of Town Hall would suddenly have disappeared. Justice may be important, but there are conflicting values which impel people to act in different ways. In the West, bringing conflicts out into the open is encouraged. The Japanese seem to resist this part of American democracy. One evidence

of their dislike for open conflict is seen in the small number of lawyers in Japan. There are fewer than 10,000 practicing lawyers in the whole of Japan (Kuroda 1962). Yet if any serious conflict is to be dealt with in modern, or at least in Western, fashion, one must depend upon lawyers for professional assistance. This is one aspect of Westernization that Japan has resisted and failed to adopt.

The second half of the chapter has thus provided an illustration of some of the similarities as well as differences that exist between the American way of resolving conflicts and that of the Japanese.

7
Community Political Change

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 5 concluded that Reed Town in 1963 had a stable-power-elite type of power structure. An earlier study (Kuroda 1967b) on Reed Town and an Oregon community suggests also that Reed Town in 1963 was a stable community. The inference was based upon a finding that the more a person participated in Reed Town politics, the more he desired community influence or political power. An assumption in making the inference was that in unstable or revolutionary political communities, as Aristotle suggested, one expects to find hitherto powerless persons desiring political influence and power. If those who seek power and influence are already active in community politics, then they will aspire for power within the existing framework. Hence, the conclusion in chapter 5 coincides with my earlier finding based upon survey (micropolitical) data.

What I intend to do in this chapter, then, is to build further on this aspect of community politics in Reed Town by employing the model and operational procedures introduced in chapter 2, which describes two types of community political systems, each characterized by a different degree of political change: the stable and the revolutionary political systems. The stable system is characterized by a positive association between the extent of political participation and the desire for community influence. A political system is said to be unstable or revolutionary when there is no relationship or a negative association between these two variables. Furthermore, I shall attempt to characterize the nature of political participation and power aspiration in Reed Town in comparative perspective to discuss the possible sources of stability and instability in Reed Town in the light of the kind of power structure I found there.

FINDINGS

Both survey (micropolitical) data and aggregate (macropolitical) data are used to ascertain, first of all, the level of political participation and that of power aspiration in Reed Town as a whole. Then, the survey data are used to describe the relationship between the two variables for the purpose of characterizing the total community. [1]

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION [2]

To classify a community in terms of the extent to which its residents participate in politics presents serious problems. Of course, one can avoid most of the problems if one uses voting turnout as the indicator of political participation and selects 50 percent as the cutoff point between low and high. Unfortunately, the data which lend themselves to quantitative (interval or ratio scale) data analysis in the social sciences are not always theoretically meaningful. Voting turnout is a good example. When one views voting turnout in cross-cultural perspective, one realizes that voting has different meanings in different countries. [3] Furthermore, over 90 percent of the general population sample respondents claimed to have always voted in elections. (In some elections in recent years, the voting records of Reed Town show that over 90 percent of the voters had voted.) These two considerations led to the exclusion of voting turnout in the construction of the political participation scale.

The items included in the political participation scale attempt to measure the degree to which individuals are interested in community politics (attitude) and are involved in it (behavior) beyond the voting level. Roughly 15 percent of the public showed that they do something beyond voting, for example, by taking an active part in community issues and urging people to vote for one or the other candidate. More than one-third of the respondents discuss local government or community issues with their friends. Approximately two-thirds of them indicated their interest in community politics, whereas about one-third stated that they are either “not very interested” or “not at all interested” in community politics. Consequently, one must conclude that nearly two-fifths of those who vote in local elections have no real interest in community politics. These figures correspond roughly to what Agger and Ostrom (1956) found in a small Oregon community. Somewhat fewer than half the voting

population participate in community politics beyond the voting level in Reed Town, and in a small community in Oregon as well (Kuroda 1965d, 1967d).

As described in chapter 3, there are no undemocratic restrictions placed upon the adult population of Reed Town. However, when one compares Japan's history of franchise with that of the Western nations, Reed Town's records of mass participation in politics are not of as long standing as those of the West (Rokkan 1962). This is not to deny that its mass political participation records compare favorably with those in other parts of the world.

The data and discussion presented thus far call for an arbitrary decision in classifying Reed Town as a community of either high or low political participation. I would argue that Reed Town residents participate highly in politics when compared with the rest of the world and possibly even with urban communities in Japan. It has been pointed out that voters in rural areas vote more often than urbanites in Japan (Hoshino 1961; Kuroda and Kuroda 1968; Kyōgoku and Ike 1959; Oka 1958; Scalapino and Masumi 1962; and Ward 1960). Furthermore, if one takes the whole of human society into consideration, the participation of Reed Town residents is greater than one would expect to find in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And finally, if one compares the present rate of political participation in Reed Town with that prior to 1945, when women had not yet been given the franchise, one must conclude that Reed Town's adult population as a whole participates much more than it used to. The evidence (both aggregate data and survey data) presented here warrants consideration of Reed Town as a high political-participation community. The next variable to be considered is power aspiration.

POWER ASPIRATION

I have argued that Reed Town is characterized by the active participation of its citizens in community politics. To what extent are these active citizens interested in obtaining more community influence?

The data for this answer come exclusively from my survey data in Reed Town and the Oregon community. To the question of whether Reed Town residents would like to increase their community influence, 34 percent responded positively and 63 percent negatively; the remaining 3 percent gave no definite an-

swers. Forty-two percent of the top leaders (eight of nineteen) indicated their desire to have more influence in community affairs.

The only comparative data I have on this question come from the Oregon community, where I found 21 percent of the Oregonians expressing the same desire (Kuroda 1967b). Approximately one-third of the residents in Reed Town want more community influence as opposed to about one-fifth in Oregon. If I base my judgment solely on the available survey data, I must conclude that *the citizens in Reed Town are more interested in gaining greater community influence than are citizens in other communities.* I have argued thus far that Reed Town, as a whole, is a community in which the citizens are highly interested in politics and desirous of more community influence, suggesting that they may be interested in changing at least part of the community political system.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND POWER ASPIRATION

Up to this point, I have been characterizing the community as a whole. This section deals with individuals in the community. Power-seekers are found in every community. A crucial question is this: Who wants more power and for what reasons? It is theorized that the type of political change a community is going through is at least partially determined by the type of citizens who are desirous of increasing their community influence. Have they been politically active or have they been inactive?

In order to ascertain whether the politically active citizens among the general population sample desired more influence, as compared with politically inactive segments of the community, Table 52 was designed.

Table 52. Relationship between Political Participation and Power Aspiration

Political participation	Percentage desiring more power	Test significance
Active (high)	46 (N = 139)	$z = 3.479$
Inactive (low)	25 (N = 135)	$P = 0.01$

It shows that 46 percent of the active participants, vis-à-vis only 25 percent of the inactive participants, desire more community influence. The table supports the hypothesis that *the more one participates in community politics, the more influence one wishes to exercise in community affairs* and vice versa. Goodman and Kruskal's coefficient of gamma through *z* (Freeman 1965) shows that I reject my null hypothesis that there is no association or a negative association between political participation and power aspiration. The level of significance is set at 0.05 for a one-tailed test.

Almost twice as many power aspirants are found among the active citizens as among the inactive ones. Those who seek more influence, then, are found predominantly among those who are already politically active. I also found that the top leaders desire more influence in community affairs than does the public. Following the assumptions and reasons presented in chapter 2, those who seek more influence are, then, unlikely to upset the existing community power structure in order to bring about any changes in authoritative allocation of values. *I thus infer from my finding that Reed Town is a stable political community not likely to be changed in its basic structure, barring the entry of exogenous factors into the process of community development.* As the reader will note in the next section, a few qualifications must be added to my inference that Reed Town is a stable community.

DISCUSSION

Although there are not only many theoretical studies of political participation but a number of empirical studies as well (e.g., references contained in Lane 1959 and Milbrath 1965), only a handful of studies containing both theoretical speculations and empirical reports of power motivation are to be found in the literature of political science today (Browning and Jacob 1964; Kuroda 1967b; Lane 1959; and Lasswell 1954, 1962). Studies of personality and politics, on which there is a considerable amount of literature now available (e.g., Davies 1963; Greenstein 1967; Krieger 1968; Kuroda 1965a; Milbrath and Klein 1962; Rieselbach, n.d.; and Rieselbach and Balch 1969) relate indirectly to the motivation for political power. The lack of literature on power motivation is perhaps due to the methodological difficulties involved in operationalizing the desire for power.

Lane and Lasswell both theorize that power-oriented people are likely to be found among those in minor political roles. Browning and Jacob report that power-motivated individuals are likely to be attracted to active roles in economic rather than political segments of a community. In one of my earlier works (Kuroda 1964b), I found that power was one of the least preferred values in Lasswell's eight-value scheme, at least as far as the Japanese law students were concerned, and that if power were placed in their hierarchy of values, only a few people would place it over the other Lasswellian values. They were concerned, rather, with "well-being," "respect," and "skill." Many of these elite law school students are expected to play politically and socially significant roles in the future. This finding is in consonance with Lane and Lasswell's speculation and with Browning and Jacob's study of American community leaders.

Continuing my interest in this particular area of political psychology, I attempted to answer the question of who wants community influence in Reed Town, and I compared the results with an Oregon community study which used an equivalent set of questions for the purpose of determining attributes of individual power aspiration (Kuroda 1967b). I found individual power aspiration highest among: males who read the newspaper regularly, who rated themselves as more influential than others in the community, and who identified themselves as socialists in a predominantly liberal-democratic (conservative) community (Kuroda 1967b, 1967c; and Kuroda and Kuroda 1968). [4] The finding that 60 percent of the socialists, as opposed to only 22 percent of the liberal-democrats, desire community influence needs to be examined closely here. Can one still call Reed Town a stable community when one finds that the minority wants much more badly to have community influence than does the majority?

The socialists, while they are the strongest and largest minority, do not command enough popularity in Reed Town to be a majority and there are at this time, as was true in 1963, no signs that they will become a majority. They are frustrated because they try hard without any real hope of becoming the majority in the foreseeable future. They are also better informed than the conservatives (Kuroda 1965b). They know that their power is limited and they cannot do much to improve the situation. A similar predicament is experienced by the socialists in the Japanese National Diet (chapter 3). In any case, they have been out of mainstream politics for so long that they greatly desire power. And this feeling seems to be manifested in their response

to my question of whether or not they would like to have more community influence. Unlike the communists, however, the socialists are not likely to use violence as a means to achieve their goals. For this reason, they are expected to work toward their goals within the rules of the game in Reed Town. If they can induce the young farmers who are leaving their family occupation in order to become factory workers to be more interested in their cause, they may be able to change their status. However, this is unlikely in Japan today, where the rate of economic growth is the highest in the world. The people's life is getting better and better under the conservative regime. For these reasons, I may still say that Reed Town as a whole is stable and is not likely to change in its basic social structure.

The active citizens in both communities (Reed Town and the Oregon community) appear to be power-oriented. However, an interesting difference was observed when the desire for community influence was related to formal schooling. I found that formal schooling relates to the desire for community influence in the Oregon community but not in Reed Town. Although the power-seekers are evenly distributed among Reed Town residents of various school backgrounds, political participation increases with the amount of formal schooling (Kuroda 1967d), which suggests that there are some people in Reed Town who are not very well educated and are inactive in politics, yet are interested in increasing their community influence.

As for the attributes leading to individual political participation, most of the variables which characterize active citizens in the United States as reported by many authors (e.g., Milbrath 1965) seem equally important in affecting the degree of political participation in Reed Town, with but few exceptions. For example, high political participation is positively associated with a Reed Town respondent's likelihood of moving away from the community if given an opportunity. In other words, the politically active citizens are the ones who want to leave the community. I must hastily add that the top leaders, with one exception, stated that they would not move out, even if there were a good opportunity to do so, but this may be because of age and other variables, for the mean age of the top leaders is much above that of the citizenry. I believe that this finding suggests an important aspect of Reed Town as a community. Reed Town as a community is not attractive to those who are politically active. This situation might have changed in Reed Town since the construction of the national railway system began.

One other finding on politically active citizens suggests the nature of Japanese political culture in a much larger perspective than in Reed Town alone. Liberals (ideologically speaking) are peace-oriented. However, conservatives are peace-oriented only if they are active in community politics or exposed to the mass media (Kuroda 1966b). This suggests that peace is one of the most important, if not the most significant, theme in the postwar Japanese political culture. *Political socialization in Japan is void of sacred cows. Children grow up without acquiring any absolute values, with the possible exception of peace.* The Japanese, in a way, are obsessed by peace. This, I believe, is somewhat unique in the political culture of Japan today vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

In this section I sought factors that contributed to high political participation and power aspiration at the individual level. Keeping these factors in mind, I shall point out the significance of my findings in this chapter as they relate to the community power structure of Reed Town.

THE FINDINGS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

I shall begin with a discussion of my findings concerning political participation and power motivation. This will be followed by a description of what I found about the relationship between the two variables in Reed Town.

The development of a political participation scale in the present study makes a cross-national comparison of political participation more meaningful. As noted in chapter 3, Japanese voters, and particularly rural residents, vote more often than do American voters. On the other hand, when one compares Reed Town citizens with those in the Oregon community or with the American citizenry as a whole (Woodward and Roper 1950), one is inclined to conclude that *when political involvement beyond voting is included in the comparison, Japanese citizens do not compare favorably with American voters, despite their higher voting record.*

Thus, the first question asked here is this: Why is it that Japanese citizens, or Reed Town residents in particular, vote more often than voters in the United States, whereas their political participation beyond voting is less than or at most equal to that of American citizens? I am inclined to agree with the notion that political participation in Japan is not a functionally specific activity but an integral part of community life. This idea is best represented in the concept of "collective orientation"

(Dore 1958; Matsumoto 1960), a term used to denote the opposite of individual or self-orientation. As noted in chapter 3, it has been said by many authors of books on Japan that the Japanese are group-oriented. Their life is characterized by their strong attachment to the groups to which they belong, be it the family, the company for which they work, or the village in which they reside. This characteristic is manifested in many aspects of Japanese society. Once a person starts to work for a company he stays with it for the rest of his life. Companies in Japan would rather employ persons without any experience. In this way an employee develops an attachment to his employer. The fact that over half the enterprises in Japan employ fewer than 100 persons contributes to the continuing existence of this somewhat premodern employee-employer relationship in Japan (Fukutake 1961:35). And this tendency is carried over to a modern organization, the labor union. Over 90 percent of the labor unions in Japan are organized along the lines of an enterprise, unlike the situation in the United States, where unions are organized horizontally on the basis of an industry or trade. The Japanese labor unions are thus vertically organized in the sense that white-and blue-collar workers belong to the same union within an enterprise.

These environmental factors may contribute to the tendency for women in Reed Town to vote slightly more often than men in the local elections, as reported in chapter 3. Women, who participate beyond the voting level less often than men, vote in local elections, not necessarily because they regard voting as an important part of being a good citizen, but because it is a part of living in a community. *They do not see voting as a political activity but as a part of social behavior.* Is this necessarily unsophisticated and politically unwise? If one of the important purposes of politics is to gain whatever one can in a society, then, in my view, Reed Town residents are pragmatic and rational in realizing that only by conforming to the group norm of a community will they be able to obtain what they want. They get what they want by voting for someone they might have been asked to vote for. Political freedom, justice, and other political philosophers' terms are translated, in the people's dictionary, to mean more tangible goods and services, such as higher pay and better roads. This line of reasoning certainly coincides with my empirical finding in chapter 5 that the Reed Town public places material well-being before political freedom. A shrewd and pragmatic politician, the late President Johnson, simplified and characterized his overall policy as a "good deal" for every-

body. Thus, the high voting turnout in Reed Town may not be a good indicator of political participation as one might wish to define it, but one should not consider this to be a sign of the unsophisticated political man. The same hypothesis may be applied in interpreting the high voting turnout in communist countries, as well as in such noncommunist countries as South Vietnam.

If functional specificity is an indicator of modernization, Japan is not as modern as the United States as far as this aspect of the Japanese political structure is concerned. Karl Marx may be correct in thinking that an ideal political system may emerge in years to come in which politics will be so completely integrated with other social behavior as to disappear. Agger et al. (1964) theorize also that less-developed societies will be characterized by an integration of political behavior with religious and other social behavior; further urbanization in Japan may lead her voters to behave more like American voters before they move on toward Agger et al.'s society void of politics. Voting patterns in Tokyo and other large urban centers support this speculation: urbanites vote less often than do rural voters.

We now move from political participation to power motivation. Most social science studies report the relevance of the social class factor as an important independent variable affecting aspects of individual attitude or behavior under investigation. However, formal schooling, used as the indicator of social class in my earlier work (Kuroda 1967b), was reported to be an irrelevant factor as far as the desire for community influence was concerned among the citizenry of Reed Town. Social class did relate to the desire for community influence in an Oregon community (Kuroda 1967b). This is an intriguing finding. Several hypotheses are offered here as possible reasons for this rather unexpected finding.

One hypothesis is that Japanese political culture has reached the point where anyone, regardless of educational background, may have a desire for high community influence. Obviously, highly educated citizens in Reed Town participate more than less-educated residents, but at least those with less education are exposed to the idea of democracy and equality to the extent that they may feel that they, too, would like to have more community influence than they exercise. The finding is remarkable in view of the fact that Japan has had such a long history of considering a hierarchical society ideal and has held

to such a system in practice. Politics was a function performed exclusively by the warrior caste and a few priviliged farmers up to a little more than a hundred years ago.

A further examination and exploration of the relationship between these two variables in comparative perspective is now in order. [5] Community political participation increases with power aspiration in both communities examined, one in Japan and one in the United States. The first question that at least some readers will ask is: Why is it that those who are already active in community politics want to have more community influence, whereas inactive citizens are relatively satisfied with what little influence they now exercise?

Although political scientists view politics as an object for study, active political men in a community may view it as a means to obtain what they want in a society. Lasswell (1958), among others, views politics in this way. Perceiving of politics as a means to get whatever there is to get in a community and finding a positive association between political involvement and power aspiration leads me to hypothesize that *politics has its payoff, whether in the form of material or psychic gains.* Participation in the community decision-making process beyond the voting level must be a rewarding experience to the residents of the studied communities both in Japan and in the United States.

An additional point to be made at this time is that, as noted in chapter 3, women in Reed Town have shown a slightly higher percentage of voting than do men in local elections. And yet, women desire community influence less often than men do (Kuroda 1967b). Forty-nine percent of the men expressed a desire for more community influence, whereas only 20 percent of the women did so. Moreover, men as a whole participate in community politics more than women do, if one excludes voting turnout from my operational definition of political participation and includes such activities as talking to people about an election or encouraging citizens to vote. This seeming paradox may be attributed to women's stronger adherence to the traditional collectivity orientation. Women are also reported to be more traditional than men in their party preference in many countries, including Japan (Campbell et al. 1960:78; Duverger 1955:49–67; Kuroda 1967c; Miyake et al. 1967:781–783). Women in Reed Town are faithful voters in the sense that they almost always vote in local elections, but their participation in politics appears to end there, and they rate low in my political participation scale in comparison with men. Although not all men vote in local elections, more men than women engage in

political activities beyond voting. This interpretation of the apparent paradox suggests that the political participation scale employed in the present analysis is valid and reliable in producing a functionally equivalent result, assuming that the two communities included in the analysis are both stable, as I judged them to be. *Thus, valid and reliable measures for constructing any community political participation scale should exclude voting turnout, if it is to be used in cross-cultural analysis.*

If women constitute the largest minority in Reed Town politics, socialists and communists in the community represent a small minority. However, unlike the largest minority, this minority very much desires increased community influence. My description of the Socialist Party in Japan as given in chapter 3 and my findings and discussion on the socialists' desire for community influence as presented in this chapter lead me to advance the following hypothesis: *members of a minority are more likely to express their desire for community influence than are members of a majority party.* One would expect this tendency to be true even when a minority has no chance of winning a majority.

If one applies this hypothesis to civil rights movements in the United States, one would expect American Blacks to increase their aspiration for political power concurrently as the rate of political involvement in various forms goes up, as has been the case in recent times. The Blacks are learning to participate and to desire more political power *because it pays to participate*. This hypothesis is thus in congruence with an earlier interpretation that it pays to participate in American as well as Japanese politics. A future inquiry along this line may profit from applying stochastic models and, particularly, Markov's chains to the study of civil rights movements and the rise of Blacks in American politics. The same model may be applied to explain the behavior of the Socialist Party in Japan.

In this section I first commented on the nature of political participation in communities, then explored possible reasons for the absence of a positive association between the desire for community influence and formal schooling in Reed Town. Finally, several hypotheses concerning the relationship between political participation and community influence aspiration were suggested. In other words, I dealt with aspects of what I considered theoretically interesting factors in the relationship between the two variables among the individuals in the com-

munity. I shall now turn from analysis on the individual level to analysis of the community as a whole and deal with the question of why Reed Town is stable.

SOURCES OF STABILITY

In addition to the reason specified in the model, a number of other factors may be considered to affect the extent of political stability in Reed Town. Demographic, sociological, economic, and political factors are suggested here as contributing to the stability of Reed Town at the time of the 1963 survey.

Demographic changes are accompanied by changes or instability (or both) in community power structure (e.g., Akimoto 1965; Katsumura 1965; and Schulze 1958, 1961). Reed Town's population influx has been very gradual, as described in chapter 3. There has been an increase of less than 1000 in the population of the community since the end of World War II. The nearly static nature of Reed Town's population may contribute to its stability.

The *sociological* characteristics of Reed Town's political culture, as they relate to the concept of collective orientation, have been pointed out several times. Ike's hypothesis (1957), though limited in its scope, is in consonance with my finding in the community, which was characterized in chapter 3 as being conservative and somewhat traditional in its attributes. As Ike might have pointed out if he had been at the research site with me, Reed Town consists of many small groups based upon kinship relations, geographical proximity, and other factors. These relationship patterns are obviously more lasting than secondary group relationship patterns, characterized by their functional specificity and fewer emotional involvements among their members. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, my respondents tend to follow their parents' political beliefs and behavioral patterns. In spite of the catastrophic experience of World War II, there is a continuity between the young and the old in Reed Town as far as the extent of political involvement is concerned.

An additional qualification must be made on this point, for there are several factors in the demographic and sociological characteristics of Reed Town which suggest basic change in the near future. Casual conversations with farmers and teachers in the town pointed to what is to come in this predominantly farming community. There are no young students in the public schools who aspire to be farmers. Parents in the farming areas

are seriously concerned about their sons and daughters, who would rather work in Tokyo or in nearby factories than carry on their centuries-old occupation. The parents are worried and ask the teachers if they can do anything to reduce their children's desire to flee the farm. Family and school, heretofore the crucial agencies of socialization, seem to have lost their authority to peer groups, mass media, and other agencies of socialization. Consequently, one would not expect the group or collectivity orientation of the people in Reed Town to continue forever.

An *economic* factor which may account for the stability of farmers in the town is the postwar land reform which made nearly every farmer owner of the land he cultivates. This may contribute to the farmer's status quo orientation and conservative political orientation. Again, however, this factor may outlive its effectiveness, as today's youth become adult members of the community.

There are several *political* factors to which can be attributed the stability of Reed Town. It was reported in chapters 5 and 6 that economic dominants in the community are not involved in bringing new industries to Reed Town. This task is carried out, rather, by several leaders and individuals in Town Hall. My impression at the research site was that the town is not really doing anything very active and positive to bring in new and clean industries to the community. The nature of Reed Town's power structure and its leaders' lack of enthusiasm certainly do not bring any instability to the community power structure.

Another political factor which is likely to account for Reed Town's stability is the fact that an overwhelming majority of the public is conservative in its party preference (Table 17). Again, a warning is in order. The Liberal-Democratic vote in the town has been on the decline in recent elections, as shown in chapter 3. If the present trend continues, the Liberal-Democratic Party may lose its power to the Socialist Party. Communist votes remain about the same. Communists have been known for their muckraking activities from time to time, for they have exposed several scandals involving members of the Farmers' Co-op and members of the Town Assembly. They seem more like a watchdog in community politics than a party.

I have presented here some of the contributory conditions which may account for Reed Town's stability. Simultaneously, a few limitations on these conditions are outlined. The next section describes factors which may in the future bring instability and change to the power structure of Reed Town.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

Although I concluded in chapter 6 that, at the time of this survey, there were no issues which might change the power structure, I also reported that there were a few lower-ranking leaders who felt that "bossism" and factionalism constituted an important issue for the community. If more of the lower-ranking leaders regard these as significant issues for the community, some change, if not instability of the power structure, becomes imminent.

Related to this finding is the fact that an earlier study has shown that an "active adviser" who plays the most active political role among the general population sample respondents has a political orientation incongruent to both the leaders and inactive citizens of Reed Town (Kuroda 1965d). A community in the United States with which Reed Town was compared in the analysis showed that the American counterpart of the "active adviser" agreed in his political orientation with the inactive citizens in an Oregon community (Agger and Ostrom 1956). Here, then, I find a group of dissenters, who are politically active and ideologically progressive, colliding with the power structure as well as with those at the bottom of the structure.

I find in Reed Town that some lower-ranking leaders in the power structure and some active citizens among the people, although small in number, do not share the party preference and ideological orientation of both the top and the bottom of the community political system. This is potentially a dangerous situation for the top leaders, and it is a frustrating experience for the dissident activists.

Moreover, competition between two major factions may prove to be a source of conflict at election time. In Reed Town, the nature of competition, which Dahl, for instance, considers very important in a pluralistic democracy, appears to be group-oriented to a large extent. *The conflict and competition are often between the two major factions and not be tween any two individuals, and therefore do not represent two different sets of ideas but two different sets of factional ties.*

The farmers' conversion to nonfarming occupations and certain other factors have already been discussed in the last section of the chapter. The advent of a major national railway coming through Reed Town must have changed at least a part of the power structure described in this study. I was aware of

the possibility of the new railway construction at the time of the survey in 1963. The railway construction was a decision made by the national government rather than by Reed Town, however.

8
National and Local Political Change: The Role of the Family

INTRODUCTION

My analysis of the Reed Town power structure began with the way the residents of the community view local politics in relation to prefectural, national, and world politics. I found that they are more interested in local politics than in national or world politics. Subsequently I made attempts to describe and characterize the community power structure in Reed Town. The last chapter dealt with the kind of change Reed Town was going through at the time of my survey. This chapter is an attempt to characterize the kind of political change postwar Japan as a nation is experiencing by using the role the family plays in the political socialization process at both local and national levels. By so doing, I hope to place the study of community power structure in a wider theoretic perspective.

Although the study of political socialization dates back to Confucius and Plato, it is only in the past decade that political scientists have begun to show serious concern over the question of how a person becomes a political animal. The possible exception to this statement is Merriam's study (1931) of civic training made almost forty years ago. [1]

My interest in political socialization in this chapter lies in examining the role of the family as an agency of political socialization and in seeing how the agency of political socialization relates to the nature of political change, as described in chapter 1. Most political scientists and psychologists, with the exception of a few who have harbored growing skepticism (Converse and Dupeux 1962; Hess and Torney 1965; Jennings and Niemi 1968; and Kuroda 1965e), have thought the role of the family to be the crucial and most important factor in the process of political so-

cialization (eg., Davies 1965; Dawson 1966; and Hyman 1959). The proposed model of the effect of political change on the role of family in the political socialization process at the local and national levels of politics ought to explain at least some aspects of political change thus far neglected. The model implies that the importance of family as an agency of political socialization may vary at different levels of politics in different political systems.

What do I mean by politics at the national level? I am here referring to those politicians who are active in national politics, such as members of the National Diet. Consequently, an ideal way to test the model would be to ascertain the impact of the family on political orientations of the diet and cabinet members and the Supreme Court justices. Inasmuch as there is no readily available data on them, I decided to make use of the data gathered for a cross-cultural study of law students in Japan in 1960. Elite law school students (Tokyo and Kyoto law school students and trainees at the Legal Research and Training Institute), many of whom will play important roles in national politics, are thus substituted for national politicians. [2] The questions used to determine the role of family in the political orientation of future national leaders, although similar, are not identical to the ones included in my survey of Reed Town. The law student survey was conducted in 1960, whereas the community survey was carried out in 1963. Such discrepancies, however, are often inevitable in cross-sectional comparisons. One last, though no less important, limitation is the fact that Reed Town cannot be viewed as an average community in Japan. However, it would be nearly impossible to find a community which is average in all aspects.

The specific questions raised are these: Do the law students' political orientations—political involvement and political party preference—agree with those of their parents? What kind of relationship exists between the residents of Reed Town and their parents as far as these two aspects of political orientation are concerned? I shall deal first with the law students and then with the citizenry of Reed Town.

FINDINGS

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF LAW STUDENTS AND THEIR PARENTS

As indicated earlier, the two aspects of political orientation examined are political involvement and party choice. The first dimension attempts to tap the level of involvement and the second the direction of involvement.

Forty percent of the law students from politicized families are found to be "politicals," those who plan to be involved in politics (Table 53). This figure compares with 31 percent for law students from nonpoliticized families. The entries in the table thus suggest a slight tendency for law students socialized in politically active families to be more politically involved than those who are from inactive families. However, the relationship is far from being statistically significant. Table 53 indicates, then, that *there is no statistically significant relationship—negative or positive— between law students and their parents as far as their political involvement is concerned.* [3]

Table 53. Relationship between Political Involvement of Law Students and Their Parents (%)

Students'	Parents' political involvement		
political involvement	**Involved**	**Not involved**	**Significance test**
Politicals	40	31	Not significant
Spectators	44	52	
Apoliticals	16	17	
Total %	100	100	
Total N	95	483	

A comparable survey of American law students by Goldstein (1964) reports a definite positive association between the extent of the law students' political involvement and that of their parents. His survey was based upon a nationwide sample of law school students; my survey included only elite law schools. The questions used in both surveys were identical. The discrepancy

between these two studies may be attributable to a number of factors, including the notion that the United States is more stable than Japan, which has gone through radical changes since 1945.

The second aspect of political orientation to be examined is political party preference. Table 54 shows that there is a discontinuity between the law students and their parents not only in the extent to which they get involved in politics but also in their party preference.

Again one sees a slight tendency of the law students to follow their parents' party preference, but Goodman-Kruskal's coefficient of association, calculated through *z,* shows its value to be only 1.565, falling short of the 1.812 required for a one-tailed test significant at the 0.05 level. It appears that the majority of law students are Socialist Party members, whereas their parents are predominantly Liberal-Democrats. [4] The entries in Table 54 suggest that party preference is determined more by generation than by family, as theorized in an earlier report (Kuroda and Kuroda 1968).

Table 54. Relationship between Party Choice of Law Students and Their Parents (%)

Students' party choice	Parents' party choice			
	L-D	No choice	Socialist	Significance test
Liberal-Democrat	13	0	1	$z = 1.565$
No choice	20	68	10	Not significant
Socialist*	67	32	88	
Total %	100	100	99	
Total N	136	19	69	

* *Includes some communists.*

The number of respondents in Table 54 is drastically reduced from the 578 in Table 53 to 224. A number of reasons account for this decrease. Those whose parents were deceased, who were inconsistent in their party choice (N = 109), or who

neglected to answer either one or both questions on party choice were excluded from the tabulation of the data for Table 54. Those respondents who lost their parents prior to the end of World War II would not have been able to identify with their parents' party choice, since both the Liberal-Democratic and the Socialist Parties are more or less new parties, established after the war.

As was the case with the degree of political involvement, I again discover that my findings on law students' party preference contradict the findings in the United States. In summarizing findings in the United States, Dawson (1966:45) generalizes as follows: "In American society there is a high degree of congruence between parent and offspring political orientations. This congruence is especially strong for party identification."

Leaving further discussion on this and other findings to a later section, I shall now move from politics at the national level to politics at the local level.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF REED TOWN RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PARENTS

The political participation scale (Kuroda 1965d, 1967d) used to separate politically active ("high") citizens from inactive ("low") citizens in Reed Town is somewhat different from the personal political involvement scale employed in the law student survey. In the law student survey I expected many of the students to be active in politics after their graduation, but I certainly could not expect the same from the rank-and-file citizens of Reed Town. Thus, the respondents in Reed Town were dichotomized into the "high" and "low" participants in community politics, as explained in the last chapter.

Table 55 presents the results of a tabulation of the data. Seventy-four percent of those citizens whose parents were active in community affairs while the respondents were growing up are found to be "high" participants in community politics, whereas 50 percent of those with "somewhat active" parents and only 39 percent of those whose parents were "inactive" are in the "high" category. Thus, three-quarters of the citizens brought up in a politically active family environment appear to have learned to be politically active in their own adult life in Reed Town.

Table 55. Relationship between Political Participation of Respondents and Their Parents While Respondents were Growing Up (%)

Respondents' political participation	Parents' community involvement			Significance test
	Very active	Somewhat active	Inactive	
High	74	50	39	$z = 3.350$
Low	26	50	61	$P = 0.01$
Total %	100	100	100	
Total N	50	129	44	

The significance of Goodman-Kruska's gamma tested through z denotes that I reject the null hypothesis that there is either no association or a negative association between the two variables. The directional nature of my hypothesis calls for a one-tailed test. The z value is a large 3.350, which is significant at the 0.01 level. I thus conclude that the *more politi cally active the family in which a citizen of Reed Town is raised, the more politicized he is.*

An objection may be made to the findings in that my Reed Town respondents are not as young as the law students. I may also find a discontinuity in political orientation between the younger respondents in Reed Town and their fathers if I control on age or generation in relating these two variables. I ran the data with generation kept constant. All my respondents were divided into prewar and postwar generations. Those who completed their formal schooling before the end of World War II were classified as belonging to the prewar generation and those who finished their education after the war were classified as members of the postwar generation. The results, which are not shown here, indicate that the partial relationship remains firm with the third variable held constant. I conclude, then, that there is continuity in political involvement between the respondents and their fathers, irrespective of their generations.

If members of the contemporary generation in Reed Town follow their parents' pattern in the area of political participation, I would also expect their political party preference to be consonant with their parents' party choice. We know from

the law student survey findings that the young law students in postwar Japan do not follow their parents' pattern of political involvement nor agree with their parents' choice of political party.

Table 56. Relationship between Party Choice of Respondents and Their Parents (%)

Respondents' party choice	Parents' party choice			
	L-D	No choice	Socialist	Significance test
Liberal-Democrat	53	0	22	$z = 3.843$
No choice	36	63	11	$P = 0.01$
Socialist	11	38	67	
Total %	100	101	100	
Total N	99	8	9	

The data tabulation was done in exactly the same manner as it was done for the law students. [5] Table 56 gives the results. The fact that fewer than ten of the respondents' parents were independents or socialists indicates the older generation's adherence to conservative and traditional political beliefs. Even though the N's are small for the two columns, the percentage difference shown in the entries indicates a definite pattern. Only 11 percent of those citizens whose parents are Liberal-Democrats are Socialists vis-à-vis 67 percent where the parents are Socialists. An interesting side finding here is that when the respondents' parents are without any party preference, the respondents are more likely to be identified as Socialists than as Liberal-Democrats (indicated in entries in the second column). The z value is again well over what is required for a one-tailed test significant at the 0.01 level ($z = 2.576$). [6] Thus, I accept my hypothesis that *there is a high degree of congruity between the party preferences of the respondents and their parents in Reed Town.* This finding is consonant with many findings on the American voter's party preference (e.g., Campbell et al.1960; Hyman 1959).

Having described my findings rather briefly, I am now ready to discuss them as they relate to the model introduced in chapter 2 and to theorize further on political socialization and political change in a larger context.

DISCUSSION

THE "TYPE 3" POLITICAL CHANGE

A finding that there is neither a positive nor a negative association between the political orientations of law students and their parents at the national level on the one hand, and that there is a definite congruity between the political orientation of respondents and their parents at the local level on the other hand, leads me to classify the political change in postwar Japan as belonging to Type 3, described in chapter 2. Type 3 political change refers to a change which, at the national level, is sufficiently basic to produce no statistically significant relationship between the political orientations of the political leaders and their fathers, while not destroying continuity in political orientations between the younger and older generations at the local level.

The political and social upheaval that took place in postwar Japan was sufficient to create some alterations in the patterns of national leadership recruitment. Reed Town continues to preserve fairly traditional value orientations. Obviously, if I had chosen a community elsewhere in Japan I might have reached a different conclusion. The best way to have tested the hypothesis would have been to use a nationwide sample. Lacking such data at the moment, I shall assume that the results obtained in Reed Town are sufficiently representative to conclude that there is still a considerable amount of continuity in political orientations between a father and his son.

This congruity in political orientations between the two generations is obviously not a sufficient condition to infer that the respondents were influenced by their parents. In any case, that there is a statistically significant correlation between the political orientations of the respondents and those of their parents adds to the validity of the operational definition used to measure political change in Reed Town, as presented in the last chapter. I concluded that Reed Town was identified as a stable political

system through the use of two variables: the desire for political influence and the degree of political participation. In this chapter, I also find Reed Town to be a stable political system.

Jennings and Niemi (1968), who challenged the well-accepted hypothesis of the importance of the American family in the process of political socialization of American youth, suggest that the congruity or incongruity found between children's and fathers' political orientations depends upon the type of issue under discussion. They were using a nationwide sample of schoolchildren. In this chapter, I want to suggest, among other things, that one ought to look at the same relationships between the two generations at different levels of politics. What may be fruitful as a follow-up of Jennings and Niemi's study is to survey congressmen and their families in an attempt to ascertain the impact of family on politicians at the national level. They, after all, are among the most important decision-makers in the United States.

Another possibility is to study some segment of a political system which is going through more rapid changes than are other parts, such as the Black communities in the United States. My hypothesis is that one would find a polity where there is an incongruity between the younger Blacks and their parents.

Having discussed the limitations of my study as well as some of the future research, I shall now attempt to explain why I find postwar Japan to be characterized by Type 3 political change rather than by other types of change.

The attempt at cross-cultural ascertainment of the degree of congruity in political party preference between two generations is hampered by some methodological difficulties. For example, political parties in the United States have been in existence for a long time, whereas parties in some other countries, as Japan, have developed only in comparatively recent years. The political parties that emerged toward the end of the last century in Japan could not be distinguished very well from factions. Two conservative parties—Seiyūkai and Minseitō, quite similar in their ideological orientation—were so dominant that the socialist parties remained powerless. [7] As World War II approached, and the military gained control in Japan, parties were eventually disbanded with the intention of unifying the entire nation. Although new parties emerged following the end of World War II in 1945, those who helped to establish the Liberal, Progressive, Social Democratic, Communist, and Cooperative Parties were men who had been active in prewar party politics. For example, Hatoyama, who was a leading figure in the

Seiyūkai, was chiefly responsible for the establishment of the Liberal Party. Needless to say, these conservative leaders' ideologies have been changed, and no one considers the Liberal-Democratic Party of today as being identical with the Seiyūkai of prewar days. Can one, then, compare the Liberal-Democratic and Socialist Parties in Japan with the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States in reference to the question raised above? Obviously, one can say that changes in the party system themselves indicate the extent of fluidity or change in the political system.

Still another problem is reported by Converse and Dupeux (1962), who found that only 29 percent of the French voters, as opposed to 91 percent of the American voters, were able to describe their father's political party identification. Converse and Dupeux assume that a French father simply does not communicate his political beliefs to his children. Another possible explanation might lie in the French multiple-party system itself. In any case, if one were to replicate my study in France, some new way of testing the hypothesis would have to be used.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FORCES CAUSING CHANGE

Whether or not there is a congruity in political orientations between the two generations at the local or the national level or at both levels appears to be affected by the manner in which a political change is brought about. For instance, one way of analyzing this question is to divide the causes of political change into two categories: *external and internal forces.*

External Forces Political changes resulting largely from forces other than those of domestic political groups can be further dichotomized into: Type 1, which is characterized by the attempt of a conquering nation or nations to integrate occupied areas into her or their own political system, as in the case of Israel's attempt to integrate the Arab sector of Jerusalem into the nation of Israel or Imperial Japan's colonization of Korea and Taiwan; and Type 2, which is characterized by the conquering nation or nations' occupying another country for only a limited time, as in the case of the Allied occupation of Japan.

I would hypothesize that *Type 1 changes brought about by external forces are most likely to bring about a political change of the Type 6 or Type 8 model described in chapter* 2. The more successful the conquering nation's attempt to integrate the occupied area, the more likely it is that there will be an incongruence between the younger and older generations in their

political orientations. In other words, changes will be felt at both local and national levels, whereas I would hypothesize that *political change brought about as a result of external forces of Type 2 is most likely to affect politics at the national level but not at the local level.* A reason behind this hypothesis is that changes caused by war will require other changes that will affect national politics, at least, as shown in postwar Japan and Germany, because those who were thought to be responsible for the war will be discouraged from active participation in politics (if, indeed, they are allowed to live on after the war). Consequently, my findings in this chapter show incongruity in political orientations between the two generations at the national level but not at the local level. This is not to deny, however, that in some cases the occupying forces may affect politics at the local level as well.

Internal Forces The changes one now observes in Black sectors of American society are brought about largely as a result of internal forces. Here one sees a segment of a society going through a near-revolutionary change. Political changes caused largely by forces that are internal to the political system may also be dichotomized for the purpose of theorizing: Type 1, characterized by changes that are so basic to every aspect of the average citizen's life that political change is said to be followed by social revolution, as seen in China, Cuba, Egypt, and the Soviet Union; and Type 2, characterized by changes in the political elite but not in other aspects of a nation, as observed in many revolutions that are taking place in Latin America, with the notable exception of Cuba.

These examples are sufficient to demonstrate that a Type 1 political change, whether caused by external or internal forces, is very likely to result in changes at both local and national levels of politics; likewise, Type 2 changes, whether externally or internally wrought, are likely to affect the national level only.

What has been said above may be summarized as shown in Figure 8. Type 1 political changes, induced either as a result of external or internal forces, are alike in the sense that the regime in power will bring about a total change in society. This could be accomplished through a variety of means, such as the establishment of communes, the carrying out of land reforms, and other methods designed to bring about an integrated social change.

Type 2 changes which occur as a consequence of external forces are likely to bring about some limited changes in an occupied nation such as Japan. Or they are likely to be charac-



Figure 8. External and Internal Forces in the Political Change Process

terized by a slow rate of political change, as in some former colonies of the Western powers. One of the most successful aspects of the Allied occupation of Japan has been said to be its land reform, whereby tenant farmers have almost disappeared from the country. Nearly every farmer tills his own land. However successful the reform may have been, one still observes continuity between the younger and the older generations in Reed Town. Or it could be that since the older generation changed its political orientation as Japan lost its war to the Allied forces, little difference now exists in the political orientations of the two generations. In any case, it is obvious that political change in postwar Japan was not as total in its extent as was the change that took place in Cuba or China in recent times.

What has been presented thus far with regard to the causes determining the type of change in a political system appears to fit into Easton's flow model of the political system (1965), in

which he divides the forces which influence the political system into intra-and extra-societal environments. Indeed, the external forces in this discussion are what Easton refers to as “extra-societal environment” forces and the internal forces are his “intra-societal environment’’ forces.

What I am suggesting, in terms of Easton’s framework, then, is that input factors in a political system bring about changes that affect the internal structure of the political system itself at both local and national levels, depending upon the type of force under investigation. Type 1, as described in Figure 8, whether it derives its source of change from external or internal forces, is very likely to cause changes in national and local politics alike, whereas Type 2 is likely to bring changes only at the national level.

Although many changes were brought about by the Allied occupation of Japan, affecting both local and national politics, this chapter points out that changes at the local level are not as basic and radical as those at the national level. I may add here that changes made by the Allied occupation even at the local level are irreversible and profound, and include such acts as making the office of mayor an elective position rather than an appointive one and allowing women voters to participate in all elections. Obviously, I am not denying the tremendous changes which have taken place in postwar Japan.

9
Conclusion

CONCLUDING CONCERNS

I began, in chapter 1, with an introduction to the nature and scope of the inquiry; models of analysis followed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 provided a contextual basis for the empirical analysis of the community, and subsequent chapters described the characteristics of Reed Town as a community political system. Findings were presented and discussed in chapters 4 through 8 in accordance with the operational definitions introduced in chapter 2. Now that I have completed the empirical report, three questions seem to be most relevant: Are the measurement techniques employed in the present work both valid and reliable? How can one interpret all these findings, or what do they mean in terms of increasing our knowledge about community politics in cross-cultural perspective? Where do we go from here?

Obviously, the findings I have presented are of no use to anyone unless the methods by which they are developed are valid and reliable. Evidence showing the validity, reliability, and comparability of the methods and operational definitions is therefore presented here. This section, then, answers the first question posed above. The second question is discussed in subsequent sections of the present chapter which cover theory-building and the concerns which are shared by many students of politics, whether their interest lies in Japanese politics alone or in comparative politics. The first of these sections includes some thoughts on the impact of political culture and formal political structure on community power structure studies. The second, dealing with disciplinary concerns, is relevant for anyone who is interested in pouring new wine into old bottles without spilling it. The reactions to earlier works on Reed Town politics

prompted me to discuss the relationship between comparative politics and area studies. An attempt is made to place this study in a wider perspective and to suggest ways in which it may contribute to future studies of Japanese politics as well as to comparative political studies in general. It also explains why new methods were used to analyze Reed Town. The last section suggests the directions in which I intend to move in my own work.

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

Although several new methods and models are used in this study, what may be considered the most significant issues, in terms of the extent of controversy caused in the past twenty years, center around Hunter's reputational technique, which was used as the principal mode of inquiry in this study. [1] Since there has been much argument and since insufficient empirical proof has been given of the validity and reliability of the reputational technique, an attempt will be made here to summarize the major factors involved in the verification of the methods employed in the study. My discussion will be concerned with validity (the extent to which the technique measured what it was intended to measure), reliability (the extent to which the technique produced stable and equivalent results), and the use of the reputational technique in Japanese political culture.

VALIDITY

The first evidence to be cited here as a factor supporting the validity of the technique used is found in chapter 6, which discusses the involvement of the leaders and the economic dominants in major issues. I found that certain issues—such as Town Hall and personnel problems—are the exclusive concern of the high-ranking leaders, whereas lower-ranking leaders consider, among other things, the elimination of "bossism" as an important issue in the community. Furthermore, the economic dominants, nearly all of whom are not numbered among the leaders, reported that they are aware of the major issues facing the community but are not involved in any of them. Contrary to the expectations of the advocates of the case-study method, the economic dominants are not in the mainstream of Reed Town community politics.

Second, my findings indicate that the leaders in Reed Town definitely aspire more to exercise power than does the general public. If one assumes that the nature of power is such that the more powerful one is, the more one desires to exercise one's power, this internal consistency can be interpreted as a positive indicator of construct validity of the variant of the reputational technique employed to identify the leaders in Reed Town.

Third, the fact that there are two major factions in the community, headed by the mayor and a former mayor, is also indicative of the validity of the technique used, since both of them are identified as leaders in the study; the mayor, who has more followers than the former mayor, is considered to be more powerful than the former mayor, according to the results of the technique used. There is a high degree of association between the number of followers of each factional leader and the number of nominations each one of them received from the knowledgeables and the leaders themselves.

Fourth, one Town Assemblyman, who happens to be a businessman, was added to the list of names presented to the leaders to evaluate. He was not nominated by anyone as being a significant figure in Reed Town politics. Thus, the leaders did seem to have given honest answers and not random ones.

RELIABILITY

Not only are indicators of the validity of the measure used found in this study but there are also several indicators of the reliability of the measure. First of all, chapter 5 points to the finding that general leaders or leaders who are competent in more than one area of community decision-making are found toward the top of the leadership structure. This finding coincides with that reported by D'Antonio and Erickson (1962). The similar findings in these two studies suggest that the reputational technique is capable of yielding equivalent results.

Second, Walton's review of the literature on community power structure (1966) indicates that the reputational technique does not necessarily lead its user to find power elite communities ruled largely by wealthy businessmen. My findings certainly demonstrate the fact that the economic elite does not govern Reed Town.

METHODOLOGY IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

Various research methods developed in the West have been and are being applied in many non-Western countries in the world today, with varying degrees of success. The reputational technique had not been applied in Japan prior to my survey of Reed Town. (Since then Akimoto and Watanuki have begun, independently, to apply variants of the same technique.) Consequently, I was at first uncertain about the applicability of the reputational technique to such nations as Japan, where close-knit groups dominate society. Some of my colleagues felt that it would be outright impossible to apply the technique. They felt that no knowledgeable informants would talk. Others, particularly scholars who were unfamiliar with Japanese culture, said, "Why not?" The only way to test was to try. And so I did. I was uncertain about the outcome even after I had begun to interview. In fact I was not certain about the applicability of the technique until I had the cooperation of seven or eight knowledgeables.

Since I anticipated some difficulties in being accepted, I hosted several parties in restaurants, to which many Reed Town positional leaders, including the Chief of Police, were invited, in order that I might get to know them personally. [2] Japanese people's activities are carried out on a personal basis. Personal involvement is thus a necessary condition for anyone who is interested in conducting surveys, particularly in small communities. It may be added here that when a writer on community politics chooses the community which is to be investigated, he normally chooses one which he knows well, such as was true in the cases of Agger et al., Dahl, and Wildavsky. This is functional in the sense that the author can check the validity of whatever he finds against his own knowledge of the community. I grew up near Reed Town; one of the top leaders is a relative. This gave me an entry into the community which would otherwise have been more difficult. Even then, I felt that it was necessary to become personally familiar with some of the government and organizational officials before conducting my survey. Another result of knowing the community well was that I was able to make validity checks on a number of findings in the survey through my informal knowledge of the community.

The important conclusion is that I now know that one can apply the reputational technique in Japan, which had not been used there before my survey of 1963. The process of applying the reputational technique may not be easy in Japan, but it

can be done. And what this implies is this: if one can use this technique in Japan, one should also be able to employ it in other parts of Asia, where much of human interaction is carried out primarily on a group basis. What was not tested is whether non-Japanese social scientists can apply the reputational technique in Japan. No non-Japanese social scientists have as yet applied the technique in Japan. My wife, who assisted me throughout the summer and who is not Japanese, was present at the parties and everywhere else except during the interviewing. Her presence did not seem to cause much difference in the conduct of the survey. What might be ideal would be to have a team of social scientists that included some indigeneous persons, rather than to have only foreign social scientists at the research site. Needless to say, indigeneous people should be used as interviewers.

COMMENTS

The foregoing presentation of evidence for the validity and reliability of the reputational technique definitely suggests that this technique is useful in ascertaining community power structure. Not only did it produce valid results but it was also *economical* and it enabled me to engage in *compara tive* studies of community politics. Obviously, this does not preclude the use of other methods in identifying community leaders. Those who claim that their method is the only and best method of community leadership identification should perhaps do so with care. For example, unlike Dahl (1961), Polsby (1963), and Wolfinger (1960), Wildavsky (1964) uses the reputational technique in his study of Oberlin, which goes beyond what Dahl and the others had done, as far as methodological sophistication is concerned. Wildavsky is also one of a few authors on community power structure who paid serious attention to the relationship between the leaders and the public. There are many and serious shortcomings in his work, however. To mention one: whenever Wildavsky discovers any discrepancies in the data obtained from the case study and through the reputational technique, he automatically concludes that the data obtained through the use of the reputational technique are invalid. The discrepancies could be a result of numerous factors, such as the kinds of issues selected as most important. It is nearly impossible to obtain a probability sampling of the decision-making cases in a community, because there are no ways of ascertaining what the

universe is. There are, for example, some potential issues which never become open issues because of a power structure which does not allow certain issues to arise.

Perhaps it is best not to jump to the conclusion, whenever there is a difference between the data derived from the two different techniques, that the reputational technique is invalid. Freeman (1968), for example, reasons that a discrepancy could be caused by the fact that some of the decision-making-approach leaders (see chapter 2) are those who do the "leg work" in the process of decision-making.

The validity and reliability of the reputational technique over a period of time is reported by Booth and Adrian (1961), to name one study. [3] My study has shown the validity and reliability of the same technique in a non-Western nation. In social science, the method is important because it determines the result one will obtain. Moreover, many so-called specialists among the Japanese pay no serious attention to any systematic research method. The detailed reports on the operational definitions employed in this study should enable those who are interested in carrying out similar studies elsewhere in Japan to use my survey as the basis for the formulation of their comparable studies. But the methodology itself is not of greatest importance to political scientists, because political scientists are interested in the development of better theories to explain political phenomena. The theoretical implications of my study are discussed next.

THEORETICAL CONCERNS

Methods and theories are inseparable and are intricately interwoven in any systematic inquiry. Each depends upon the other for its usefulness in expanding our knowledge. The theoretical framework described in chapter 2 started with the locating of community politics in the world of politics; this was followed by attempts to classify community power structure into several types. The rate of political change was then discussed, and finally political change at the local level was compared with that at the national level. Thus, the essentially static models of community power structure introduced were placed on a dynamic continuum of political change within the perspective of national politics. It was hoped that this comprehensive theoretical framework would yield more new hypotheses and give us a better understanding of community politics in more com-

parative and wider perspective than similar studies had done in the past. Too often, community power structure studies have remained static in their theoretical framework, have been non-comparative (as were many of those which employed issue or case-study methods), or have failed to establish any significant relationship between local and national politics. The study by Vidich and Bensman (1958) is one of the few exceptions.

Some of the problems involved in the theoretical framework and some thoughts on the impact of culture on the findings of community power studies are presented next.

TYPOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

One of the problems of testing abstract models such as community power structure types, as discussed in chapter 5, is that of deciding when one can say that one's empirical findings fit a particular type of community power structure. Following Weber's concept of ideal type, many political theorists today engage in the development of typology. The problem lies in how to operationalize the various types one devises. How can one do so so that others with similar interests can replicate one's studies elsewhere? One political theorist, Fred W. Riggs, offers a solution. Having tried to apply "agraria and industria" types to developing countries, Riggs came to realize that these types are never found empirically. He then proposed a new type, which he referred to as a "prismatic" society, one possessing attributes for agraria and industria (1964). Riggs found his new typology to be useful in the sense that it was more realistic and was easier to apply to developing countries. Another solution lies in generating more mathematical models, which are more amenable to operational research. Still another alternative, employed in the present study, is to continually try several different operational procedures in testing the proposed models, as was done in the discussion of community power structure types in chapter 5.

REED TOWN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In order to make precise statements about how Reed Town compares with other communities studied by political scientists and sociologists in recent years in Japan, United States, and elsewhere, I need to have studied more Japanese communities, using some probability sampling in choosing the communities to be investigated. Thus, the task of isolating possible cultural and

institutional variables that affect the power structure in Reed Town is almost impossible. The difficulty of such a task is multiplied by the fact that different analysts of community power structure have made use of different typologies and methods in their studies. What is possible, however, is to propose hypotheses showing how Japanese culture might have affected the decision-making process in Reed Town on the basis of the limited data gathered for the present study.

There are both similarities and dissimilarities between my findings in Reed Town and the rest of studies done in Japan and the United States. First, we shall look at some of the remarkably similar findings.

One of the striking similarities I found is in the attitudes of the leaders and the public in Reed Town and those of other communities studied in the United States by both "pluralists" and "elitists." For example, the leaders are characterized by the following attitudinal features: tolerance and low F Scale scores when compared with the public (Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Lane 1955; Presthus 1964; and Sanford 1950); high political efficacy (Wildavsky 1964); conservatism (Presthus 1964); low political cynicism (Presthus 1964; Rose 1967; and Wildavsky 1964); against tax cuts and for more bonds (Boskoff and Zeigler 1964); and desire for more community influence (Kuroda 1967b). The leaders' attitudes are also said to be more constrained than those of the public (Converse 1964; and Kuroda 1968b).

Now, why these similarities? Perhaps most can be explained by the functions that leaders must perform whether in Oretown or Reed Town. The leaders must feel highly efficacious in politics when compared with the masses. They must trust politicians rather than hold them in disrepute because they themselves are the politicians. They are interested in gaining more influence because it pays. Their attitudes may be more constrained because they have a greater cognitive capacity. Such findings as the leaders' lower scores on the F Scale and their being more conservative are perhaps attributable to the particular communities in which these studies were conducted. It is not unlikely that those who scored high on the F Scale would have found themselves quite comfortable if they had been politically active in Imperial Japan.

Another finding which is similar to at least some findings regarding American communities, such as in Jennings' study of Atlanta (1964), is that the economic dominants participated very little in Reed Town politics. Using a technique similar to the

leadership selection of the present study, Jennings concludes that the "economic dominants are, for the most, lowly politicized individuals" (Jennings 1964:194). Consequently, they have little power in Atlanta as well as in Reed Town. Certainly neither community can be said to be ruled by a tightly knit group of economic dominants. It may be appropriate to assert, then, that noncultural factors determine whether or not any community in Japan or the United States is ruled by an economic dominant group. [4]

What must be kept in mind is that all the results of my research depended upon the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 2. Had I adopted a different operational definition of pluralistic democracy and power elite, I might very well have concluded that I found a pluralistic democracy in Reed Town, because most of the leaders who are influential in several areas of community decision-making are subject to public sanction in the sense that they are publicly elected government officials and assemblymen. Had that happened, my conclusion about Reed Town would have been close to what Dahl said about New Haven. However, the detailed description of operational procedures should enable the reader to understand at least the framework within which this characterization of Reed Town was made. Reed Town is not governed by leaders who do not heed the public's wishes. There are many areas of agreement between the public and its leaders, although there are many other areas of difference in such value orientations as political freedom vs. material well-being. A recent empirical report by Okabe et al. (1968) points out that the Liberal-Democratic Party rules Japan without much regard for public opinion in many areas of policy-making. Their report, as well as mine, is based upon empirical findings which are couched in theoretical frameworks. What all these warnings mean is that my conclusion on the nature of community power, characterizing it as being power elite, should not be interpreted in the same manner as Mills (1956) and Hunter use the term. I am in agreement with Eldersveld (1964:524), who says that to place every empirical observation into a "neat theoretical image" is not only difficult but also unrealistic. Political science as a scientific endeavor has just begun to grow. *For the purpose of generating new ideas about com munity politics, I sought not oversimplifications but principal patterns.* The conclusions reached should be interpreted in this vein.

The school building incident described in chapter 6 shows that a dissenting political man behaves very much like Dahl says he will in any political system. If he cannot get what he wants from the existing power structure, he will go outside of the decision-making group to the public. And if he succeeds in creating a sufficient stir and wins the argument, the dissenter becomes part of the establishment. However, there are some unique characteristics in the way the incident was settled in Reed Town, as opposed to what might have happened in other communities such as in the United States. The uniqueness has to do with the *style* of the decision-making rather than the *techniques* of the decision-making. For example, all section heads of the Town Hall disappeared all of a sudden in order to avoid open conflict with the irate public. Another unique feature of the case, when compared with what might have happened in the American political culture, is that part of the reason for the dissenter's behavior was that he was not considered as one of the local men in Reed Town in spite of his thirty years' residence there. One hypothesis that one can generate from this incident is that at least some causes of community conflicts are culturally determined. Of course, there are many similar problems which any modern community must somehow solve, such as the construction and maintenance of good streets and transportation. Particular techniques or styles used to arrive at the decisional outcome may be different in different cultures, but the alternatives available to any dissenter may be equally limited everywhere. Furthermore, the proclivity for consensus-building may not be peculiar to Japan alone but may be observed in many parts of the non-Western world. If so, even the *process* of the decision-making, in addition to other differences pointed out, may be different in various parts of the world. *What effects, then, do these differences have upon the community power structure?* If consensus-building or unanimity is a necessary and sufficient condition for any community decision to be reached and if there are factions based upon personal loyalties of varying degrees among the leaders, what is likely to happen is *the formation of a coalition among the major factions of a decision-making group.*

Factional struggles within the Japanese community power structure make it difficult for any one faction to stay in power over a long period of time, as is the case to some extent at the national level. There were two major factions in Reed Town at the time of my survey. Even though a pyramidal power structure is presented in chapter 5, Reed Town's power structure can



Figure 9. Factional Strength in Reed Town

be described, if one so desires, as a bimodal or an M-shaped structure, in which case it will look more like a camel's back with two humps than a pyramid, as depicted in Figure 9. (For more details see Kuroda 1968a.) Although factional activities at the local level are not as well established as those at the national level, there are definitely factions in Japanese communities. In Reed Town, it was estimated that over half of the fifty leaders belong to major or minor factions in the community. There were some minor factions headed by such leaders as Amano, Endō, and Emoto, who had only a few followers. The largest and most powerful faction is the one headed by Mayor Abe; the former mayor, Enoki, led the second largest faction.

One of the prerequisites for the emergence of a pluralistic democracy is competition among different power groups, but it is not a sufficient condition for pluralistic democracy to prevail as long as most of these competing powers remain alike in their values and attitudes. Lest some readers question my characterizing Reed Town's community power structure as "stable power elite" in view of the fact that there are different power groups or factions in Reed Town, I wish to point out that unless these factions represent different values and attitudes that reflect those of the public, there are no reasons to change my conclusion.

That the Japanese political culture has had a definite impact on the attitudes of Reed Town's residents is manifested in such proclivities as their assigning importance to local government and politics, turning out to vote in large numbers, avoiding open conflict, and other behavior which seems to have been affected by the collectivity orientation discussed in chapter 3.

Furthermore, the Japanese lack of commitment to any established ideological belief helps to maintain the nonpartisan nature of community politics.

We shall now move from theoretical concerns to disciplinary concerns.

DISCIPLINARY CONCERNS

As I began to write the first few chapters of this book, it became quite evident that I could not write for everyone. Any casual review of the literature on Japanese politics and comparative politics would lead one to believe that there is a gap between the two. There are many writers on Japanese politics who write as though there were few or no other countries with which comparisons could be made. On the other hand, there are many books on comparative politics which still exclude Japan and China. All this results in a lack of communication between area specialists and discipline-oriented social scientists. A series of dialogues would, no doubt, benefit both groups.

Area studies emphasize the importance of language training, understanding of history, and experience of living in the area to be studied. These undoubtedly assist one in understanding the area of one's interest better than one would be able to without them. However, area specialists somehow shy away from the learning of other languages such as mathematics, statistics, and FORTRAN. [5] On the other hand, discipline-oriented scholars tend to emphasize the significance of theory-building and the use of more modern methods of analysis at the expense of deemphasizing the importance of learning a foreign language. What makes matters even more difficult is that such a discipline as political science is going through such rapid change that what was considered adequate graduate training in the early 1960s is no longer thought to be sufficient in the late 1960s, to the extent that early graduates cannot understand their own professional journals, such as the *American Political Science Review.* There are many of these inadequately trained political scientists in the United States today. This is indeed a serious problem.

What appears to be most desirable, however, is to combine what the area specialists consider important, such as the acquisition of language skills and knowledge of history, with proficiency in the new analytic techniques that are becoming more readily available today. Just as one does not have to be a

Japanese-language specialist because he is interested in Japanese politics (although such a skill is welcomed), one does not have to be a statistician to analyze his data. *What is required, however, is that one become sufficiently familiar with scientific techniques that he can ask specialists to assist him in analyzing the data. Otherwise, we do not even know what we want. Technicians cannot help us set goals. They can only help us with the means to an end.*

There are some discipline-oriented political scientists who assert that one can find a collaborator in a foreign country to carry out any survey. If one can find a trained collaborator, such an arrangement presents one with no problems in carrying on scientific work abroad. However, perhaps it is safe to postulate that such an arrangement is difficult unless the culture and history of the country under study are known. Thus, we political scientists must work toward modernizing our tools in one way or another for the purpose of widening our knowledge of a particular area in comparative perspective.

What appears to be the most serious discrepancy between the area-oriented and the discipline-oriented scholars is that the purpose of studying a foreign area appears to be different. Area specialists attempt to understand the area in its totality as much as possible—in such a way that their perspective may be called *Gestalt*—whereas discipline-oriented social scientists are interested in building theories of politics in human society, and not in the area as such. This difference accounts for the present lacuna between the groups, as manifested in various articles appearing in area-oriented journals vis-à-vis discipline-oriented journals.

Rossi and Crain (1968) report a new service of the National Opinion Research Center. The purpose of the service is to provide a permanent sample of American communities which can be used in conducting comparative community studies of various sorts. This enables a scholar to engage in cross-community studies within the United States. Thus far, community power structure studies have been largely comparative, but none of the studies has taken all communities in the United States into consideration. This new service is, indeed, an excellent system by which social scientists can now engage in various comparative community studies. Such a system should not stop with the United States but should expand to include Japan and other countries where there are enough social scientists to maintain a permanent sample of communities.

I have attempted in this book not only to build theories of community politics but also to increase our knowledge of Japan as an area which offers testing grounds for a number of hypotheses already advanced and tested in the United States. Efforts were made to overcome difficulties found in Hunter's approach to the study of community power structure, as well as in that of Dahl.

Of prime concern to a graduate student is what he ought to learn and acquire while he is in graduate school so that he can be a productive scholar. His decision should rest on a careful examination of what area specialists and discipline-oriented scholars have done in the recent past. He should at least be exposed to both ways of approaching reality. It is best that he become familiar both with statistics and with the culture of his area interest, for without such knowledge he will find serious difficulties in conducting independent research abroad and in remaining a literate member of the political science profession.

Now, where do we go from here?

FUTURE CONCERNS

There are several directions in which the efforts of political scientists ought to be continued if we are to build better theories of community politics in cross-cultural perspective. These directions must be apparent to the reader by now.

First of all, the present study of Reed Town was conducted in 1963, since which time the community has gone through a basic change in the sense that the advent of a national railway system has brought about a considerable shift in the occupational composition of the community. Furthermore, in order to make any comparative statements about the nature of Reed Town's power structure, a *longitudinal* study of the town is a sine qua non.

Second, not only is a longitudinal study necessary but also an *intra-cultural* study of communities within Japan is called for, in order to place Reed Town in comparative perspective within Japan. Reed Town obviously is not the most typical community in Japan. The extraction of what is peculiar to Reed Town and not typical of Japan as a whole is impossible without more comparable studies within Japan.

Third, this intracultural study of communities should be accompanied by systematic attempts to employ *linkage* analytic techniques of some sort to view community politics within the framework of a nation-state. Vidich and Bensman (1958) have

explored the relationship between local and national governments, but not enough of those who are engaged in the study of community politics have pursued this path of inquiry toward the development of community politics theory. Erickson et al. (1963) once drew up a research design to study the linkage between the local, state, and national governments by examining the defense contracts and industry. The joint effort never materialized beyond the drawing up of the proposal, but one of my students did follow up by writing a PhD dissertation on the subject. [6] Certainly such an inquiry carries not only theoretical importance but practical and experimental significance as well.

Fourth, of course, is to conduct studies in countries other than Japan, preferably not only in the West but also in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Since the community is the most basic unit of the governing process, it is not difficult to find communities in any culture. *Cross-cultural* studies of community power structure will lead one to a further understanding of the human community as a whole, seen as the lowest level of the governing process. Indeed, one cannot know what the Japanese political culture is like unless one can compare it with other political cultures in the world. There appears to be an expectation on the part of some that Japan ought to be compared only with Italy or with a few other countries which are assumed to be similar in their process of industrialization or modernization. On the contrary, efforts ought to be made to compare Japan with many different countries of varied degrees of modernization and industrialization.

This leads us to a fifth point. Thus far, we political theorists have studied community power structures in relatively stable and established nations, such as the United States, Mexico, and Great Britain. There are several types of communities that have been left alone in the past. The first type comprises communities in newly independent nations, such as those in Africa and Asia. The second type consists of those special communities that are under stress, such as refugee communities and "relocation camps" (Kuroda 1968c). We have simply forgotten a study of the Japanese relocation centers by Leighton (1945). A fruitful path to a further understanding of community politics may lie in relating what we now know about such communities with these findings given by Leighton, or in conducting community power structure studies in refugee camps in Biafra, Jordan, or Vietnam (Kuroda 1971). How does the power structure emerge after refugees have moved into a new environment? How do these people, under extreme stress and in need of material

and psychological comfort, attempt to build a community power structure which can give them the most? We should make more use of "natural" experiments such as war and refugee camps in developing better theories of community politics.

Lastly, one of the recent phenomena which has been gaining increasing importance in Japanese politics and one which was not so prevalent at the time of my survey in 1963 is the emergence of *shimin-undō* (civic movements) in Japan as a whole (Kuroda 1972). These movements are largely protest groups of one sort or another interested in protesting some specific areas of the community living, such as a movement to protect a river from being polluted. Such protest groups are said to number in the thousands *(Asahi Journal,* 1971). To be sure, there have been a number of protest groups in Japanese political history. What is different about these groups today is that there are a great number of them. Communists and socialists are making use of the antiestablishment characteristics of the emerging protest groups to win local elections, such as in Osaka and Tokyo in April 1971. The burgeoning of these locally based protest groups suggests that one is beginning to observe more and more *issue- oriented politics* in local politics. Different people are likely to participate in different areas of the community decision-making. The phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy accelerated the pollution of rivers, ocean, and air. The war in Vietnam also precipitated the growth of peace groups everywhere. What was most crucial in the mushrooming of these groups might be the mass media which reported events that led people to join the protest groups. How these protest movements will affect community power structure in Japan is a problem one must deal with (Akimoto 1971:263–281). This again will lead one to examine the relationship of local governments with the national government since the problem of pollution may be a local problem, but it is definitely a national problem in nature.

Appendix: The Questionnaire

The questionnaire schedule used to interview 287 respondents and leaders is translated into English on the following pages. The figures in parentheses given immediately following a variable identification denote the number of respondents falling into that particular category. For example, for Item 6 on Card I there were 148 male and 139 female respondents. “Don’t Know” and “Not Ascertainable” are combined into one category entitled “NA.” (Cards II and III do not contain these figures. The data in these cards are exclusively semantic differential data, none of which were employed for the present study.) The card number is noted on the bottom right-hand corner by a Roman numeral. I–2, for instance, denotes the second page of Card I. Six cards of data were gathered in the survey. The data cards are deposited with the International Data Library and Reference Service, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. Interested readers may obtain the cards for secondary analysis.

REED TOWN SURVEY

July 1963

We would like to get some general background information as to your occupation, education, age, and the like and some of your opinions so that later we can compare groups of people as to their ideas and the kinds of things they do.

This is not a commercial survey. It is conducted solely for academic reasons. The results will be kept completely confidential.

I thank you for your cooperation.

Yasumasa Kuroda, PhD

Office 1558–1
Reed Town

Telephone 165

for IBM only
1_____
2_____
3_____
4_____
5_____

Sample number:_____

CARD I

6. Sex
1) Male (148) 2) Female (139) 6_____

7. Age
1) 20–24 (43) 4) 35–39 (31) 7) 55–64 (41)
2) 25–29 (39) 5) 40–44 (22) 8) 65 or over (34)
3) 30–34 (32) 6) 45–54 (45) 9) NA (0) 7_____

8. Where were you raised?
1) Reed Town and its vicinity (226)
2) X Prefecture but not in Reed Town (36)
3) Other prefecture (24)
4) NA (1) 8_____

9. Are you single, married, divorced, or widowed?
1) Single (57) 3) Married (199) 5) Divorced (0)
2) Widowed (29) 4) Married (separated) (0) 6) NA (2) 9_____

10. How many children do you have?
1) None (65) 3) 3–4 (96) 5) 7 or more (10)
2) 1–2 (74) 4) 5–6 (39) 6) NA (3) 10_____

11. How old are your children?
1) No children (63)
2) Preschool only (28)
3) Public school only (38)
4) Beyond school only (73)
5) Public school and preschool (39)
6) Public school and beyond (40)
7) Preschool, public school, and beyond (6)
8) Preschool and beyond (0)
9) NA (0) 11_____

12. What is your educational background?
1) Grade school (81)
2) Prewar secondary school (80)
3) Prewar middle school (15)
4) Prewar high school or college (4)
5) Prewar univ. (1)
6) Postwar j. high (62)
7) Postwar s. high (30)
8) Postwar univ. (4)
9) NA (10) 12_____

13. How long have you lived in Reed Town and vicinity?
1) 0–1 years 4) 6–9 (6) 7) 31 yrs. or more (93)
2) 2–3 (3) 5) 10–19 (23) 8) All my life (61)
3) 4–5 (5) 6) 20–30 (90) 9) NA (10) 13_____

14. What is the size of your family?
1) 1 (0) 4) 4 (24) 7) 7–9 (121)
2) 2 (5) 5) 5 (33) 8) 10 or more (28)
3) 3 (17) 6) 6 (53) 9) NA (6) 14_____

15. Within which of the following income categories was your total family income (before taxes) for Showa 37 (1962)?
1) Under ¥10,000 4) ¥30–39,000 (37) 7) ¥70–99,000 (31)
2) ¥10–19,000 (8) 5) ¥40–49,000 (31) 8) ¥100,000 and over (17)
3) ¥20–29,000 (21) 6) ¥50–69,000 (62) 9) NA (78) 15_____

Note: ¥360 = $1

16. What is your regular occupation? (Please be specific, such as insurance salesman, housewife, etc.)
1) Professional: professor, physician, priest, engineer, lawyer, etc. (5)
2) Managerial: high government official, business manager, proprietor, etc. (25)
3) Clerical: clerk, insurance salesman, policeman, store clerk, etc. (27)
4) Skilled labor: carpenter, electrician, machinist, etc. (8)
5) Semiskilled or unskilled labor: bus driver, switchman, laborer, etc. (27)
6) Farming (136)
7) No gainful employment: housewife, retired person, student, etc (45)
8) Service work: waiter, barber, and others not classified elsewhere (3)
9) NA (11) 16_____

17. What is your spouse's (wife, husband) regular occupation? 17_____
(Response categories same as col. 16)

18. What was your father's occupation while you were growing up? 18_____
(Same as col. 16)

19. How many years of schooling did your father have? 19_____
(Same as col. 12)

20. How important is religion in your life?
1) Extremely important (21) 4) Not very important (130)
2) Very important (17) 5) Not important at all (60)
3) Important (45) 6) NA (14) 20_____

21. Do you read newspapers?
1) Don't read at all (32) 4) 2 every day (16)
2) Read a little but not every day (58) 5) 3 or more (7)
3) 1 every day (171) 6) NA (3) 21_____

22. You read:
1) *Asahi* (23) 4) *Tokyo* (12) 7) More than 2 (23)
2) *Yomiuri* (110) 5) *Sankei* (51) 8) Other paper (3)
3) *Mainichi* (33) 6) *Hōchi* (5) 9) NA (27) 22_____

23. In general, how do you feel about living in Reed Town? Would you say it is:
1) An excellent community to live in (51)
2) A good community to live in (176)
3) Not a very good community to live in (49)
4) NA (11) 23_____

24. Would you move away from Reed Town if you had a satisfactory opportunity to do so?
1) Yes (49) 2) No (226) 3) NA (12) 24_____

25. How actively would you say your close friends are involved in Reed Town's affairs?
1) Very active (23) 4) Have no close friends (25)
2) Somewhat active (53) 5) NA (8)

3) Not active (178) 25____

26–27 How often do you meet and discuss things with the following people:						
		1) Often	2) Once in a while	3) Very seldom or not at all	4) NA	
26.	Town or county officials	18	53	215	1	26____
27.	Community leaders	28	50	209	0	27____
28–35. How would you rate Reed Town for each of the factors listed below?						
		1) Very good	2) Good	3) Not very good	4) NA	
28.	Business district	10	163	82	32	28____
29.	Responsiveness of city government to people's wishes	14	128	72	73	29____
30.	The local public school system	30	171	35	51	30____
31.	Opportunity for economic development	12	77	143	55	31____
32.	People's pride in Reed Town	9	99	106	73	32____
33.	Recreational facilities	5	40	211	31	33____
34.	Street construction and maintenance	3	46	224	14	34____
35.	Sanitation	31	136	101	19	35____

36–40. Which social organizations would you say arc the most influential in the making of important decisions affecting the whole community? Name them in order of importance.

1) Town Assembly (66)
2) Farmers' Co-op (7)
3) C of C & I (3)
4) District Chief's Council (5)
5) Women's Assoc. (8)
6) Fire Department Assoc. (2) 37
7) Young People's Assoc. (3) 38
8) Others (10) 39
9) NA (183) 40

36____
37____
38____
39____
40____

Note: Col. 36: 1st choice; 37: 2nd; 38: 3rd; 39: 4th; 40: 5th.

41. What, in your opinion, are the most important issues, problems, or projects facing Reed Town at the present time?

1) Street maintenance (65)
2) Railroad (18)
3) School building (4)
4) New industries (23)
6) Educational problems in general (8)
7) Development of town in general (9)

5) Agricultural problems (9)
8) Others (23)
9) NA (128)

41_____

42–58. Do you belong to any organizations or associations?
For each one: Do you attend regularly?
Do you hold an office?
Have you held an office?

Name of Organization	Attendance	Office (present)	Office (past)
Educational			
Agricultural			
Business			
Political parties			
Neighborhood			
Professional (public)			
Social			
Labor			
General (county, prefectural, national levels)			
Religious			
Others			

42. PTA
1) Attend regularly
2) Hold office
3) Held office
4) 1) and 2)
5) 1) and 3)
6) 2) and 3)
7) No attendance, no offices
8) No affiliation
9) 1), 2), and 3)

42_____

43. Farmers' Co-op (*Nōkyō*)
(Same as col. 42)

43_____

44. Producers' Association (*Skukka kumiai*)
(Same as col. 42)

44_____

45. Other farmers' organizations
(Same as col. 42)

45_____

46. Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(Same as col. 42)

46_____

47. Other business organizations
(Same as col. 42)

47_____

48. Political parties
(Same as col. 42)

48_____

49. Neighborhood Association (*Tonari-gumi, jyōkai*)
(Same as col. 42)

49_____

50. Neighborhood Recreational Association (*Yusanko*)
(Same as col. 42)

50_____

51. Professional organizations

(Same as col. 42) 51_____

52. Social organizations
(Same as col. 42) 52_____

53. Labor unions
(Same as col. 42) 53_____

54. General
(Same as col. 42) 54_____

55. Religious associations
(Same as col. 42) 55_____

56. Women's Association
(Same as col. 42) 56_____

57. Others
(Same as col. 42) 57_____

58. How many organizations do you belong to?

1) 1 (78)	4) 4 (19)	7) 7 or more (1)	
2) 2 (69)	5) 5 (5)	8) 0 (67)	
3) 3 (47)	6) 6 (1)	9) NA (0)	58_____

CARD II

Here you can just relax and let ideas pop in and out of your head as each item appears. In this section, we want to get at the meanings some things have for people. This is done by rating them on a series of descriptive scales.

You indicate your first reaction to each idea in the left-hand column by a circle marked in the appropriate box to the right. For example, you might think of school as fair, so you would make a mark toward the "fair" end of the scale, as shown below:

SCHOOL

Fair	:__ : O : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Unfair	1_____ 2_____ 3_____ 4_____ 5_____

1. MYSELF

6.	Negative	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Positive	6_____
7.	Fast	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Slow	7_____
8.	Belligerent (warlike)	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Peaceful (gentle)	8_____
9.	Weak	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Strong	9_____
10.	Friendly	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Hostile	10_____
11.	Pleasant	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Unpleasant	11_____
12.	Unfair	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Fair	12_____
13.	Popular	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Unpopular	13_____

2. JAPAN

14.	I like	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	I dislike	14_____
15.	Most people like	: __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ :	Most people dislike	15_____

16–23. (Same as cols. 8–13)

3. AMERICA (United States)

24–33. (Same as cols. 14–23)

4. SOVIET UNION (USSR)

34–43. (Same as cols. 14–23)

5. COMMUNIST CHINA

44–53. (Same as cols. 14–23)

6. UNITED NATIONS

54–63. (Same as cols. 14–23)

CARD III

7. PREMIER IKEDA

6–15. (Same as Card II, col. 14–23)

8. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

16–25. (Same as Card II, cols. 14–23)

9. PRESIDENT KENNEDY

26–35. (Same as Card II, cols. 14–23)

10. CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG

36–45. (Same as Card II, cols. 14–23)

11. PEACE

46–55. (Same as Card II, cols. 14–23)

12. WAR

56–65. (Same as Card II, cols. 14–23)

CARD IV

We have found out that one of the best ways to get a general view of a community is to find out something about the way people engage in community affairs. Each person has his own way of living and, for a wide range of reasons, has his own way of engaging in public affairs. Some are very active and some are not. We have prepared several questions along this line—some of them may be difficult for you to answer, but we would like to have the best answer you can give.

Let us start with voting. For various reasons some people vote more often than others. Which, of the following statements most accurately describes your voting activity?

1_____
2_____
3_____
4_____
5_____

6–7. How often do you vote in the following elections?	1) Always	2) Nearly always	3) Some times	4) Never	5) NA
6. Local government elections	261	16	6	4	0
7. Prefectural and national elections	257	15	7	7	1

6_____
7_____

8. Party Identification
What political party do you support?
1) Liberal-Democratic Party (124)
2) Democratic Socialist Party (1)
3) Socialist Party (39)
4) Communist Party (2)
5) Other right-wing parties (0)
6) Other left-wing parties (0)
7) No party identification (independent) (102)
8) NA (18)
9) Not applicable (1)
8_____

9. Spouse's Party Identification (Same as above) 9_____

10. Do you support your party strongly or not so strongly?
1) L-D Party strong (66)
2) L-D Party weak (57)
3) Socialist Party strong (26)
4) Socialist Party weak (14)
5) Communist Party strong (2)
6) Communist Party Weak (0)
7) Not applicable (other minor parties, etc.) (115)
8) NA (17)
10_____

11. If you do not have any particular party preference, do you think of yourself as closer to the Socialist or the L-D Party?
1) Closer to Socialist Party (19)
2) Closer to L-D Party (48)
3) Neither one (26)
4) Not applicable (162)
5) NA (32)
11_____

12. Your parents' party preference?
1) Both conservative (L-D, etc.) (102)
2) Both progressive (Soc., etc.) (9)
3) Both independent (8)
4) Con. and prog. (2)
5) Con. and indep. (2)
6) Prog. and indep. (0)
7) Deceased and con. (alive) (13)
8) Deceased and prog. (alive) (5)
9) NA or not applicable (146)
12_____

13. To what extent was your family (parents, brothers, etc.) interested in community affairs while you grew up?
1) Very interested (51)
2) Somewhat interested (129)
3) Not at all interested (45)
4) NA (62)
13_____

14–15. I have a list of some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. Can you tell me whether you did any of these things during the election campaign (House of Councillors) last year (1962)?

14. Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?
1) Yes (36) 2) No (246) 3) NA (5) 14_____

15. Did you attend any political meetings?
1) Yes (48) 2) No (229) 3) NA (8) 15_____

16. Do you associate frequently with any political party officials or people who do campaign work in a party?
1) Yes (50) 2) No (229) 3) NA (10) 16_____

17–20. How often have you seriously discussed political party affairs and elections during the past year, including last year's election campaign?

		17. Family	18. Friends	19. Party officials or candidates	20. Community leaders
1)	Often	18	25	10	10
2)	Once in a while	113	89	38	31
3)	Not at all	132	168	232	239
4)	NA	4	5	7	7

17_____
18_____
19_____
20_____

21. Has anyone come to you within the past year for advice on political party or election matters?
1) Yes (34) 2) No (244) 3) NA (9) 21_____

22–25. Is there any political leader whom you especially admire or dislike?

		Admire (name)	Dislike (name)	Not especially	NA	
22.	At the town level					22_____

23.	At the prefectural level	23_____
24.	At the national level	24_____
25.	At the international level	25_____

Coding for cols. 22–25: (figures for only col. 22 are shown)

1) Mentioned by name only those whom the respondent admired (36)

2) Mentioned only those whom the respondent admired, but by position and not name (2)

3) Mentioned by name only those whom the respondent disliked (2)

4) Mentioned only those whom the respondent disliked, but by position and not name (2)

5) 1) and 3) (3)

6) 1) and 4) (1)

7) 2) and 3) (0)

8) 2) and 4) (1)

9) Not especially or NA (240)

26–29. Some people don't pay much attention to international, national, prefectural, and local politics. How about you?

		26. Local	27. Prefecture	28. Nation	29. World	
1)	Very interested	33	15	25	16	26_____
2)	Somewhat interested	177	142	119	76	27_____
3)	Not interested	61	107	119	165	28_____
4)	NA	16	23	24	30	29_____

30–34. What do you think of the following political figures?

		1) Strongly approve	2) Approve somewhat	3) Undecided		
30.	Ikeda	25	120	80		
31.	Kawakami	9	47	92		
32.	Kennedy	13	85	88		
33.	Khrushchev	7	34	102		
34.	Nehru	10	53	113		
		4) Disapprove somewhat	5) Disapprove strongly	6) DK	7) NA	
30.	Ikeda	20	12	12	18	30_____
31.	Kawakami	37	5	72	25	31_____
32.	Kennedy	9	5	61	26	32_____
33.	Khrushchev	31	13	68	32	33_____
34.	Nehru	9	2	71	29	34_____

35. What, in your opinion, are the most important issues, problems, or projects facing Reed Town at the present time?
1)
2)
3) 35_____
1) Economic and industrial development, bring in new industries, etc. (26)
2) Street problems (62)
3) Railway, bring in new railway (15)
4) Sanitary problems (3)
5) Education problems (16)
6) Recreational facilities (1)
7) Agricultural problems (7)
8) Development of town in general, etc. (12)
9) NA (145)

36. How interested are you in what the town government is doing?
1) Very interested (34)
2) Somewhat interested (140)
3) Not very interested (53)
4) Not at all interested (39)
5) NA (21)
36_____

37–40. How often during the past year have you seriously discussed local government or community matters with:

		37. Family	38. Friends	39. Civic leaders	40. City officials	
1)	Often	17	20	19	17	37_____
2)	Once in a while	108	83	28	24	38_____
3)	Not at all	155	178	233	237	39_____
4)	NA	7	6	7	9	40_____

41. If you have discussed any matters with anyone, often or once in a while, what matters have you discussed?

1) Economic and industrial development (new industries) (12)
2) Streets and highways (22)
3) Railways (2)
4) Sanitary problems (4)
5) Schools, swimming pool construction (17)
6) Election matters (11)
7) Others (31)
8) Not applicable (125)
9) NA (63)
41_____

42–44, How often have you discussed international affairs during the past year with:

		42. Family	43. Friends	44. Leaders	
1)	Often	3	9	9	
2)	Once in a while	38	46	14	42_____
3)	Not at all	236	222	252	43_____
4)	NA	10	10	12	44_____

45. If you have discussed matters with anyone, often or once in a while, what matters have you discussed?
1) War in general (nuclear warfare, etc.) (10)
2) Space development and astronauts (9)
3) Peace and the future of the world (19)

4) Cuban crisis (9)
5) International affairs directly related to Japan (4)
6) International affairs not directly related to Japan (world affairs) (3)
7) Others (15)
8) Not applicable (109)
9) NA (109) 45____

46. If you wanted to talk over what should be done in regard to administrative, welfare, or other problems of the town, to whom would you go?
Name and address
1) Town Hall (22)
2) Town mayor (15)
3) Town Assemblymen (10)
4) District chief (16)
5) Other organizations or officials (6)
6) Kazuo Abe (current mayor) (4)
7) Others (individual names mentioned) (41)
8) NA (173) 46____

In every community some people are so situated that they come to have more influence in the affairs of the community than do others. The next few questions attempt to find out who you think are the most influential people in the community. All we want is your best judgment. For each question pick out people *you believe are actually very influential* rather than people you think should be influential. If possible, name a specific person rather than a position.

47. School affairs:

Coding (only the first person or office mentioned):
1) Mayor (13)
2) President and other officers of the PTA (21)
3) Other officers of educational organizations such as Committee of Education (9)
4) Town Assemblymen (2)
5) H. Endō (4)
6) E. Enomoto (10)
7) A. Hara (3)
8) Others (45)
9) NA (180) 47____

48. Local government matters:

1) Town mayor (32)
2) Town Assemblymen (13)
3) Kazuo Abe (31)
4) Toshio Enoshita (4)
5) Nobuo Enoki (4)
6) Bokuzen Amano (4)
7) Takeo Emoto (2)
8) Others (17)
9) NA
48____

49. Problems in general:

1) Town Assemblymen (18)
2) Other officials (town) (3)
3) Kazuo Abe (8)
4) Taro Akamine (5)
5)Eizen Enomoto (3)
6) Masaru Akita (3)
7) Hideo Endo (1)
8) Other individual names mentioned (30)
9) NA (216) 49____

50. Have you taken an active part on any local government or community issue since the annexation (1955)?
1) Yes (34) 2) No (245) 3) NA (8) 50____

51–52. If you have, what was the issue about?

Coding:
51. 1) Unification of junior high schools (11)
2) Swimming pool construction
3) The annexation (1955) (4)
4) Educational problems in general (3)
5) Wire telephone and radio station construction (0)
6) Tax problems (2)
7) Others (9)
8) Not applicable (256)
9) NA (Q.50, 1) Yes (1)

51_____

52. (Same col. 51) 52_____

53. Would you say that:
1) You are very influential (6)
2) You are more influential than most people (20)
3) You are about average as far as influence is concerned (168)
4) You have less influence than most people (81)
5) NA (12) 53_____

54. Would you like to have more influence in community affairs than you now have or are you pretty much satisfied with what you have?
1) Would like more influence (98)
2) Satisfied with present influence (181)
3) NA (9) 54_____

55–57. It may be easier for you to answer this question by selecting specific areas of influence. How would you rate yourself in each of the following?

		1) More influence than most people	2) Average influence	3) Less influence than most people	4) NA	
55.	School affairs	23	180	62	22	55_____
56.	Local government	12	187	62	26	56_____
57.	Election	18	188	58	23	57_____

58. Which of the following sections of the newspaper interests you the most? (If you cannot choose one section, choose two.)
1) Local and prefectural news (142)
2) National news (36)
3) International news (14)
4) 1) and 2) (24)
5) 1) and 3) (4)
6) 2) and 3) (18)
7) NA (49) 58 58_____

59–61. How often do you think of the following things in your daily life?

		59. Community affairs	60. International affairs	61. Peace and war	
1)	Not at ail	48	127	73	
2)	Seldom	82	70	75	
3)	Once in a while	97	46	69	

4)	Often	35	19	36	59____
5)	Very often	14	9	19	60____
6)	NA	11	16	15	61____

CARD V

These last questions are to get your first impression on a number of statements to which you agree or disagree strongly, somewhat, or slightly.

1) Agree strongly
2) Agree somewhat
3) Agree slightly
4) Disagree slightly
5) Disagree somewhat
6) Disagree strongly
7) NA

1____
2____
3____
4____
5____

	1)	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)	7)	
6. What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.	94	107	35	10	10	6	25	6____
7. Most of our social problems could be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, feeble-minded, and crooked people.	66	101	59	16	9	1	35	7____
8. People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the Japanese way of life.	69	96	53	18	14	2	35	8____
9. The findings of science may someday show that many of our most cherished beliefs are wrong.	31	56	55	33	17	14	81	9____
10. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	74	85	71	16	5	3	33	10____
11. I don't blame anyone for trying to grab all he can get in this world.	22	40	44	46	64	37	34	11____
12. It is wise to flatter important people.	72	87	53	31	17	9	18	12____
13. The most important things to me are my duties to my job and to my fellow men.	116	81	51	6	5	0	28	13____
14. Never tell anyone the real reason why you did something, unless it is useful to do so.	50	75	55	36	36	11	24	14____
15. A person does not need to worry about other people if only he looks after himself.	18	33	33	52	88	43	20	15____
16. There is no excuse for lying to someone.	166	62	28	11	6	4	10	16____
17. I chose my life's work primarily because I wanted to help make a better society.	98	86	59	6	3	1	34	17____
18. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.	152	82	26	5	6	2	14	18____
19. So many other people vote in the general elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.	2	9	3	11	42	206	14	19____
20. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it done, rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight	157	79	24	5	5	4	13	20____
21. It is not so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win.	4	14	16	18	82	126	27	21____
22. If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government ought to give them the money they need.	137	87	28	4	2	1	28	22____
23. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.	149	86	30	6	2	0	14	23____
24. The government ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.	151	81	24	4	1	0	26	24____
25. A good many local elections are not important enough to bother with.	8	9	23	25	69	119	34	25____
26. The government ought to help people get medical and hospital care at low cost.	167	73	23	3	2	1	18	26____

27. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it.	37	35	16	23	60	95	21	27_____
28. The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle.	15	32	43	25	35	50	87	28_____
29. I prefer being with other people rather than by myself.	78	80	60	19	18	11	21	29_____
30. If *Burakumin* (an ethnic minority) are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do.	119	86	21	4	4	1	52	30_____
31. I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.	27	66	68	44	41	22	19	31_____
32. The government ought to cut taxes even if it means putting off some important things that need to be done.	80	92	63	15	5	3	29	32_____
33. When in a group of people, I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about.	31	56	83	37	34	11	35	33_____
34. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.	49	95	55	32	14	10	52	34_____
35. When I think something is good for someone, I frequently try to persuade him that this is the case.	91	87	56	16	8	3	26	35_____
36. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	52	79	59	36	29	11	21	36_____
37. It is hard for me to find anything to talk about when I meet a new person.	35	63	84	26	36	19	24	37_____
38. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	37	66	51	36	40	15	42	38_____
39. In social conversation, I frequently have definite ideas and try to convince others.	47	59	68	40	40	9	24	39_____
40. I don't believe that public officials care about what people like me think.	43	59	65	41	30	9	40	40_____
41. In a group I usually take the responsibility for getting people introduced.	19	42	56	48	65	35	22	41_____
42. In order to get nominated, most candidates for political offices have to make basic compromises and undesirable commitments.	21	41	13	15	63	101	33	42_____
43. The major goal of our nation should be to obtain peace at any price.	130	67	34	9	1	2	44	43_____
44. Politicians spend most of their time trying to get reelected or reappointed.	52	82	67	16	14	9	47	44_____
45. We should not fight any war even though it seems to be to our advantage.	193	41	16	5	5	6	21	45_____
46. Money is the most important factor influencing public policies.	63	88	47	10	7	8	64	46_____
47. Peaceful coexistence (of US and USSR) is our best bet for survival.	131	65	35	4	3	0	49	47_____
48. A large number of city and county politicians are party hacks.	32	54	66	31	31	14	59	48_____
49. In this atomic age, we must not proclaim peaceful negotiation as a national policy.	14	19	22	27	71	56	78	49_____
50. People are often manipulated by politicians.	33	87	74	13	19	10	51	50_____
51. We should rearm our country at once.	21	30	20	21	56	92	47	51_____
52. Politicians represent the general interests more frequently than they represent the special interests of groups.	95	73	46	9	6	1	57	52_____
53. The United Nations is just a plot by the "one-worlders" to sacrifice the sovereignty of Japan on the altar of world government.	7	14	24	29	47	51	115	53_____
54. Most politicians in the community are probably more interested in becoming known than in serving the needs of their constituents.	44	78	70	15	13	9	58	54_____
55. I am not willing to surrender my allegiance to Japan in order to give it to a world government.	60	50	46	19	24	11	77	55_____

56. International exchange of students, scientists, farmers, and other personnel should be encouraged and expanded.	160	61	21	1	3	2	39	56_____
57. I would prefer to be a citizen of the world first, and a citizen of one country second.	40	34	31	38	36	20	88	57_____
58. I'm for my country, right or wrong.	66	91	44	32	21	8	25	58_____
59. In the last analysis, material well-being is more important than political freedom.	39	72	57	21	27	22	49	59_____

CARD VI

1_____
2_____
3_____
4_____
5_____

	1)	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)	7)	
6. The United States is a democratic nation in general.	61	81	52	8	3	2	80	6_____
7. The United States is imperialistic.	7	22	30	45	59	27	97	7_____
8. The United States is by and large the best country I can find in the world today.	34	67	59	51	14	6	56	8_____
9. The United States is not really trying to bring about peace in the world.	16	24	38	45	57	24	83	9_____
10. The Soviet Union is a democratic nation in general.	9	16	42	34	58	32	96	10_____
11. The Soviet Union is imperialistic.	11	39	39	51	31	17	99	11_____
12. The Soviet Union is by and large the best country I can find in the world today.	5	12	37	47	83	29	74	12_____
13. The Soviet Union is not really trying to bring about peace in the world.	28	50	36	37	38	15	83	13_____
14. There will be a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union within the next decade.	10	24	37	31	60	49	76	14_____
15. We will eventually bring about world peace.	70	72	45	23	14	4	59	15_____
16. We will never be able to eliminate war from this world.	26	67	42	15	42	37	58	16_____
17. There will be no world war in the next decade.	46	71	38	18	26	9	79	17_____
18. The *Shūshin* should be revived.	108	63	39	12	15	6	44	18_____
19. I am opposed to the Japan-Korea Conference.	17	23	39	42	42	20	104	19_____
20. The United States should withdraw its troops and bases (from Japan).	55	72	37	21	20	6	76	20_____
21. Japan should trade with Communist China.	76	98	40	5	2	3	83	21_____
22. The United States atomic-powered submarine should not be allowed to visit Japan.	6	21	41	25	49	50	95	22_____

Now we would like some information on your relation to a few specific matters that have come up.
23. The first matter is the activities of people here to get new industry to move here.
24. The next matter is the newly built swimming pools.
25. The next matter is an attempt to bring in the national railway *(Musashino-sen)* to Reed Town.
26. The next matter is the unification of junior high schools.
27–30. Do you approve or disapprove of these issues?
27. Bring in new industry.
28. Swimming pools.
29. Bring in the national railway.
30. Unification of junior high schools.

		23.	24.	25.	26.	
1)	Haven't heard about it	96	24	52	80	23_____

2)	Does not matter much to me	28	39	27	43	
3)	Interested, but haven't done much about it	78	74	104	74	24_____
4)	Have talked about it with friends or acquaintances	63	79	84	62	25_____
5)	Have taken an active part on one side or the other	6	55	6	11	26_____
6)	NA	16	16	14	17	
		27.	28.	29.	30.	
1)	Strongly approve	104	104	115	53	27_____
2)	Approve	106	126	108	92	
3)	Undecided	22	20	25	45	28_____
4)	Disapprove	17	11	4	30	
5)	Strongly disapprove	1	3	1	11	29_____
6)	Don't care	15	6	11	24	
7)	NA	22	17	23	32	30_____

31. Have you seen posters with such slogans as 'Withdraw American Bases!" or "Destroy the Japan-Korea Conference" in Reed Town?
    1) Yes (30) 2) No (237) 3) NA (20) 31_____

32. Do you know who put those posters on utility poles?
    1) Yes, correct answer (Communist Party) (9)
    2) Yes, wrong answer (4)
    3) No (87)
    4) and 5) NA (187) 32 32_____

33. Do you agree with these slogans?
    1) Agree strongly (6)
    2) Agree (24)
    3) Disagree (20)
    4) Disagree strongly (3)
    5) Don't care (103)
    6) and 7) NA (131) 33 33_____

Notes

1: INTRODUCTION

1. Jennings' study was not an exact replication of Hunter's work in the sense that he contaminated his own data by changing operational procedures although he dealt with the same city. This made it impossible to compare his study systematically with that of Hunter to draw any conclusion about the nature of the power structure in Atlanta.
2. There are numerous works on local government and politics abroad. Several authors, such as A. H. Birch (1959) who wrote on an English city and William Hanna who studied two African cities, are quite capable and knowledgeable writers who regrettably ignored the well-established tradition of community politics research methodologies developed and improved in the past twenty years. Consequently, they made no systematic efforts to relate their studies to the rich literature of community politics.
3. Furthermore, Dull's study of the *Senkyoya* (1953) and Ward's study of Niiike community politics (Beardsley et al. 1959) represent the best realistic studies of community politics in Japan.
4. There has been a trend toward more cross-national comparative studies of community politics in recent years. Terry Clark of the University of Chicago, for example, initiated

the publication and distribution of the *Newsletter.* Papers on comparative community politics read at the International Sociological Association's meeting appeared in the *New Atlantis* (1970), A permanent committee on comparative local government and politics of the International Political Science Association was formed at the 1970 International Congress in Munich. The committee members representing various parts of the world elected Jerzy J. Waitr of Poland as chairman, Yasumasa Kuroda of Hawaii as vice-chairman, and Franco Cazzola of Italy as secretary. The committee is now in the process of preparing a comparative study of European communities as a point of departure.

5. It is assumed that there is a government and a power structure in Reed Town. There is obviously a government in Reed Town. A person cannot help identifying the police headquarters as he enters the town, unless he cannot read Japanese. The police or the armed forces are indeed a significant symbol of government, for the monopolistic use of physical force is often a necessary and sufficient condition for a government Bendix and Lipset (1957:89) claim that political sociologists treat governments as dependent variables and that political scientists treat them as independent variables. Empirical evidence, however, does not bear out this distinction although it may have been true historically.
6. The Mandate of Heaven concept allowed people to rebel against the emperor. It was used as a legitimization for rebellion as well as conquest in China. However, it led only to changes in regime and not to radical revolution, until the Communist Revolution.
7. The term "shogunate" refers to the rule of a shogun (commander in chief) or shoguns. The shogunate held the real power over the imperial dynasty, which was theoretically (de jure) supreme. For more details see Kuroda (1967e).

8. Agger et al. (1964) discuss political history and political change in community power structure and regime. Kautsky (1962) edited a book which deals with the problem of political change viewed in the framework of its relationship to nationalism and communism. Apter (1955, 1965) discusses political change within the context of African experiences. Following the functionalist tradition, Almond and Powell (1966) view political change in terms of system capabilities, adaptive and conversion functions. Binder (1962) rejects Almond and Powell's functional categories and offers an alternative. Merkl (1966) traces continuity and change in Western political institutions and examines the effect of modernization on many revolutionary and developing countries. Johnson (1966) perceives revolutionary change not only from a political viewpoint but also from the standpoint of various social science disciplines in his analysis of revolution. After abandoning his own theory of "agraria and industria," Riggs (1964) has developed the theory of a prismatic society as a model of administrative systems at points between the two polar models of traditional and modern society. He points out the utility of a form of multivariate analysis in the study of administration. More recently, he has introduced his theory of tonic polities. And, finally, Lipset (1960) sees political change in part through his model of effectiveness and legitimacy. When a political system loses its effectiveness and legitimacy, it is very likely to fall or to become unstable.

2: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Agger et al. (1964) introduced sophisticated models of community political systems which separate structures from regimes. Prior to their models, all one had were models centered around the power elite vs. the pluralistic democracy

dimension. They introduced three important, hitherto neglected, dimensions to the study of community power structure. First, they are concerned not only with whether power is shared broadly or narrowly in a community but also with the question of the extent to which the ideological orientation of the leadership is divergent. Second, they take the use of illegitimate sanctions into their concept of regime. Third, their concept of regime takes into account the feelings of the rank-and-file citizens about their own political efficacy.

2. The *Eta* have been subject to all sorts of discrimination in Japan. For a recent introduction to the *Eta* see De Vos and Wagatsuma (1966).
3. See Table 25 on pp. 118–119.
4. Others have made use of variants of their technique. See, for example, Booth and Adrian (1961), Clelland and Form (1964), and Jennings (1964). See also the often-quoted work, Schulze (1961).
5. Ike (1957:90–91) reports that in 1951, plants with less than 100 employees accounted for three-fifths of the total number of plants in Japan, whereas those with less than five workers comprised about 13 percent.
6. However, some of the most prominent authors as, for example, Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961), have paid little attention in their studies to the citizenry.

3: REED TOWN, JAPAN: THE RESEARCH SITE

1. For an introduction to Japanese politics see, for example, Ike (1957), Langdon (1967), Tsuneishi (1966), and Ward (1967).
2. See Kuroda (1968a) and the references listed there.
3. The number of persons who believe in religion decreased from 35% in 1958 to 31% in 1963 (Tōkeisūri Kenkyūjo 1961, 1966). See also Schubert (1967).

4. The first mass amalgamation of towns and villages took place during the Meiji period. The second mass amalgamation started as the result of a vigorous government campaign in the early 1950s. The government even instituted "Amalgamation Weeks" in 1954. Subsequently, one study shows that the number of muncipalities decreased from 9868 in 1953 to 3546 in December 1959 (Isomura and Hoshino 1961:221). This is indeed a drastic reduction. For more details see Steiner (1965:186–194) and Hoshino (1961:190–205).
5. A historian whose textbook was disapproved by the Ministry of Education is suing the ministry at the time of this writing, on the grounds that the government has no right to bar any textbook from use in public schools.
6. For a historical description and analysis of the Japanese educational system see Dore (1964:176–207) and Passin (1965). For the relationship between local government and educational changes see Steiner (1965:90–98, 250–255).
7. For a report on newspaper reading and political behavior in Reed Town see Kuroda (1965b).
8. For the best historical survey of Japanese local government see Steiner (1965).
9. This is how the role of deputy mayor is perceived in the political culture of Reed Town.
10. Yanaga (1956:85–86) makes a similar point in his discussion of Japanese political behavior.
11. For a most comprehensive treatment of the outcast, in English, see De Vos and Wagatsuma (1966). See the conclusions of chapter 6 of the present book for more detail about the validity of the item.
12. *Rashomon*'s major theme is that there is no absolute truth in this world of uncertainty.

4: THE PLACE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD OF POLITICS

1. The degree of difference in local and national election turnouts is somewhat less in European countries such as Norway, with a figure about 10 percent of what is found in the United States (Rokkan and Campbell 1960). Within the United States this difference is found to be least in the South and greatest on the East Coast (De Grazia 1954:172).
2. The question is related to another theory accepted by many authors on Japanese politics, namely, that the voting turnout is higher in rural than in urban areas— for example, see Hoshino (1961:96–104); Kyōgoku and Ike (1959); Mendel (1957); Oka (1958:355); Scalapino and Masumi (1962:109); and Watanuki (1967:188–205). The explanations offered here will, I believe, also be applicable to this aspect of the Japanese voting pattern, which contradicts the findings in the United States.
3. For example, see Ike (1957:278–287); Kyōgoku and Ike (1959); Scalapino and Masumi (1962:121–124); Steiner (1965:375–376); Tsuneishi (1966:159); Ward (1960); and Watanuki (1966). Some of the ideas expressed in this section of the chapter are taken from Kuroda and Kuroda (1968). Furthermore, some of Lucian Pye's seventeen hypotheses about the non-Western political process coincide with the concept of collectivity orientation; one such hypothesis is that politics remains undifferentiated from other social activities (Pye 1958:286–287).
4. Obviously, the reasons for the Southerners' attitude may be different from those of the Japanese.
5. What this means in terms of party politics is that the Liberal-Democratic Party will continue to maintain its strength in rural Japan through "pork-barrel" politics.

6. Those who have paid serious attention to local politics in the past are: Beardsley et al. (1959), Dull (1953), Steiner (1956, 1965), and Totten (1953).
7. This section draws heavily from Isomura and Hoshino (1961:69–73).
8. Hoshino (1961:190).
9. Isomura and Hoshino (1961:220).

5: THE COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

1. For example, Hunter (1953) certainly gives one the impression that important positions in business are both necessary and sufficient for entering into the power structure of Regional City. See also Mills (1956).
2. This man has been gainfully employed from time to time. He was once secretary to a member of the parliament, but he really has no steady occupation. His wife is a physician.
3. Lane (1959:196) states that centrally located residents are more likely to be involved in politics, to engage in more group activities, and to be informed. A similar point is made by others as well (see Milbrath 1965:111–112 and the references listed there).
4. This is not to imply that the large landowners are altogether irrelevant to the study of politics. At least one large landowner, Enoki, is included among the farmer leaders. Enoki was once mayor and still seems to be an important figure in the town, as evidenced by his eight votes in the area of local government in general. He apparently is not very active in the Farmers' Co-op. His activities seem to be more in the area of local government affairs not directly related to his farmer status.
5. At the time of this writing in 1969, he is no longer politically active or influential, owing to poor health.

6. A similar study on the same relationship, using a comparable method, reports a slightly lower but still high correlation coefficient of .68, indicating also the visibility of the power structure in Honolulu, Hawaii (Nosse 1967). The lower correlation in Nosse's study of Honolulu may be attributed to a number of factors, such as the size of the two communities and cultural differences. A most likely reason for the higher correlation in my study is that Reed Town is smaller than Honolulu. Assumed in this reasoning is Honolulu's greater complexity.
7. See Questions IV-47, 48, and 49 in the appendix.
8. This finding coincides with similar findings in the United States (McClosky 1964 and Rosenau 1963).
9. For more details see Kuroda (1965c).
10. A question that arises is why the economic dominants, who, earlier in the chapter, were characterized as being excluded from the core of the decision-making process in Reed Town, also scored uniformly high on political obligation items. A speculation is that those who realize the value of political activities will score uniformly high on the items, regardless of the extent to which they themselves are involved in politics. In fact, this finding suggests the position in which these economic dominants find themselves: they believe that everyone should participate in politics but for one reason or another they themslves do not participate in community politics. They have the economic resources necessary to be successfully involved in politics, and many of them probably would like to participate actively in community politics. In any case, this finding does not conflict with my earlier finding, which characterizes the economic dominants as being relatively powerless in Reed Town politics. My observation is substantiated by the economic dominants' response to one of the political cynicism items, which reads: "A large number of town and county politicians are party hacks." They agreed with this statement more than

did the citizens; the top leaders, naturally, disagreed with it (Table 32). The economic dominants could hardly have agreed with such a statement if they perceived themselves as politicians actively engaged in community politics. The seemingly contradictory finding in the economic dominants' response to political obligation items not only turns out to be not contradictory but also reaffirms my earlier findings.

11. For a detailed report on F Scale analysis of the respondents see Kuroda (1966a).
12. One may wish to keep in mind that all the items but one deal with economic liberalism. The exception is Item 5, which pertains to the problem of a minority group, the *Eta.* For more about this *Eta* question see the conclusion of chapter 6.
13. Among Japanese law students, I found that socialist and communist students are highly civic-minded, feel politically impotent, and hold a cynical view of politics (Kuroda 1967a). For related papers see Agger et al. (1961) and Litt (1963).
14. Key (1961:336–338) reports that socioeconomic characteristics and exposure to mass media relate to the extent of internationalism in the United States. The more a person is exposed to mass media and the higher his socioeconomic status, the more internationally oriented he is.
15. For reports on the peace-war orientation scale see Kuroda (1964c, 1966b).
16. An equivalent in the Judeo-Christian political culture might be: "He who hates Peter harms his dog."
17. See Walton (1966) and the references listed there. Erickson found that his use of the reputational technique to ascertain the power structure of the state of Washington did not produce the economic-power-elite type of power structure Polsby and others discuss (as revealed in a personal conversation I had with him in 1963). An elaboration of this point is necessary, lest I be misunderstood. Although Walton is correct in concluding that "the reputational method tends

to identify pyramidal power structures, while the decision-making approach discovers factional and coalitional power structures," it is also true that fourteen out of the twenty-seven reputational studies Walton examined identified nonpyramidal power structures. This implies that slightly over one-half of the reputational studies produced conclusions similar to those derived from the event-analysis methods. Furthermore, Walton, in his Table 2, shows that twelve out of fourteen event-analysis studies resulted in the identification of nonpyramidal power structures. This, then, suggests that the use of the event-analysis method is more apt to predetermine conclusions than is the use of the reputational method. Thus, it appears that critics of the reputational method base their opinion not on empirical evidence but on some nonempirical base.

6: COMMUNITY-ISSUE ANALYSIS

1. The existence of factionalism within the community leadership system of Reed Town was discussed in chapter 5.
2. It will be interesting to see what has happened by now to this relationship between the leaders and the economic dominants. As mentioned in chapter 5, a major railroad is being laid through Reed Town and its neighboring communities at the time of this writing. Many of the rice fields known for their excellence since the seventh century have given way to railroad tracks.
3. The data for this section are derived from *S Shinbun* (S Journal), 5 December 1959, as well as from interviews with individuals in the town.
4. He became incapacitated in January 1966 as a result of a heart ailment.

7: COMMUNITY POLITICAL CHANGE

1. The sample survey is used as the primary source of data. Inasmuch as the sample is considered to be a good representative of the universe (the registered voters in Reed Town at the time of my survey), I assume that there are no meaningful differences between aggregate data, such as voting turnout records, and my survey data.
2. For a comprehensive inventory of findings on political participation see Lane (1959) and Milbrath (1965).
3. For a detailed discussion of this problem see Kuroda and Kuroda (1968).
4. For a detailed report on newspaper reading and political behavior in Reed Town see Kuroda (1965b). For political party preference in Reed Town see Kuroda (1967c).
5. Some of the ideas appearing in this section are derived from Kuroda (1967b).

8: NATIONAL AND LOCAL POLITICAL CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY

1. Indeed, if the number of PhD dissertations dealing with some aspect of political socialization is used as an indicator of the interest of the younger generation of political scientists in the United States, the study of political socialization can be said to have become popular. There was one dissertation on political socialization completed in 1959 (Greenstein), one in 1961 (Frowman), one in 1962 (Kuroda), four in 1965, and twenty (including those in progress) in 1966. The data source: Dennis (1967).
2. The important role of lawyers in modern political systems has been noted by many, among them Agger (1956), Goldstein (1964), Matthews (1954), and Schlesinger (1957). A majority of the political leaders in the United States are recruited from the legal profession. Several sociologists and

political scientists have also pointed out the significance of law schools, particularly the Tokyo and Kyoto law schools, in the recruitment of political leaders into their positions —see Iyasu (1960); Kuroda (1962); Miyake (1964); and Watanuki (1967). Thus, my earlier study on law students in Japan, as part of a larger study on comparative political socialization in Japan, Turkey, and the United States (Field 1964; Goldstein 1964; and Kuroda 1962), was an attempt to discover variables affecting the decision of elite law-school students to take an active part in national politics.

3. This finding was reported earlier in Kuroda (1965e). Abegglen (1958) and Mannari (1960) report that political leaders are recruited into their positions from a wider segment of Japanese society than are business and intellectual leaders. The 171 political leaders they studied comprised "cabinet members, leaders in the diet, officials of the political parties, and senior members of the civil service," in addition to some trade union leaders. Nineteen percent of the political leaders had fathers who were also government officials. Abegglen and Mannari note some degree of continuity between the presently active political leaders and their fathers. Their data are not quite comparable to the data from my study of law students, which makes it difficult to relate their findings to mine. However, one can say at least that my findings do not contradict theirs.
4. An earlier report indicates that 59 percent are Socialists, 6 percent Communists, and 7 percent Liberal-Democrats, whereas 24 percent have no party preference; for the remaining 4 percent the party affiliation is not ascertainable (Kuroda 1964b).
5. For a detailed report on the law students' party preferences see Kuroda (1964b). For the party choice of Reed Town residents see Kuroda (1967c). For the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of Japanese voting behavior see Miyake et al. (1967).

6. Freeman (1965:249). The reader should be aware that there are printing errors on the page cited. All columns in Table E which list the significance of values for gamma and z are misarranged.
7. For the best description of parties in Japan see Scalapino and Masumi (1962).

9: CONCLUSION

1. The methodological controversy seems to have no end. For a recent argument by a leading proponent of the pluralist school see Polsby (1969).
2. Needless to say, entertaining in restaurants costs money. It is, however, a sad fact that no foundation seems to consider such expenses as a legitimate research expense item. I paid these expenses from my own pocket.
3. Booth and Adrian compared a list of leaders which Smuckler and Belknap (1956) obtained through various information sources with another list of leaders secured in the same community several years later through the use of a variant of the reputational technique (Form and Miller 1960). The Booth-Adrian study yielded results remarkably similar to the original result as indicated by a high correlation of .766 significant at the 0.01 level.
4. Presthus (1964:410–411) offers a hypothesis as follows: "In communities with limited leadership and economic resources the power structure will be more likely to be dominated by political leaders, whereas in those with more fulsome internal resources it will probably be dominated by economic leaders." His hypothesis is applicable to Reed Town, but it is doubtful that such an explanation is applicable to Atlanta, Georgia.
5. See also Kuroda (1964a, 1969a).
6. See Present (1966, 1967).

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